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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to explore the shifting cultural norms of copyright 
law, and that concept’s impact on the performance and practice of artists producing 
original works of authorship. Although related concepts predate it, and today it exists as a 
subset of a broader category known as intellectual property, the purpose of copyright 
beginning with the United States Constitution was to allow for a temporary economic 
monopoly to an author of a fixed creative work. This monopoly was meant to incentivize 
authors to contribute to the public good with works that promote progress in science and 
art. However, increases over time in the scope and duration of copyright terms grant 
broader protections and controls for copyright owners today, while advances in 
technology have provided the public with the potential for near-limitless low-cost access 
to information. This creates a conflict between proprietary interest in creative works and 
the public’s right and ability to access and build on those works. The history of copyright 
law in America is rife with efforts to balance these competing interests. 
The methodology for this study consisted of flexible strategies for collecting and 
analyzing data, primarily elite, semi-structured interviews with professional artists, 
attorneys, and others who engage with the cultural and legal norms of intellectual 
property regimes on a regular basis. Constant comparative analysis was used to maintain 
an emic perspective, prioritizing the subjective experience of individuals interviewed for 
this research project. Additional methods for qualitative analysis were also employed 
here to code and categorize gathered data, including the use of RQDA, a software 
package for Qualitative Data Analysis that runs within the R statistical software program. 
Various patterns and behaviors relevant to intellectual property reforms as they relate to 
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artist practices were discussed in detail following the analysis of findings, in an effort to 
describe how cultural norms of copyright intersect with the creation of original works of 
authorship, and towards the development of the theory that the semiotic sign systems 
subject to intellectual property laws are not themselves forms of real property, as they do 
not meet the categorical requirements of scarce resources. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mass Mediated Communication as a Public Good 
The development of copyright law over the last several centuries is a transition 
from an understanding of the concept as a temporary monopoly privilege granted by 
either a secular or religious authority to a broadly interpreted property right that may, in 
effect, last in perpetuity. That same paradigmatic shift in understanding has also changed 
the perception of copyright as a necessary incentive for authors to create works which 
will in some way benefit society (i.e., “progress in science and the useful arts,”1) to a 
perception that the author’s rights – not privileges – are paramount. Which approach to 
copyright law can be said to result in a better society? A follow-up question must also be 
asked: a better society for whom? 
If the author of any given fixed creative work possesses a monopoly on the sale 
and distribution of that work, then copyright is the conceptual mechanism by which that 
individual holds such a monopoly. This grant of exclusivity is meant to incentivize the 
author to perform the creative labor necessary to fix that work initially. This is true 
whether the fixed creative work in question is a book, visual work of art, or musical 
composition, among numerous other categories. However, once the initial fixed creative 
work has been digitally or otherwise mechanically reproduced and distributed, it is 
irrevocably transformed from a scarce artifact to a public good. 
A good is any material that satisfies human desires, and it is public when, 
according to Tyler Cowen, it possesses two characteristics: nonexcludability and 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 8. 
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nonrivalrous consumption.2 For a good to exhibit nonexcludability, it must be 
prohibitively expensive to exclude those who do not pay for access. In the case of fixed 
creative works, this is demonstrated to be the case by the continued development of 
mediating and network-enabled technology, from the printing press to the modern 
desktop publishing power of an inkjet printer paired with a smartphone or other personal 
computer. Individuals who use these technologies or other means to access a fixed 
creative work but do not pay for access through a legitimate source are known as “free 
riders.” However, if the presence of free riders does not directly change the cost of the 
initial creation and market transactions related to a good, then that good allows for 
nonrivalrous consumption. 
Fixed creative works, once they enter the marketplace and begin to exist in a mass 
mediated context, thus become public goods. From the perspective of a consumer or 
audience member, the downward pressure on prices to access – not costs to produce – 
fixed creative works engendered by mass mediating technologies is beneficial. Artists, 
authors, publishers, and others empowered by the privileges of copyright with regard to a 
given fixed creative work may also view the distributive power of these technologies as 
beneficial. However, authors also rely on the exclusivity granted by copyright law to 
counteract downward pressures on prices that technological factors may set at or near 
zero.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Tyler Cowen, “Public Goods,” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, David R. 
Henderson, ed. (The Library of Economics and Liberty, December 2007). Retrieved June 
18, 2018 from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html. 
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Problem of Interest 
This project seeks to examine the potential ramifications of the evolution of 
copyright law, and its effect on the authors of original creative works and their audiences. 
While a copyright is in effect, its owner has an economic monopoly on that intellectual 
work. As proscribed by the “limited times”3 clause present in the U.S. Constitution, 
though, that monopoly should not last forever. The initial Federal Copyright Act, passed 
in 1790, set the maximum length of statutory protection at 28 years, or two terms of 14 
years. Subsequent copyright laws in America continued to extend these terms, so that 
current terms last for 70 years after the death of the author, or 95 years total in the case of 
copyrights held by corporate entities.4 Copyright terms for fixed creative works today 
may still be described as existing for limited times, but they are, by statute, less limited 
than the lives of the authors of those works. 
An author who owns the copyrights in his or her own fixed creative works may 
thus possess – for a lifetime – a statutory competitive advantage for the economic 
exploitation of those works. In the United States, this lifetime privilege has only been 
inscribed in law since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, although the proper length 
of copyright protection has been debated across cultures for centuries before that. One 
example of this was the debate between rabbinical authorities in Moravia in the 
nineteenth century, who started from the guiding principle that competition should be 
free unless there was some mitigating factor to justify a monopoly – in that case, the 
                                                 
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 8., declaring that Congress shall have the power “To promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
4 U.S. Copyright Office, Duration of Copyright, Circ. 15A (Washington, DC, 2011), 1, 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf. 
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monopoly on the printing of certain religious texts.5 One such mitigating factor to justify 
copyright grants is what these rabbis described as “theft because of the ways of peace.” 
“Theft because of the ways of peace” is a doctrine derived from a Talmudic story 
called “The Case of the Poor Man Who Shakes the Olive Tree.”6  In this tale, a man who 
climbs a tree to knock some olives to the ground is shocked to discover that when he 
climbs back down the tree, another man has taken the dislodged olives. The man who 
climbed the tree may have labored to remove the olives, but he never possessed them, 
and so rabbinical authorities did not describe the second man as a thief. Instead, they 
recognized that such activity can sow discord amongst civilized individuals – dissension, 
fighting, and hatred – and is thus described as “theft because of the ways of peace.”7 
Similarly, individuals and groups who develop original fixed creative works have 
labored to do so, and copyright privileges can reward these authors with the metaphorical 
fruits of their labors. Free riders who might profit from the creative efforts of others are 
prohibited from infringing on copyright protections, even if such infringement might also 
be termed free competition. These types of justifications have helped to expand the 
privileges awarded under copyright law.  
Today’s laws as currently written and enforced grant owners of copyrights 
exclusive privileges for the distribution of fixed creative works, as well as the ability to 
exclude derivative interpretations of those same works. This includes radical 
reinterpretations of fixed creative works – emphasizing potentially sensitive issues like 
drugs, sex and race – that the initial author or copyright owner would not see fit to create 
                                                 
5 Neil Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft: The Jewish Law of Copyright Since the 
Birth of Print (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 175. 
6 Mishnah Gittin 5:8, explicated in Neil Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft, 175. 
7 Ibid. 
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or distribute themselves. This dissertation is an examination of the impact of copyright 
law’s grant of exclusivity on the practice of artists and authors, and how they choose to 
enforce their own copyrights and interact with others’ copyrights.  
 
Study Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine three main concepts – cultural norms, 
legal statutes and case law, and technological innovation – and describe the interactions 
between these concepts with regard to intellectual property regimes both in America and 
in international contexts. One such interaction occurs between the aforementioned 
exclusive benefits that may be conferred through the grant of copyright to authors of 
fixed creative works, and the concurrent limitation on free speech principles as granted 
by the First Amendment.  
 
General Research Question Examined 
At its core, this dissertation seeks to answer this question: How do culture, the 
law, and technology inform the current perception of copyright by creative art 
professionals today? More specifically, is there a sense of continuity between current 
perceptions of copyright as a natural right and the historic perception of copyright as a 
temporary privilege at the time of the initial drafting of the U.S. Constitution? 
In order to better contextualize the proposed general research question, Chapter 2 
of this dissertation provides a brief history of copyright and intellectual property law, 
tracing its development as a regulation on trade and as a means of censorship, to the 
modern understanding of copyright as a guarantee on property to either an author or his 
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or her successors and assigns. Much of this developed gradually, over the course of 
hundreds of years in Western Europe and later in the United States. The primary 
technological innovation to aid in this development was the printing press, which allowed 
for the mechanical act of widespread copying of written materials. 
Technological developments alone, however, cannot account for the evolution of 
the central concept of copyright. Copyright, after all, is not used to incentivize the 
mechanical duplication of existing written material, but instead is meant to champion the 
creation of original works of authorship by the grant of entitlements that allow an author 
or copyright owner exclusive license to sell his or her work. According to researchers like 
Martha Woodmansee, the consideration of some authors as “creating” or otherwise 
developing “original” works, rather than the image of a craftsman following an already-
established set of rules to communicate traditional ideas, is a fairly recent historical 
development.8 
Again, while the development of the modern conceptualization of copyright 
began in Western Europe, the literature review that follows this chapter focuses 
particularly on the American history of copyright law. Primary and secondary source 
documents and relevant court cases are analyzed in order to present the history of 
copyright law in this country, as that national history has the greatest effect on the 
practices of artists working in America today. 
As copyright law has changed and evolved, new and revised statutes have 
influenced the development and distribution of fixed creative works. This dissertation 
                                                 
8 Martha Woodmansee, “On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity,” in The 
Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature, Martha 
Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 16. 
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examines the effects of those changes on the practices of artists and authors. These 
effects are analyzed by this researcher through data collected from a qualitative study 
consisting of elite, semi-structured interviews with professional artists. A brief summary 
of guiding interview questions and the methods employed to gather data for this 
dissertation is presented immediately below, while Chapter 3 describes the methodology 
in greater detail.  
 
Guiding Interview Questions 
Based on the review of literature described in Chapter 2, certain preliminary 
questions for artists guided the initial collection and analysis of qualitative data. These 
questions included: 
1) What incentives currently exist for the artist or author that would not exist in 
the absence of formal copyright law? 
2) How would the artist’s practice be changed by the absence of formal copyright 
law? 
3) What are the artist’s experiences with the enforcement of copyright privileges 
as granted by statute? 
4) How has technology changed the artist’s approach to distribution of fixed 
creative works and other matters relating to copyright? 
Other questions were developed over the course of each interview conducted as a 
result of the dynamic nature of each individual’s responses to these guiding questions. 
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Significance of the Study 
This study adds to the existing literature and understanding on the subject of 
intellectual property regimes. It also contributes to a body of knowledge that serves as a 
reference point for artists, authors, and other creative persons to understand what 
copyright law does and does not enable or incentivize for the creative process. In addition 
to a greater understanding of the legal nature of copyright and other intellectual property 
regimes, the research conducted for this study also contributes to an understanding of the 
technological advancements that inform the cultural perceptions of copyright, and 
furthers the discussion on the potential normative future for intellectual property regimes 
and the creation of fixed works subject to copyright. 
 
Limitations 
This project used a constant comparative qualitative methodology, and was not 
meant to be a large-scale ethnographic study, or one that could encompass all conceivable 
global participants engaged in the creation of creative works subject to copyright laws. 
This project, then, was consequently limited in its applications to the geographic regions 
and locations available to this researcher. Further, even within chosen professional 
settings for data collection in the form of elite interviews, complete samples of all 
professional, semi-professional, and amateur participants within those settings was 
unlikely. 
The professional artists interviewed were not chosen randomly and thus are not 
representative of the larger population. While some statistical data was derived and 
accumulated, basic subjective versus objective arguments can be made and may limit 
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some of this research. The use of a constructivist approach, or one that assumes a shared 
creation of knowledge, helped to reduce this limitation by foregrounding the assumption 
that researcher and participants mutually create an interpretive understanding of the 
ethnographic setting and concepts discussed.9 A constructivist approach informed the use 
of caution and explicit transparency in interviews, as subjects may omit lived details or 
otherwise impose a priori accounts of pattern and order.10  Recordings and reflexive field 
notes were maintained during the data acquisition process, in line with grounded theory, 
so as to better streamline any fieldwork and move it towards theoretical interpretations 
that could more effectively categorize the varied components of current intellectual 
property regimes. Findings as a result of the conducted interviews are presented in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides analysis and discussion of all collected data, for the 
purpose of better contextualizing the numerous competing interpretations of the 
phenomenon of copyright, as well as to communicate a more coherent theory of its 
continued application by authors and publishers of fixed creative works. 
  
                                                 
9 Kathy Charmaz and Richard G. Mitchell, “Grounded Theory in Ethnography,” in 
Handbook of Ethnography, ed. Paul Atkinson, et al. (London: Sage, 2001), 160. 
10 Melvin Pollner and Robert M. Emerson, “Ethnomethodology and Ethnography,” in 
Handbook of Ethnography, ed. Paul Atkinson, et al. (London: Sage, 2001), 119. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
In order to better contextualize the proposed research questions, it is necessary to 
examine the history and categorical development of copyright law over the past several 
hundred years. This literature review discusses the conceptualization of copyright as an 
attendant result of technological innovation, most specifically the mechanical act of 
widespread copying that was first enabled by the printing press. There is also a particular 
focus in this literature review on the American history of copyright legislation, as 
described in primary and secondary source documents and relevant court cases. This will 
help to present the historical highlights of copyright law over the past three centuries. 
While the bulk of this material is presented in chronological order, the narrative will 
occasionally shift to a topical pattern of arrangement in order to more fully explicate 
current concepts of copyright law related to past or future events in the overall timeline. 
This may be most noticeable when attention is given to international conceptualizations 
of copyright, the resultant interactions with the American standard, and the impact of 
same on the current formation of copyright law. 
 
The Printing Press and Free Speech 
Prior to the development and widespread implementation of the printing press in 
the fifteenth century, any copy of a given document or book was necessarily completed 
as a strictly manual, and thus labor-intensive, process. Manual copying was not limited 
by statute, but by literal access to a written work. In this context, the practice of copying a 
11 
 
given fixed work of authorship was presumed to be a boon to society, although the 
idiosyncratic process was subject to “corruption and textual drift.”1 The printing press 
helped to standardize the text of books across multiple editions, as well as to significantly 
reduce the amount of labor necessary to create copies. But the new technology also posed 
a new challenge: while the labor required to set the type for a new edition of a book was 
certainly less than was needed to manually copy one, the process still relied on a 
“significant investment.”2 Publishers – more often referred to at the time as printers – 
desired some assurance that their efforts to bring a new edition of a book to market would 
not be undercut by rival reprints.3  
This led to the development of printing privileges that granted market exclusivity 
to the publisher of a book until the initial investment in printing could be recovered. 
These privileges were decided on a case-by-case basis by either papal, secular, or 
rabbinic authorities. The first of these was granted to a Venetian printer in 1469 by local 
state authorities.4 The system of book privileges was supplemented by book publishing 
cartels in various markets, often sanctioned by local authorities.5 
Sanctions by authorities typically took the form of laws prohibiting or censoring 
works to be published. This was the case with England’s Licensing Order of 1643, which 
required authors to seek license – or what were then called patents – from the government 
before their works could be published. Those without such imprimatur found the free 
                                                 
1 Neil Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft, 19. 
2 Ibid., 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications 
and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe, Volume I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 120. 
5 Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft, 4. 
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expression of their own writing to be a criminal act. John Milton, in his Areopagitica – 
considered by Vincent Blasi to be the “foundational essay of the free speech tradition”6 – 
called for the end of licensure as a requirement for the publication and distribution of 
books or other written materials, for the stated reason that such activity negatively 
impacts the quest for truth.7 
Other authors would follow in Milton’s footsteps, as John Stuart Mill did when he 
argued against censorship practices, so that individuals could be exposed to a variety of 
viewpoints and thus better suited to determine truth.8 For Mill, it was clear that the more 
choices individuals have, the more they could develop what he called mental and moral 
faculties.9 Mill likened these faculties to the human muscular system, and argued they 
were best improved by the introduction of resistance. More specifically, this resistance 
took the form of ideas that some might find cause to license, censor, or otherwise 
prohibit.10  
Free speech principles and their relation to copyright were further developed by 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant. The continental European conception of copyright as a 
natural right was especially influenced by Kant, who argued that an author has a natural 
                                                 
6 Vincent Blasi, “Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment,” Occasional 
Papers, 6 (1995), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsop_papers/6. 
7 John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the 
Parliament of England (London: 1644), 35. The quest for truth itself is seen as a primary 
function of, and justification for, free speech. 
8 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, David Bromwich, ed. (Yale University Press, 
2003)(1859), 31. “No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting 
a legislature, or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe 
opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed 
to hear.” 
9 Ibid., 109. 
10 Ibid., 113. 
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right claim to his work as an autonomous exercise of free will and self-expression.11 
Therefore, any publisher would have a moral duty not to claim an ownership right in an 
author’s work, nor to publish a work without the consent of the author who created it, and 
should instead act only as a legitimate agent for the distribution of that work.12 
Principles of free speech did have some bearing on the passage of laws related to 
copyright, especially as the concept of a free press was developed in the American 
colonies and early republic. However, as will be shown in the next section, the earliest 
specific copyright statutes were more concerned with economic considerations than free 
speech. 
 
The Statute of Anne   
A century and a half after the publication of Areopagitica, modern copyright 
statutes began to make explicit the rights of an author to express himself. More 
concretely, however, they would grant publishers some market exclusivity for the 
publication of those expressions. Statutory copyright was born in the early eighteenth 
century with the passage of the Statute of Anne in Great Britain. Depending on how 
copyright is defined, the Statute of Anne may technically be considered the sixth or 
seventh copyright statute in England, although the prior versions were more directly acts 
                                                 
11 Immanuel Kant, “von der Unrechtmassigkeit des Buchernachdruckes,” in Immanuel 
Kants Werke, edited by Ernst Cassirer, 213-16 (1913). See also Neil Netanel, Copyright’s 
Paradox (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 53 (describing Kant’s stance that 
publishers and printers should not “obtain title to the author’s work”). 
12 Immanuel Kant, “On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books,” in 
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 29-35. 
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of censorship, including the various decrees of the Star Chamber.13 The Statute of Anne 
was the first statute to provide copyright protections – and not just printing prohibitions – 
by the government instead of by private parties. Enacted by Parliament in 1710, its full 
title was “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of printed 
Books in the Authors or Purchasors [sic] of such Copies during the Times therein 
mentioned.”14 
The statute was originally passed in part due to political efforts by the Stationer’s 
Company, a trade guild that had for more than a century enjoyed a near-monopoly on the 
publication of books in England.15 Royal entitlements and the power of the Stationer’s 
Company to grant copyrights that lasted in perpetuity also concentrated this power even 
more.16 But by the end of the seventeenth century, the Crown had ended prepublication 
licensing requirements, hobbling the power of the guild.17 
Members of the book trade, as represented by the Stationer’s Company, believed 
it was important to offer some form of exclusive rights in expressive works. They argued 
that exclusive printing privileges were justified, because without any kind of financial 
incentive, the literary world would remain stagnant. Authors would fear that others, 
primarily publishers but also the public at large, would reap the benefits of their 
intellectual labor by freely copying authors’ works.18 As the preamble to the Statute of 
                                                 
13 Lyman Ray Patterson, “The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued,” Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 3 (1965): 227. 
14 Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710). 
15 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations 
Without a Theme,” Houston Law Review 47, no. 4 (2010): 969. 
16 Peter W.M. Blayney, The Stationers’ Company and the Printers of London 1501-1557 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
17 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny,” 970. 
18 Ibid., 974. 
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Anne asserted,  
Printers Booksellers and other Persons have of late frequently taken the Liberty of 
printing, reprinting and publishing, or causing to be printed reprinted or published 
Books and other Writings without the consent of the Authors or Proprietors of 
such Books and Writings to their very great Detriment and too often to the Ruin 
of them and their Families...19 
 
In an age long before digital distribution, the high cost of printing, binding, and 
disseminating fixed creative works led to a concentration of those capabilities in the 
hands of a few publishers, and the Stationer’s Company copyright was the only one that 
existed in England up to 1709.20 With the passage of the Statute of Anne, royal 
entitlements and prior acts of censorship that had allowed the Stationer’s Company 
monopoly were supplanted by a law that allowed any author or printer, not just those who 
belonged to the guild, to register a copyright.21 The guild, then, would be granted terms 
of protection of up to 21 years from publication, but so would everyone else who secured 
a copyright.22 Even though the monopoly privilege of the Stationer's Company was 
lessened by the passage of the Statute of Anne, that law’s version of copyright was based 
on the one developed by the guild, and so continued to favor the rights and privileges of 
publishers over authors.23  
The Statute of Anne also had the stated purpose of promoting learning, and its 
guarantee of “vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasors” allowed 
those who purchased a text to reprint the work freely following the stated period of 
                                                 
19 Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710). 
20 Lyman Ray Patterson, “The Statute of Anne,” 225. 
21 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny,” 974. 
22 Lyman Ray Patterson, “The Statute of Anne,” 225. 
23 Ibid., 225-226. 
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entitlement.24 Again, however, during that period of entitlement the Statute served more 
practically as a form of trade regulation to break the monopoly of the Stationer’s 
Company for printing and selling books.  
By providing coverage that was narrow (owners were protected only 
against unconsented wholesale reproduction of books) and of brief 
duration, proprietors would get enough protection to make the publishing 
business attractive but not so much that they could damage the public 
welfare through sustained high prices or lengthy periods of control.25  
 
Such lengthy periods of control are also products of American copyright legislation, 
although it took several hundred years to get to that point. 
The development of the printing press, principles of free speech, and early 
copyright legislation such as the Statute of Anne all served as prelude to the American 
colonial perception of copyright. The next section of this literature review describes how 
this perception influenced the founding fathers to include a constitutional clause 
concerning copyright at the dawn of the American nation. 
 
 
Early American Conceptions of Copyright 
According to some American jurists, the only valid way to interpret the U.S. 
Constitution is through the intentions of its Framers. From this perspective, according to 
one of those jurists, Robert Bork, judges should seek “enlightenment from the structure 
of the document and the government it created.”26 For some, those intentions are 
appropriately deduced contextually, as the words of the Constitution itself may not 
account for the dynamic changes in cultural norms over time. According to U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
24 Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft, 24. 
25 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “The Statute of Anne,” 974. 
26 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New 
York: Free Press, 1990), 165. 
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Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: 
Provisions of the Constitution of the United States are not mathematical formulas 
having their essence in their form, but are organic living institutions transplanted 
from English soil. Their significance is not to be gathered simply from the words 
and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.27 
 
Alternatively, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia offered a more precise method 
of constitutional interpretation with textualism, wherein a text “is construed reasonably, 
to contain all that it fairly means,” but legislative intent absent of textual support must not 
be used as a basis for judicial authority.28 In either case, the balance between any 
government’s textual – or contextual – claims to authority, and the subsequent limitations 
placed on individuals, must be considered in relation to the natural rights reserved by 
those individuals.  
Here, this researcher uses the term “natural right” to refer to any principle of 
freedom which does not require any legal structure to enable or enforce it, and is self-
evident to the individual.29 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution had some experience 
with governments that would infringe on one such natural right, freedom of speech. The 
Framers, then, were careful to limit the powers of the new American federal government 
to endanger that right. Thomas Jefferson sought to strike a balance between the legalism 
                                                 
27 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 605 (1914). 
28 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 23. 
29 See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953), in which the author argues for the existence of objective ethical rights and wrongs 
as a foundation for philosophy and law; also John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34, for discussion of “pre-moral 
principles of practical reasonableness,” or the personal inclinations of humans 
(specifically the practice of speech itself) that are precursors to shared understandings of 
natural rights. 
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of England and the rationalism of France in the development of early American law.30 
Within this context, this would secure the rights of American citizens to express 
themselves, while also providing a temporary monopoly to print and sell one’s own 
intellectual and creative endeavors. 
Other Framers, including James Madison, were hesitant to allow for a state-
granted monopoly of any scope or duration, including monopolies of copyright. Madison 
was perhaps most clear on this point in an essay published posthumously: 
Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with caution, and 
guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of the United States has 
limited them to two cases - the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both 
which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the 
community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold 
from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these 
cases; but it ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient 
recompense and encouragement may be given...Perpetual monopolies of every 
sort are forbidden not only by the Genius of free Governments, but by the 
imperfection of human foresight.31 
 
However, both Madison and Jefferson could accept the argument for an incentive such as 
copyright as a means to ultimately enrich America and its people with a literary canon.32 
Both men were likely influenced by Thomas Paine, who argued at the time for “sufficient 
laws...to prevent degradation of literary property.”33 Paine’s writings were given to 
Madison and other members of a committee of the Continental Congress in 1783, four 
                                                 
30 Fred Siebert et al., Four Theories of the Press; the Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social 
Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 46. 
31 James Madison, “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” Harper’s Monthly 
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32 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), retrieved from 
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years before the Constitution was created.34 
The copyright clause in the U.S. Constitution35 is nearly identical to the language 
of Britain’s Statute of Anne. By granting the exclusive privilege of duplication and 
distribution in the marketplace to the authors of original works, the copyright clause 
intended to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”36 Thus, the public good 
was the primary motivation for copyright legislation, and the grant of a temporary 
economic monopoly a means to incentivize publication of new works that would further 
such good. The founders, however, did not necessarily believe that the goal of progress 
for society as a whole was incompatible with incentives of exclusivity made for authors. 
As Madison wrote, “The Public good fully coincides...with the claims of individuals.”37 
Jefferson made a similar point in a letter from 1813: “Society may give exclusive right to 
the profits arising from [intellectual property], as an encouragement to men to pursue 
ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done...without claim or 
complaint from anybody.”38  
Since the nation’s beginning, then, the American government has endorsed the 
practice of granting a copyright, or the exclusive privilege of duplication and distribution 
in the marketplace, so as to advance the public good through progress in science and art. 
This is an incentive paradigm that recognizes the concept of a copyright as a monopoly, 
                                                 
34 Justin Hughes, “Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, 
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35 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 8. 
36 Ibid. 
37 James Madison, Federalist, No. 43 (Jan. 23, 1788), in The Federalist Papers (Black 
and White Publications, 2015), 134. 
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however temporary (as made clear by the “limited times” clause).39 Some scholars have 
stated that the primary purpose of copyright is a protection for authors against those who 
would steal their work.40 However, while this belief may influence how copyright is 
understood by authors, publishers, and audiences today, it is, again, not the original stated 
legal purpose present in the Constitution.  
Based on the language in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the founding fathers 
intended to champion the theory of public benefit from intellectual works by means of 
incentivizing authors to publish their writings and discoveries with the grant of 
copyright.41 Even into the twentieth century, Supreme Court decisions would foreground 
the importance of public benefit, as in the case of Mazer v. Stein,42 wherein Justice Reed 
delivered the opinion of the Court that, “The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that it is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’”43 The Framers enacted the compromise of economic monopolies on 
original fixed creative works granted to authors for a limited time, so as to advance public 
knowledge. 
After drafting the Constitution and its copyright provision, the Congress of the 
                                                 
39 The limited times clause becomes more important in recent years due to changes in 
copyright legislation. Laws like the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) 
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new American federal government passed its first official Copyright Act in 1790.44 
Rather than the dictatorial fiat of prior English law, this act positioned copyright as a 
privilege which may be sought, but which would not serve as a limitation or restriction on 
printing in general. Only a small percentage of published authors sought copyrights, 
which required depositing several copies with the appropriate authorities, including the 
Secretary of State, and the announcement of the copyrighted publication in newspapers.45 
In contrast to the copyright laws in effect today, the 1790 Act was also quite narrow in its 
proprietary grants to authors. For example, the 1790 Act allowed for the free creation of 
derivative works, as well as the public display or performance of works under 
copyright.46 This initial Federal Copyright Act also did not apply to foreign works, as 
section five explicitly permitted the free reprinting of works published and copyrighted 
by those who were not Americans: 
That nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or 
vending, reprinting, or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, 
book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the 
United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United 
States.47  
 
Americans were thus free to copy and distribute the literary works of Britain and other 
nations without remunerating the authors. 
The duration of copyright as granted by the 1790 Act, and even as granted by 
subsequent copyright laws of the next century, was also more limited compared to today. 
                                                 
44 “An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and 
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Initial copyright terms were for 14 years with the option to renew for another 14-year 
term. Up to the passage of the 1976 Act, total term protection never exceeded 56 years. 
These limitations in duration, in accordance with the Constitution, as well as the limited 
proprietary rights granted by copyright itself, all reinforced the stated purpose of 
copyright as a means to enrich society by temporarily incentivizing authors to create and 
publish new works. Again, the early American conception of copyright was to view it not 
as a natural right, as the act of self-expression or speech itself was understood. Instead, it 
was a means by which the government could encourage authors to share their fixed forms 
of self-expression so that all members of society could learn from them. This is also 
referred to as an instrumental rights model, since it recognizes the use of copyright 
privileges to improve the public or common good.48 
 
 
Wheaton v. Peters and Copyright as a Temporary Grant 
In the decades following the 1790 passage of America’s first federal copyright 
law, legislators and the courts continued to seek balance between incentivizing authors 
and limiting monopolies. This was accomplished in part by court decisions that still have 
some bearing on copyright norms today. In Folsom v. Marsh,49 for example, Justice 
Joseph Story, in making a determination about what constituted an appropriate and legal 
use of existing written materials as opposed to illegal piracy of those materials, set forth a 
four-factor test that was later codified into law as the fair use doctrine.50 
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Wheaton v. Peters51 is another important case in analyzing the development of 
copyright law. The ruling solidified the treatment of copyright as a statutory protection, 
and not a natural right or product of common law.52 The case originated when Richard 
Peters and Henry Wheaton disagreed over the right to publish the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Peters succeeded Wheaton as reporter for the U.S. Supreme Court in 
June 1828. Peters planned to publish, or more accurately re-publish, court decisions that 
were reported by his predecessors, including Wheaton.53 Wheaton and his publisher filed 
a claim in the Pennsylvania Circuit Court against Peters and his own publisher, seeking 
an injunction to stop Peters. Judge Joseph Hopkinson ruled that because Wheaton had not 
secured statutory protection for his previous publishing of court decisions, he was not 
entitled to government protection now.54 
The ruling was appealed, and the Supreme Court decided in January 1834 that 
opinions of the Court could not be copyrighted. Justice John McLean, in delivering the 
majority opinion, stated, “It may be proper to remark, that the Court is unanimously of 
opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered 
by this Court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”55 
The majority held that there was no common law copyright at the federal level, or at the 
state level (Pennsylvania), or even in England.56 The Court also held that requirements 
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for securing copyright under the Copyright Act were mandatory and must be strictly 
followed to ensure statutory protection.57  
The Court was clear: no common law interest for copyright existed. It was a 
privilege that must be sought, and even then, the government could deny claims for 
copyright in existing materials that were sought as a means to control and limit society’s 
access to information. Dissenting opinions stressed that an author has natural rights that 
automatically protect his property as a matter of justice, equality, and appeals to 
presumed tradition.58 So the premises of the majority and dissenters were at polar 
opposites, with the majority emphasizing the interest of the public, and the dissenters that 
of the individual author. In the end, copyright was defined as a statutory grant of a 
monopoly for the benefit of the author, and not a product of common law, or a natural 
right.59  
This case solidified the stance that copyright in America was meant to favor the 
public domain and the public’s right to access over the author’s interests. The interests of 
the author were not excluded entirely, though, and were mentioned explicitly by Justice 
McLean in the ruling:  
That an author at common law has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain 
redress against anyone who deprives him of it or by obtaining a copy endeavors to 
realize a profit by its publication cannot be doubted, but this is a very different 
right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future 
                                                                                                                                                 
common law of Pennsylvania”), and 657 (“...since the statute of 8 Anne, the literary 
property of an author in his works can only be asserted under the statute [in England]”). 
57 Ibid., 593 (“All the conditions [to secure a copyright] are important; the law requires 
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publication of the work after the author shall have published it to the world.60  
 
Independent of the ruling, authors were already protected from the unauthorized 
publication of an unpublished manuscript, which is more a privacy right than a copyright 
issue.61,62 
The Court also referred directly to a decision in England’s House of Lords in 
1774 as the ruling precedent, that of Donaldson v. Becket.63 There, the issue of whether a 
perpetual common law right in the creation of fixed works existed was famously debated. 
If that right did exist, reasoned England’s then-Attorney General Edward Thurlow, any 
copyright legislation that enacted term limits on copyright would be an infringement on 
the natural rights of the author to control their work in perpetuity.64 The court ruled 
against such common-law protections, affirming that any protections granted to the 
author – and the enforcement of such protections – must rely on the relevant statutes as 
written, and not the moral claims of a plaintiff.65 
Again, the Supreme Court in 1834 ruled in a similar manner, declaring that by the 
statute of 1790, Congress did not affirm an existing (or natural) right, but created a right 
through legal entitlement. To rule otherwise would have opened the door for a perpetual 
copyright, which the Court saw as something to be limited in the interests of society, just 
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as monopolies must be limited.66 Additionally, Justice McLean questioned how some 
privileges granted by copyright could even be truthfully described as rights: 
A book is valuable on account of the matter it contains, the ideas it communicates, 
the instruction or entertainment it affords. Does the author hold a perpetual 
property in these? Is there an implied contract by every purchaser of his book that 
he may realize whatever instruction or entertainment which the reading of it shall 
give, but shall not write out or print its contents?67 
 
This query from Justice McLean perhaps best summarizes the reasoning behind any 
argument that copyright cannot exist as a natural right independent of statute. The ruling 
“established as a bedrock principle of American copyright law that copyright is a creature 
of statute and not a product of the common law.”68 
 
 
Copyright in New Territories and New Media 
A conspicuous absence in the 1790 Copyright Act – and one which would remain 
absent for the next century – was the lack of consideration for copyright protection for 
foreign works.69 Throughout the nineteenth century, American politicians and publishers 
offered several justifications for that absence. President James Buchanan, for example, 
was opposed to an international treaty for copyright, stating, “But to live in fame was as 
great a stimulus to authors as pecuniary gain; and the question ought to be considered, 
whether [British authors] would not lose as much of fame by the measure asked for, as 
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they would gain in money.”70 The implication was clear: American authors who sought 
statutory protection would receive it, but foreigners must settle for being known by the 
American public. 
Other prominent opponents of international copyright, such as American author 
and publisher P.H. Nicklin, made the argument that British books were more expensive 
than the unlicensed versions printed in America, and thus an unfair financial burden 
would be placed on American citizens, especially during a period – 1837 to 1843 – when 
America’s economy was in the midst of a depression.71 Nicklin described the “immense 
amount of capital” that was necessary to publish a book, and how a change in the laws to 
acknowledge foreign copyright would have catastrophic effects on the American 
publishing industry’s ability to make a profit.72 Nicklin also reiterated President 
Buchanan’s stance that foreign authors might benefit from the increased fame that came 
with a wider audience. For British authors in particular, he wrote, “their American fame 
is echoed back across the ocean, and increases the value of their copyrights at home.”73 
On the other side of the debate, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky led a select 
committee, and repeatedly introduced bills to Congress to secure copyright protections 
for foreign works. Clay wanted an international copyright agreement, and introduced 
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three different copyright bills between 1838 and 1842 that would include an Anglo-
American copyright agreement. None of them received congressional support. Popular 
British authors of the period, including Charles Dickens, also argued for increased 
proprietary protection and control of their works in U.S. markets. Dickens even toured 
the United States in 1842 to champion his cause.74 While some derided Dickens for being 
insensitive to the economic plight of Americans during the depression then, Senator Clay 
remarked that American publishers of foreign works were disingenuous about the costs of 
remunerating Dickens and other popular British authors: “[The book printers] bring 
forward highly exaggerated statements both of the extent of Capital employed and the 
ruin that would be inflicted by the proposed provision for Foreign authors.”75 
Yet even if these reports were not exaggerated, it should be noted that British and 
other foreign publishers would face similar costs in printing as those incurred by 
American publishers like Nicklin. In describing the challenges of the publishing business 
in nineteenth century London, one historian noted that “a publisher, to achieve success, 
needed charm, financial acumen, fore-knowledge of the future, a stony heart, and a very 
rich wife.”76 Most American legislators, however, did not see fit to enact protections for 
foreign publishers through the next revision of the Copyright Act in 1870. 
The Copyright Act of 187077 made one major change to existing law: the 
Librarian of Congress was made the official copyright officer. Two copies of any fixed 
work seeking a copyright were required to be filed with the Librarian no later than ten 
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days after publication in order to secure statutory protection. This Copyright Act still 
allowed for the free publication of foreign works. That changed in 1891, thanks in part to 
efforts by the Authors’ Copyright League, a collective of popular writers who spoke 
before Congress and otherwise petitioned for an Anglo-American copyright agreement.78 
These efforts eventually led to the 1891 International Copyright Treaty, which recognized 
copyrights of foreign works for the first time in America.79 By that time, American 
authors and publishers had their own concerns about the strength of American copyright 
abroad, and several European nations were prepared to “extend reciprocal protection to 
the productions of Americans.”80 
Like Charles Dickens, other popular authors continued to petition the U.S. 
government for additional copyright terms and related entitlements, foremost among 
them Samuel Clemens.81 Speaking before Congress in 1906, Clemens – more popularly 
known as Mark Twain, and wearing the cream-colored suit with which he is still most 
associated – argued for longer terms of copyright protection for authors, at a time when 
maximum protection lasted up to 42 years.82 Many decades before such a change would 
actually be included in a statute, Clemens sought copyright terms that would last for the 
lifetime of the author plus fifty years. Under the system then, once the author dies, 
according to Clemens, “his children starve.”83 The author, however, did not argue for a 
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perpetual copyright. “Let the grandchildren take care of themselves. That would take care 
of my daughters, and after that I am not particular.”84 
Although the copyright bill that Clemens championed was not signed into law, 
authors and other interested parties continued to petition Congress for longer copyright 
terms and greater protections, so that the relevant statutes updated in 1909 included some 
of those provisions. The disparate interests of so many parties, including authors and 
publishers, meant that more than 200 copyright bills had been introduced in Congress by 
1904. The Register of Copyrights responded, “The [copyright] laws as they stand fail to 
give the protection required, are difficult of interpretation, application, and 
administration, leading to misapprehension and misunderstanding, and in some directions 
are open to abuses.”85 Thus, with the 1909 Copyright Act,86 changes were made to the 
requirements to secure a copyright in order to ease the burden on government, which 
continued to see progressively more works seeking legal protection. 
The Copyright Act of 190987 established a twenty-eight year term with a like 
renewal term, for a total fifty-six year term limit on copyright. This act also expanded the 
scope of the statutory protections and limited monopolies provided by law, granting 
copyright holders the exclusive right to publish or republish, translate, adapt, or perform 
intellectual works. The Copyright Act of 1909 still required affirmative notice on the part 
of the author to gain statutory protection, but it was no longer necessary to register a copy 
of the work with the Copyright Office. The same protections could now be sought merely 
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by the act of affixing in some way to the work itself a small, circled “C” – © – the 
copyright symbol.88 
This version of the copyright law also continued the trend of repudiating 
copyright itself as a product of common law. This was important for emphasizing that 
rights of property in literary or artistic works were granted by statute, and not assumed to 
be natural or perpetual in their character.89 An earlier form of the bill included a clause, 
“that subject to the limitations and conditions of this Act copyright secured hereunder 
shall be entitled to all the rights and remedies which would be accorded to any other 
species of property at common law,”90 but this was not enacted in the law itself. 
However, the author of a copyright-eligible work was still able to seek damages by civil 
action from any unauthorized publisher of a private work.91  
The scope of copyright and the types of works to which it could be applied also 
increased with the 1909 Copyright Act. From initial protections for books, charts, and 
maps in the eighteenth century, copyright could now also be applied to pictorial 
reproductions, sheet music, advertisements, merchandise, and new mediums such as 
film.92 Still, facts and ideas themselves could not be copyrighted, and the courts set a 
minimum threshold for originality as a precondition for a work to be copyrighted. All 
work that met this threshold, though, would be eligible for copyright, independent of the 
perceived merits of the work itself. 
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The expansion of copyright’s potential scope – and the need for neutrality in 
judging a work’s value or merits – was illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing.93 In that case, Justice Holmes stated that the Court 
and the law must remain value neutral and not judge the merits of a particular work 
because of the potential risk that even an educated judge may not anticipate the true 
worth of a given work as determined by the marketplace and society as a whole.94 
As a slight temporal tangent, it has also since been established that no work would 
be deemed original, and thus granted copyright protection, merely because of the “sweat 
of the brow,”95 or the effort it took to complete. This was not made explicitly clear, 
however, until nearly a century following the Bleistein decision, in Feist v. Rural 
Telephone Service.96 Here, the Court reinforced the principle that copyrights could not be 
secured in databases or other collections of information that do not meet the minimum 
threshold for originality.97 
The overarching trend of copyright throughout the nineteenth century – and 
entering the twentieth – was an expansion of entitlements, in term length, territorial 
scope, and types of creative expressions included. Courts in both America and Great 
Britain had determined that copyright was not a product of common law. Thus, all of 
these expansions, petitioned for by interested parties, had to be explicitly provided by 
statute. As the next section of this literature review will describe, laws drafted in the 
twentieth century continued these expansions, as well as firmly incorporating into statute 
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the philosophical position that copyright is indeed a natural right. 
 
WIPO and Copyright as a Natural Right 
This dissertation seeks in part to analyze the development of the ideological 
conflation of intellectual property (i.e., ideas) as a subset of real property, and the 
resultant justification for the continued increase in scope and duration for copyright law 
in America. In part, this conflation originated within the trend towards globalization and 
internationally shared principles of copyright that were codified in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and motivated in large part by the aims of corporations to use 
trade agreements as a means to control ownership of works subject to copyright law, 
according to Debora Halbert.98 Although these are described as internationally shared 
principles, Susan Sell argues that much of this trend of globalization can be traced most 
directly to the laws and trade agreements initiated by the United States government and 
American corporate interests,99 including the efforts of Henry Clay and the Chace Act. 
However, as evidenced by the Berne Convention  and the United Nations’ creation of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967,100 the trend of global 
agreements for copyright was not limited in appeal to only American corporations. 
The World Intellectual Property Organization is most notable for first 
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popularizing and defining explicitly the term “intellectual property.”101 Prior to the use of 
the term “intellectual property,” others had seen cause to refer to creative expressions and 
fixed works specifically as property for several hundred years prior, most often as 
“literary property.” For example, eighteenth century English judge William Blackstone 
“analogized ideas, thoughts, and opinions with tangible objects to which title may be 
taken.”102 In his own words, Blackstone asserted that an individual who creates an 
original work should have rights not just in the fixed expression, but also in that work’s 
“style” and “sentiments.”103 Literary property thus gave way to intellectual property. 
As the United States Congress began to develop the 1976 Copyright Act, it would 
in turn use both Blackstone’s and WIPO’s sentiments regarding copyright to draft 
legislation that would include the right to exclude others from not only literal copying, 
but the creation of works deemed to be derivative of the original. Before discussing that 
statute and its ongoing impact on public perception of copyright today, it is necessary to 
mention the incompatibility of simultaneously acknowledging property rights in both 
chattel and ideas. 
Chattel and other real property, by their very definitions, are finite resources. 
Were they not finite, there would be no legitimate need to determine ownership, as 
anyone who wished to exploit an infinite resource would be free, by nature, to do so. 
Ideas, and even the concrete expression of those ideas, either verbally or in writing, are 
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among those categories of infinite resources, a fact remarked upon by Thomas Jefferson: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive 
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual 
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot 
dispossess himself of it.104 
 
However, just because there is no legitimate cause to claim ownership in an infinite 
resource does not mean there is absolutely no cause. One reason to determine ownership 
over infinite resources is as a means of proprietary control, or the implementation of a 
monopoly – that is, a controlling party holding exclusive title to the reproduction of ideas 
set forth in a fixed form, e.g., the copyright of a book. Whether such a monopoly is in 
effect, forms of intellectual property, such as creative works under copyright, exist as 
what Laura Biron refers to as “multiply realisable” types.105 These types can exist in 
more than one place simultaneously, and new instances, or tokens, of a single type 
(“distinct, physical things,” such as books) are not limited by the types themselves.106 
American courts have understood this philosophical divide between real property 
and intellectual property with varying degrees of success. Although not a perfect system, 
one of the ways that books are guaranteed a second life even when out of print is the first 
sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine was established in Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,107 
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court decided that, “[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article, 
without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a 
book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he 
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could not publish a new edition of it.”108 At least for printed works, then, this doctrine 
aids in the spread of culture and access to creative works, and the limited monopoly of 
copyright does not grant the owner absolute control over pricing and dissemination of a 
work.109 In more recent years, the Supreme Court has held that the first sale doctrine 
allows the purchaser of a legitimate copy of a published work to sell or dispose of that 
copy as he wishes, even if the copy was lawfully printed in a foreign territory.110 
In contrast to printed works, however, modern technology and digital distribution 
complicate the norms established by the first sale doctrine. As professor of law Thomas 
Dreier points out in regards to the modern consumption of tokens of works under 
copyright, “digital technology turns the end user into a producer of the copy that he or 
she consumes.”111 This means that end users, through mediums like networked personal 
computers, must always produce the copy of a fixed work that they read or view. Under 
current copyright law, this is recognized as the essential step defense, or that “it is not an 
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the 
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided that such a new 
copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer 
program.”112 However, there is no guarantee in every case that such a copy is legitimate, 
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as would typically have been presumed when technological barriers to literal copying 
were primarily limited to “commercial producers of copies.”113 This has also shifted the 
onus of potential copyright infringement from traditional publishers to those end users 
who access and copy digital versions of fixed creative works. 
Dreier also describes how copying fixed works is made easier by digital 
technologies, but that “technological protection measures...are capable of restricting or 
blocking access to, and use of, copyright[ed] material.”114 Others, such as Sherwin Siy, 
the VP for legal affairs for the Public Knowledge group, have extrapolated from similar 
ideas regarding technological controls to “imagine a system where you can pay one 
amount to read a book...another amount to search the text, another amount to be able to 
cut and paste.... Such a system seems at best tedious and at worst dystopian, but it’s 
within the realm of technological possibility.”115 While this outcome is positioned as 
dystopian by Siy, such control might be favored by proponents of a moral rights doctrine 
regarding copyright. 
A doctrine of moral rights, from the French droit moral, has been suggested by 
numerous parties, including European governments, the WIPO, and even some American 
trade organizations, including the Graphic Artists’ Guild. That guild describes the 
following four rights implied by the concept:116 
1) An artist has the right to prevent modification or distortion of the initial fixed 
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creative work. 
2) An artist has the right to be properly attributed as the author of his or her creative 
work. 
3) An artist reserves the right to reveal or disclose his or her creative work to the 
public. 
4) An artist has the right to recall, destroy, or disavow his or her own creative work 
at any time.  
Thus, there is some conflict between the first sale doctrine and moral rights 
doctrine, centering on the just amount of proprietary control that should be afforded an 
author in his or her works. This amount of control is further complicated by whether it is 
afforded both in type and token, as well as sentiment and expression, and also what is 
enabled or constrained by technology. The debate regarding controls through copyright 
has been ongoing for more than a century. Allen Ripley Foote described, in the 1890s, the 
necessity of copyright laws as a matter of justice in securing rights for authors in their 
discoveries.117 Foote also noted that such control should not be interminable, as “by that 
order of nature which sets a limit to the life of the body, the results of those who once 
lived...become the common heritage of all the living. The dead cannot own property.”118 
Absolute and interminable control of intellectual property is incompatible with the stated 
aims of copyright, which again is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts 
by incentivizing authors to share their works and discoveries with society at large.119 
The first sale doctrine is one way the courts have attempted to balance the rights 
                                                 
117 Allen Ripley Foote, The Right To Property in an Idea (Philadelphia, PA: Franklin 
Institute, 1898), 4. 
118 Ibid., 5. 
119 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
39 
 
of authors and audiences with regard to copyright, and to draw a clear legal distinction 
between types, which may not be reproduced without permission; and tokens, which may 
be treated as chattel without license. As the next section will show, however, the 
argument for copyright as a natural or moral imperative, coupled with broader 
interpretations of whom or what may be legally considered an author, continues the trend 
of increased proprietary control. With regard to copyright, the most prominent of these 
controls is the right to exclude other illegitimate copies of a given work from the 
marketplace. Language in the 1976 Copyright Act extends this right of exclusion to 
works derived from or substantially similar to works under copyright. This is an 
expansion of prior protections only against mechanical reproductions. This trend also 
continues to necessitate the creation of exceptions to such control, foremost among them 
fair use. The next section, then, examines how the 1976 Copyright Act has increased 
proprietary control for intellectual or literary property, as well as the moral justifications 
made for increases in control and even extensions of copyright terms long past the life of 
the author.   
 
 
The 1976 Copyright Act 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the natural or moral rights arguments 
regarding intellectual property (IP) as advanced by WIPO were further legitimized in the 
United States through its participation in international conventions and treaties such as 
the Berne Convention.120 The Berne Convention is the oldest international copyright 
treaty, created in Switzerland in 1886. It “requires signatories to recognize the copyright 
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of authors from other member countries,” which some argue guarantees both economic 
and moral protection for authors across borders.121 
The Berne Convention also requires signatories to eliminate registration 
requirements for securing a copyright. This same policy was not completely enacted in 
America until the Copyright Office ended the requirement to affix a copyright notice to a 
new creative work in order to gain protection.122 This occured in 1989, the year the 
United States acceded to the Berne Convention.123 Prior to that, the United States ended 
requirements to register a work with the Copyright Office to gain protection with the 
1976 Copyright Act, in part to ease the burden on the U.S. Copyright Office, which 
continues to see increasingly more authors seeking copyrights through registration, with 
more than 600,000 registrations per annum in recent years.124 Registration still affords 
potential copyright owners certain advantages over those who do not register a work, 
such as establishing prima facie evidence for the validity of a copyright and the ability to 
sue for infringement.125 
The 1976 Copyright Act,126 still in effect today, offers owners of copyrights five 
broad privileges, including the right to copy, distribute, display, perform, or develop 
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derivative works from the original work in question.127 The last privilege, “the exclusive 
right…to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,”128 is an entitlement 
that presumably limits how future authors may respond to, and critically examine, a work 
under copyright.129 Additionally, this act extended terms to more than a century, and 
helped to advance the natural rights argument with language that positions these 
privileges as rights.  
The 1976 Act also grants protections to the owner of a copyright, which may not 
always be the initial author of a fixed work. An author who creates fixed works “within 
the scope of his or her employment,” and who contributes to a collective work like a film 
or instructional text, has created a work made for hire under the law, and the copyright 
rests with the employer, most often a corporation rather than individual.130 Some 
researchers have noted the internal inconsistencies in the law about how collective works 
are defined as pre-existing materials, yet the work for hire provisions of the law 
recognize that materials for a collective work may be newly commissioned and 
created.131 
Artists who relinquish their rights in the works they create demonstrate that such 
rights are not inalienable. This phenomenon calls into question the description of such 
statutory terms as rights, and for some parties is even positioned as morally dubious at 
                                                 
127 Ibid., § 106. 
128 Ibid., § 106 (2) 
129 See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: 
Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 6 
(describing how existing legal structures potentially impede “interpretative appropriation 
[of intellectual property] in the service of other interests and alternative agendas”). 
130 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
131 David S. Nimmer, Peter S. Menell, and Diane McGimsey, “Preexisting Confusion in 
Copyright's Work-for-hire Doctrine,” Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 50, 
no. 1-4 (2003): 423. 
42 
 
best. The Graphic Artists’ Guild, for example, is opposed to work for hire practices on 
the grounds that “it strips the artist of the moral right of paternity,” or being recognized as 
the author of a given work.132 The possibility that an author may divest themselves of 
their right of paternity is further impacted by changes in copyright terms under the 1976 
Act. 
The scope and duration of copyright were both significantly expanded by the 
1976 Act. Copyright terms now last for the life of the author and an additional 70 years 
after that author’s death.133 However, as the work for hire provision demonstrates, these 
expansions benefit only the owner of a copyright, not necessarily the author. Should an 
author create a new fixed work under work for hire terms, the employer is always the 
owner of the copyright, and entitlements granted by law are vested in that employer, who 
can exclude anyone, including the initial author, from distributing or otherwise exploiting 
a work in the marketplace.134 The lack of an individual author with whom the copyright 
rests also necessitates a different metric for copyright term length in work for hire cases, 
since corporate entities do not have finite “lifetimes.” In cases of works made for hire, 
then, the “the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first 
publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires 
first.”135 
Besides the limitations that may be placed on an author, the 1976 Act also limits 
the use of works subject to copyright by the audiences for those works. Those audiences 
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are also referred to as end users, or the individuals presumed to use a product, such as the 
reader of a book. Provisions within the act allow for exceptions to the entitlements 
granted by statute, under the assumption that end users may have justification in certain 
contexts to further disseminate or otherwise copy creative expressions to which they have 
been exposed. The most important of these exceptions is arguably fair use.136 Detailed 
discussion of the fair use doctrine and its application is undertaken in the next section, 
and is important to this dissertation as a whole for its relation to free speech and the 
nature of what constitutes derivative versus transformative expression. 
 
The Fair Use Doctrine 
The concept of fair use is derived from the idea of copying a significant portion of 
an original creative work for non-commercial use, such as in academic settings, and is 
perfectly legal. While this section is primarily concerned with the application of fair use 
as it relates to the creation of new derivative works, there is some brief coverage here of 
how mechanical reproduction of fixed works and information can also trigger concerns of 
fair use. For example, groups assigned to the task of determining what type of use in even 
academic contexts constitutes fair use – and thus not a breach of copyright law – have 
been unable to reach consensus. This was the case with the Working Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights, organized by the executive branch of the federal government 
to convene Conferences on Fair Use at separate times from 1993 to 1996. This group was 
unable to determine in that time what constituted fair use of digital images subject to 
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copyright law in electronic classrooms and distance learning.137 
Fair use is often linked by copyright law to the concepts of plagiarism and/or 
transformation in academic settings.138 This is especially true in the context of academic 
writing when scholars are accused of improper attribution, an act that may 
simultaneously be fraud (plagiarism) as well as theft (copyright infringement).139 Even 
without triggering copyright concerns, such activity has long been ill-advised, especially 
for students. Samuel Johnson, writing in the eighteenth century, described the temptation 
among university students to rely on and repeat the established work of others, rather 
than to cogently form their own thoughts: “He that adopts the sentiments of another, 
whom he has reason to believe wiser than himself, is only to be blamed, when he claims 
the honours which are not due but to the author, and endeavours to deceive the world into 
praise and veneration.”140  
The additional layer of copyright, again, means that actions that may have once 
been merely plagiaristic now also can be described as theft. Describing such activity as 
theft, however, means that the repetition of existing information is in some way curbed, 
so that free speech concerns are broached. The courts have adopted the stance that a 
potentially infringing work is transformative – and thus a fair use (i.e., a non-violative 
use) of an original work – if it “adds something new...with a further purpose or different 
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character, altering [an original work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”141 
Although it is overwhelmingly agreed that plagiarizing another work by copying a whole 
or part of the work without citation is unethical,142 legal protections against plagiarism 
must be balanced against whether a work is strictly copied, derivative of an original 
work, or so transformative of another work as to be fairly interpreted as an original work 
itself.143 Under American copyright law in the nineteenth century, statutory protection 
only extended to a finished work as published, and other authors were free to abridge, 
translate, make derivations, or transform a given work as fair use.144 Today, copyright 
statutes specifically define fair use as a requirement to allow a type of copying or 
borrowing. In addition, those laws label copying that does not meet this requirement as 
infringement, a change in culture and policy that expands the monopoly of copyright at 
the expense of limiting free speech.145   
Such limitations on speech are ostensibly balanced in the current regime by the 
fair use doctrine described under statute. These justifications of fair use take the form of 
defenses when an individual is charged with copyright infringement. A defendant may 
claim fair use, for example, for reasons such as academic use, critical commentary, or 
parody. These reasons are then weighed according to four factors explicit in the 1976 
Copyright Act:  
                                                 
141 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
142 Hatch, “The Crime of Plagiarism,” 2. The author lists several prominent academic 
examples of plagiarism and the resultant critical responses. 
143 See Max W. Thomas, “Eschewing Credit: Heywood, Shakespeare, and Plagiarism 
before Copyright,” New Literary History 31, no. 2 (2000): 293 (discussing types of 
plagiarism - appropriation, misattribution, adulteration, etc. - and the effects of their 
practice on ongoing cultural norms regarding the unlicensed use of intellectual property).  
144 L. Ray Patterson, “Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy,” Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law 5, no. 2 (1988): 431. 
145 Ibid., 432. 
46 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.146 
The application of this defense, though, is potentially at odds with principles of 
free speech, for the reason that fair use rulings can enjoin speech based on why it is 
thought to be made. The motive of a speaker – whether a motive for profit or to say 
things that might be thought offensive – should not automatically result in the forfeiture 
of the right to free speech.147 As Frederick Schauer argues, the motive of a speaker 
should be disregarded because what is of greater concern to principles of free speech is 
not why products of free speech are produced, but the products themselves: “The interest 
of the speaker is recognized not primarily as an end but only instrumentally to the public 
interest in the ideas presented.”148 Again, this public interest in ideas is constitutionally 
guaranteed by the copyright clause, but “the progress of science and the useful arts” 
cannot accurately be determined by a single speaker or author. Works that are created 
purely for profit – at least in the mind of the initial author – may ultimately be interpreted 
by audiences as worthwhile contributions to scientific and artistic progress. In short, the 
why of any speech is transactional, and not merely determined by the speaker or any one 
listener or reader. 
The courts do not ordinarily seek to determine motive, including a motive for 
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profit, when ruling on whether certain speech or expressions should be tolerated. In cases 
related to copyright, however, courts have emphasized commercial motives as a reason to 
rule against defenses of fair use, according to Eric Barendt.149 In the case of Harper & 
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,150 for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
unauthorized publication of excerpts from President Ford’s memoirs prior to their 
publication in book form was not a fair use because the defendants intended to make a 
profit from that publication. The Court ruled that an “author’s right to control the first 
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”151 
This is contrary to the language present in § 107 of the Copyright Act: “The fact that a 
work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use.”152 
The Supreme Court, in refusing to categorically position an unlicensed use of a 
copyrighted work as fair for reasons outlined in statute, also emphasized the case-by-case 
or idiosyncratic nature of determining findings of fair use. Fair use, then, is an affirmative 
defense, for which the burden of proof is on the defendant, the party expressing the 
allegedly infringing speech.153 The courts, in enacting such a requirement, are in effect 
ruling that one who reproduces an existing work under copyright, or even one who 
creates a derivative work, must demonstrate no harm to both actual markets and potential 
markets that a copyright owner could exploit.154 Since decisions on cases that invoke the 
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fair use defense are done on a case-by-case basis, and arguably randomly applied,155 there 
is likely some chilling of speech as individuals would seek to avoid a costly legal battle 
that could result in their own work being enjoined by the courts. Again, this chilling of 
speech may not seem as bad when the limitations are merely on pirated expressions, but 
such limitations may also affect new, derivative expressions, the subject of the next 
section. 
 
Fair Use in Derivative, Transformative, and Satirical Works 
Neil Netanel suggests that when charges of infringement are applied to works that 
are not literal copies of an existing work – but still in some way derived from the original 
work – that the burden of proof should fall on the plaintiffs, since they are attempting to 
stifle speech, derivative or not.156 Further, Netanel argues on First Amendment grounds 
that even if the derivative work is found to be infringing, remedy should come in the 
form of a licensing fee, and not enjoining the work.157 Again, this is in part because 
enjoining the publication of works that are derivative downplays the contention that such 
derivations are not mechanical reproductions of fixed works. Instead, they are new forms 
of expression themselves, albeit ones that have drawn the ire of the copyright owners of 
the allegedly infringed original work. Derivative works may not be conveying the 
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message the original copyright owner would want, but that very fact is evidence that the 
derivative expression has in some way overcome the low threshold necessary to be 
deemed original itself. Enjoining such works, then, represents a threat to freedom of 
expression, and reinforces the importance of changes in copyright law as an issue 
relevant to scholars of First Amendment principles. As Stephen Smith states, the 
Constitutional Framers were committed to the discovery and production of new ideas, 
and intended a wide diffusion of ideas and knowledge.158 
The case law regarding fair use in this context has been predictably unpredictable 
over the last several decades, since each decision does little to establish reliable doctrine, 
so that the legal determination of whether a use is fair is impossible without a lawsuit.159 
Defendants charged with infringing upon a plaintiff’s copyright or trademark have used a 
defense of satirical fair use as a transformative act, or one that calls upon the original 
work being satirized without being so derivative as to be perceived as “fulfilling the 
demand for the original.”160 Courts have decided such satirical fair use can be a protected 
form of expression under the First Amendment.161 While this has been a successful 
defense in recent years, such as in the case of Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics,162 
defendants in the past have faced damning charges of pornographic intent and a 
likelihood of confusion with the original work, as in the case of Walt Disney Productions 
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v. Air Pirates.163  
Derivative works that are thought to be obscene or contain other cultural 
improprieties are also often accused of copyright infringement. Owners of popular 
copyrighted works have, at times, framed the argument of legal proprietary interest in 
intellectual works as a form of moral guardianship.164 More specifically, these owners 
allege the cultural damage that could result from the unlicensed creation of obscene 
derivations of the original work in question. In  Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 
Disney objected to comic book artists drawing its trademarked characters engaging in 
sexual activities and drug use, and successfully obtained a court order that enjoined the 
publication of such works by the defendants.165 Along similar lines, representatives for 
the estate of Dr. Seuss have argued that if that author’s works were in the public domain, 
transformative works of stories such as “The Cat in the Hat” could be used to “glorify 
drugs or to create pornography.”166 Prior to that, the estate of George Gershwin argued 
that it should continue to own the copyright to the play “Porgy and Bess” because the 
estate had the moral duty to refuse to license it to anyone who does not cast African-
Americans in the play’s roles.167 Further, licenses granted by corporations like the above 
examples will often include a nondisparagement clause that forbids the licensee from 
using licensed material in any way that could cast a negative light on the copyright owner 
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or original copyrighted work itself.168 
Owners of copyrighted works with continuing economic appeal, then, often put 
forth legal arguments that the public or society at large cannot be trusted with certain 
intellectual property, which should remain under exclusive control in perpetuity. 
Lawrence Lessig describes this assumption surfacing as a result of the blind acceptance 
of the idea of property in American culture: “[W]e don’t even question when the control 
of that property removes our ability, as a people, to develop our culture 
democratically.”169 
Despite the current extended nature of copyright terms, there is still the 
underlying expectation, at least as expressed in copyright law, that all creative works 
eventually lose protection and enter the public domain. One example of the type of art 
that can be created and distributed legally once the copyrights on popular creative works 
have expired – and one that would trigger the moral guardian concerns described above – 
is the comic book Lost Girls. Writer Alan Moore and artist Melinda Gebbie released this 
graphic novel – a colloquialism for comics that adhere to a particular narrative structure 
and physical binding style170 – through publisher Top Shelf in 2006. Lost Girls features 
numerous popular literary characters, including Alice from Through the Looking Glass, 
Wendy from Peter Pan, and Dorothy from The Wizard of Oz, all of whom are engaged in 
explicit sexual activity throughout the story. Since those original works all reside in the 
public domain, Moore and Gebbie were free to publish Lost Girls without fear of 
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copyright infringement. There was one notable exception, though: the Great Ormond 
Street Hospital in England, to which J.M. Barrie had bequeathed the copyright to Peter 
Pan, blocked the publication of Lost Girls in the United Kingdom until that copyright 
expired on January 1, 2008.171 
Besides that minor conflict, Lost Girls is notable for being an example of 
pornography that has been positioned as possessing literary merit. As the publisher, Chris 
Staros, stated, “There’s no confusion that it has literary merit, which in this country 
means it’s not obscene.”172 Moore himself echoed that sentiment, and offered proof from 
legal authorities on the matter:  
We got back a wonderful letter from the Canadian Customs Authority, basically 
saying that, even though there were scenes that were tantamount to bestiality or 
incest, this could in no way be considered obscene, and even though it did appear 
that there were underage people taking part in some of the sex scenes, this could 
in no way be considered as child pornography, and that it was a work of great 
social and artistic benefit.173 
 
The first two printings of Lost Girls earned revenues in excess of $1.5 million in 
its first year of publication,174 and the book is still in print more than a decade later. At 
the same time, Disney and other family-minded publishers continue to create new 
derivations also based on the original works of Lewis Carroll, J.M. Barrie, et al. At least 
in this singular case, then, a moral guardianship of fictional works and the characters 
within those works is unnecessary, and it is clear that the market is willing to support 
multiple derivations of the same fictional settings and characters, regardless of an 
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existing copyright in the underlying original work. 
Thus, as shown by the example of Lost Girls, once works under copyright are 
released into the public domain, individuals are free to copy, distribute, or use them in the 
creation of derivative works as they wish. But under today’s copyright regimes, when 
does this typically happen? The next section of this literature review will explore the 
evolution of the legal role of the public domain and its relation to copyright law. 
 
The Public Domain 
The idea of the public domain has always been present within the U.S. brand of 
copyright law, with the Constitution drawing a distinction between actual property and 
intellectual (creative) property. For actual property, the Fifth Amendment includes a 
“Takings Clause” that requires the government to pay “just compensation”175 for the 
privilege of taking someone’s property.176 On the other hand, the Constitution requires 
that creative property must be released into the public domain after a “limited time” 
(again, the original statutory provision was 14-28 years), with no compensation for what 
a copyright holder might perceive as a taking of personal property.177 James Madison 
proposed in his “Essay on Monopolies” that government should have “a right to 
extinguish the monopoly [of patents and copyrights] by paying a specified and reasonable 
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sum,”178 but it was assumed that the privilege granted by copyright was never in 
perpetuity, and that a perpetual copyright would be a loss to society.179 Instead, any 
proprietary control over the commercial duplication of a fixed creative work was 
understood to be temporary, and the fate of any creative work was to enter the public 
domain, or what might also be called the creative commons or public sphere. 
This domain could be considered the natural state of communicated expression, 
and the previously discussed decisions of the English House of Lords and American 
Supreme Court support that claim.180 However, because current copyright law grants 
lifetime statutory protection automatically upon creation, new original works typically do 
not enter the public domain for upwards of a century, so that the ease with which such 
works may be legally accessed is necessarily limited. 
This impediment to access might not matter outside of the minor added cost or 
inconvenience one might experience in accessing a work under copyright versus one in 
the public domain. Lessig, however, argues from a democratic perspective the importance 
of works entering the public domain. This notion is rooted, he writes, in a “competitive 
context, not a context in which the choices about what culture is available to people and 
how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of the many.”181 Further, 
a healthy public domain, aided by modern networked culture, encourages cultural 
diversity by allowing unfettered access to a variety of creative works, as well as the 
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ability to effectively “remix” those works.182 The potential to remix or otherwise alter a 
creative work also emphasizes the inherently unstable nature of meaning-making that 
attends the interpretation of fixed creative works. Moreover, Rosemary Coombe argues 
that copyright law is a means to limit cultural development by prohibiting the creation of 
derivative works that change the intended meaning of an original work, or what Coombe 
refers to as resignification or alterity.183  
While any resignification or remix of a fixed work can affect the market demand 
for the original, that resignification does not itself change the existence of the original. 
Again, the nature of actual property is distinct from that of intellectual property,184 and 
the recognition of this fact has led some to argue that differences among classes or 
categories of property should result in differences in their treatment by law.185 David 
Lange further argues that the increasing scope of intellectual property interests through 
changes in copyright law should be offset by a purposeful expansion of individual rights 
in the public domain.186 Sometimes, though, new or improved rights for either party are 
an accidental or secondary effect of technological advancements, such as the rise of 
Internet culture. 
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Individuals acting without commercial interest have used the low-cost publishing 
platform of the Internet to distribute public domain works. One such individual is Eric 
Eldred, a retired computer programmer who, in 1995, uploaded the works of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne to a server. This is an example of what Lessig calls a “noncommercial 
publication of public domain works.”187 Eldred even added annotations and contextual 
images, so that his contribution to the public domain was arguably transformative of the 
original works. He enjoyed the project, and continued adding other authors to his online 
archive, until his planned addition of Robert Frost’s collection of poems, New 
Hampshire, was inhibited by Congress’ decision in 1998 to further expand the duration of 
copyright through the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.188 
For some, a frustrating aspect of extended statutory protection for economic 
reasons is that the limits on freedom of expression and creativity do not generally result 
in an economic boon for copyright holders. As Justice Stephen Breyer remarked in a 
dissenting opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft,189 close to 98 percent of copyrights are 
worthless after about half a century.190 Building from that, some believe that to continue 
to grant statutory protection to those works is an unnecessary impediment to public 
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access.191 Moreover, an impediment to public access is an impediment to learning, a 
purpose of clear prominence in all American copyright legislation for more than 200 
years, from the Constitution, to the most recent Copyright Act, and even supplementary 
legislation such as the TEACH Act.192 
It is not always clear that the public’s ability to access works is endangered by 
overly-broad copyright protections. When corporations seeking ever-longer terms of 
copyright lobby members of Congress, this does not appear to overtly interfere with the 
production of new works or create undue monopolization.193 Therefore, each new piece 
of copyright legislation continues to expand the term of copyright, as well as ensuring a 
system where a copyright owner is legally entitled to the full value associated with an 
authored work. 
There continues to be a variety of new creative expressions available for 
consumption under the current regime of copyright. However, some research suggests 
that as time passes, fixed creative works still under copyright become prohibitively 
inaccessible. Paul J. Heald, for example, has emphasized the loss to the cultural commons 
caused by what he believes to be excessive copyright terms.194 In a random sampling of 
2000 recently published works of fiction available from the online bookseller Amazon, 
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Heald found that books originally published in the 1880s were more available than those 
from the 1980s, suggesting a positive correlation between an active copyright and the 
unavailability of works from 1923 onwards.195 Heald described the results of his 
research: “Copyright correlates significantly with the disappearance of works rather than 
with their availability. Shortly after works are created and proprietized, they tend to 
disappear from public view only to reappear in significantly increased numbers when 
they fall into the public domain and lose their owners.”196 Books tend to go out of print 
very quickly, most within the space of a year, and of the books published between 1927 
and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print at the turn of the twenty-first century.197 Heald’s 
research further suggests that the commercial lifespan for most creative works is brief, so 
that publishers are deterred from releasing books again until they are in the public 
domain.198 
Heald’s research strengthens the claim – made by individuals like David 
Bollier199 and organizations like Duke Law’s Center for the Study of the Public 
Domain200 – that works in the public domain are not valueless, and there are 
organizations that still profit from them. The clearest difference between works in the 
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public domain and those under copyright is only that there is no monopoly on who is able 
to legally profit from their distribution. As described earlier in this chapter, for example, 
there is no copyright on the opinions of the Supreme Court, and anyone can freely access 
them through a library.201 However, LexisNexis and Westlaw also have electronic 
versions of case reports available to their service subscribers, and they can charge users 
for the privilege of gaining access to court opinions in addition to other items. Publishers 
such as Hackett also continue to sell and make available new copies of works in the 
public domain. Without the burden of excessive regulation and interminable monopolies, 
a variety of works that might disappear are instead republished in a competitive context 
that drives prices lower, to the benefit of readers and other end users of fixed creative 
works. 
With regard to the current reality of copyright, Lessig states, “The law’s role is 
less and less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain industries against 
competition.”202 Protecting against competition, however, arguably creates the very 
problem that copyright was originally meant to eliminate: the danger of a permanent 
monopoly on information by limited proprietary interests. As show in the preceding 
section on fair use, owners of valuable copyrights are protected against not just 
competition with those exact works under copyright, but also resignified or alternate 
derivative versions. 
Some researchers have argued that the monopoly privilege of copyright, as an 
incentive to create and disseminate original creative works, must also have some impact 
on how those same creative works are accessed by audiences. Glynn Lunney, for 
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example, notes that incentivizing authors to produce new works must in some way, most 
often economically, limit the ability of the public to access such works.203 Additionally, 
he argues that incentives and proprietary protections provided to authors since the 
original copyright statute in 1790 are unwarranted, and are at best “superficially 
attractive”204 in justifying the expansion of copyright. This expansion of term length 
continues to minimize the importance of the public domain, and its designation as the 
natural and final destination for creative works. Excessive term lengths also disregard the 
stated legal purpose of copyright, as a means to benefit society and ensure the diffusion 
of a variety of creative works which might promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. The Supreme Court has been especially clear on this point, as when Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor wrote the opinion, “The primary objective of copyright is not to reward 
the labors of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ Art. I, § 
8, cl. 8.... To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”205 
 
The Expanding Scope of Copyright 
Judicial opinions within the realm of copyright have historically favored a work’s 
benefit to society and the public good over author’s rights, as noted above. As the 
Supreme Court held, “The copyright law...makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”206 However, the increase in proprietary control for copyright, the 
minimization of the public domain, and the reconceptualization of intellectual property as 
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a natural right of the author, have all contributed to a current legal culture that sees no 
problem in limiting the benefit to the public for the “rights” – again, more accurately, 
privileges – of the author. This is made explicit in the 1976 Copyright Act, which no 
longer requires any registration or other voluntary process to affirm a copyright. The 
reformed process of registration is described above.207 It is also mentioned again here to 
draw attention to the possibility that while the act of creation itself is enough to gain a 
copyright for a lifetime and more,208 all of the attendant privileges granted by copyright 
law are not always sought or even desired, as the rise in copyleft209 or creative commons 
schemes demonstrates.210  
Some scholars have argued that the extension of copyright to the lifetime of the 
author plus seventy years does not promote creativity. According to Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
such term lengths “rewards the established at the expense of the emerging.”211 New and 
emerging artists, from this point of view, should be allowed “maximum exposure” to 
creative works that came before, along with “liberal freedoms” to use existing works’ 
elements in the creation of new works, even if those works are deemed derivative by 
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potential audiences.212 Others, such as Barendt, have pointed out that examples of works 
that may broadly be described as unoriginal or derivative, including satirical works or 
critical reviews, should enjoy greater free speech protections because they “enhance our 
understanding of literature or the arts.”213 
In a discussion of freedom of speech as it relates to copyright, it is important to 
note that the government does not bring charges against those whose speech may be 
unoriginal. That would be in clear violation of the First Amendment.214 An individual can 
freely copy the speech and work of others without fear of independent state enforcement 
of copyright statutes, because accusations of copyright infringement depend on the owner 
of a copyright choosing to bring suit against any potential infringers.  Instead, when 
copyright infringement claims are filed, they are done so by private parties. When those 
cases go to trial, the courts then interpret and apply the intellectual property rights 
granted by statute, and such enforcement must balance the privileges of the copyright 
owner against potential free speech and/or fair use exceptions.215 
In striking this balance, the courts have placed some limitations on freedom of 
speech, and Supreme Court Justices have spoken to the justifications for such limitations. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, believes that freedom of speech 
considerations weigh heavily in favor of allowing an individual to make his or her own 
speech, but less so on the ability to make others’ speeches again.216 Such an argument is 
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easy to make for examples of blatant commercial piracy and the pure mechanical 
reproduction of fixed works under copyright, an act that most understand to enjoy little to 
no protection under the First Amendment or free speech principles.217 According to 
Melville Nimmer, “One who pirates the expression of another is not engaged in self-
expression in any meaningful sense.”218 Outside of such literal copying, however, 
determining what constitutes one making his or her own speech – thus creating an 
original expression rather than an imitation or copy of others’ speeches again – is difficult 
to determine. Additionally, there is some disagreement about who should be responsible 
for determining if expressions accused of infringement are pure imitations or original in 
some way. Nimmer points to the First Amendment as evidence that the burden of proof to 
show that a copier is not entitled to free speech protections should be on the copyright 
owner in every case.219 
The courts, too, have long recognized the difficulty faced by authors who attempt 
to balance novel and existing expressions in the development of original works. As 
previously mentioned in this literature review,220 Justice Holmes acknowledged – a 
century before Justice Ginsburg’s opinion – that even an educated judge may have no 
clear understanding of what makes a creative work valuable in the eyes of the consuming 
public.221 Truly original and great works, he stated, might possess “novelty [that] would 
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author 
                                                                                                                                                 
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches.” 
217 Eric Barendt, “Copyright and Free Speech Theory,” 18-19. 
218 Melville Nimmer, “Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press?” UCLA Law Review 17 (1970): 1192. 
219 Eric Barendt, “Copyright and Free Speech Theory,” 19. 
220 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
221 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
64 
 
spoke.”222 Even a minimum threshold for originality leaves open the possibility that 
expressive works which, while new and likely meeting such a threshold, may still be 
described as derivative of another creative work, and thus guilty of copyright 
infringement. 
A century prior to that Holmes opinion, Thomas Jefferson also seemed to 
recognize the furtive nature of what might be deemed original, and how much of that 
designation could rightly be said to be in the eye of the beholder: “He who receives an 
idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”223 Ideas, however, are no longer 
perceived in the Jeffersonian conception as random discoveries that may, by nature, be 
used by all people if the discoverer can be enticed to make them public. Instead, the 
expression of an idea is thought to be the exclusive purview of the individual or 
corporation that owns the copyright, and this monopoly disenfranchises others who may 
expand or develop on that expression, with terms of copyright protection that last for 
close to a century. 
The length of copyright terms, even those as long as a century, might still be 
charitably described as “for limited times.” But the scope of copyright protection is 
likewise expanded when alternative terms for intellectual property are applied to creative 
works, granting perpetual ownership and further preventing those works from ever 
entering the public domain. The next section of this literature review will describe the 
application of trademark law to works under copyright, and how this expands the scope 
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of privileges granted to certain types of intellectual property. 
 
The Conflation of Trademark and Copyright 
As briefly noted above, ideas may be granted further protections in addition to 
what copyright law provides if they are used in commercial transactions as a mark of 
authorship and labeled trademarks rather than merely works subject to copyright. 
Trademarks, under the Lanham Act,224 are granted entitlement protections similar to 
copyright, in the sense that owners of a registered trademark may exclude others from the 
use of that mark in commerce.225 However, in contrast to copyright, trademarks may be 
renewed and remain proprietary intellectual property in perpetuity.226 
There is the potential for the entitlements granted by trademark law to limit 
others’ freedom of expression in using those marks or logos for artistic purposes that their 
owners do not intend or desire. The courts have attempted to reconcile conflict between 
the Lanham Act and the First Amendment in cases like New York Racing Ass’n v. 
Perlmutter Publishing.227 In that case, the court ruled that an artist painting scenes from 
the Saratoga Race Course was within her First Amendment rights to include trademarks 
in the paintings, since those marks actually appeared in the real life scenes depicted, and 
thus served the “artistically relevant purpose of accurately depicting the scene 
(realism).”228 
Alternatively, artists’ freedom of expression when using trademarked imagery 
                                                 
224 Lanham (Trademark) Act of July 5, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427. 
225 Trademarks, 15 U.S.C. ch. 22, §§ 1051-1141n. 
226 15 U.S.C. ch. 22, § 1059. 
227 New York Racing Ass'n v. Perlmutter Publishing, 959 F. Supp. 578, 581 (N.D.N.Y 
1997). 
228 Ibid. 
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absent of a realist context is more limited. The economic exploitation of fictional 
characters in a specific medium is one of the areas of creative expression that most 
confuses and conflates the related legal concepts of trademark and copyright. Michael 
Todd Helfland argues that this is a violation of the intent of intellectual property law, 
enabled by courts which merge claims of unfair competition, common law trademark, 
and statutory copyright.229 The original intention of a trademark was to use a specific 
image, logo, or mark on a product as a clear referent to the product’s source. It is simple 
to call to mind the trademarks of companies such as Ford, Nike, and McDonalds. In 
addition, some fictional characters have their own specific logos that have been registered 
as trademarks. Batman’s chest emblem, a yellow oval surrounding a black bat, is one, and 
the three circles used to denote the head of Mickey Mouse is another. 
Jasmina Zecevic notes that, compared to characters that are purely literary and 
thus graphically-abstract, characters from more visually-dominant mediums such as 
comic books and cartoons enjoy greater protection under copyright law.230 An existing 
and consistent visual design for a character also allows for the registration of that 
character as a trademark. Moreover, once a character is legally classified as a 
trademarked image, unlicensed use of that imagery on products sold across state lines 
infringes on the intellectual property entitlements of the copyright and trademark 
                                                 
229 See, e.g., Michael Todd Helfand, “When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman: 
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial 
Characters,” Stanford Law Review 44 (1992): 623. 
230 Jasmina Zecevic, “Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That Constitute the 
Story Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright 
Protection,” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 8, no. 2 (Spring 
2006): 369. 
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owner(s).231 
Although it is more difficult for a literary character without a consistent visual 
design to find protection under copyright or trademark laws, it is not impossible. If, for 
example, certain literary characters are deemed to be “distinctly delineated,” then they 
may enjoy such protection. The phrase “distinctly delineated” is derived from a decision 
delivered by Judge Learned Hand: “It follows that the less developed the characters, the 
less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too 
indistinctly.”232 However, it is not clear from that statement what the proper test to 
determine distinction deserving of copyright protection might be.233 
An examination of relevant case law provides examples of what characters have 
overcome the hurdle to be considered distinctly delineated and thus copyrightable. One of 
these is the popular character Tarzan, determined to be distinct enough to warrant 
copyright protection in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.234 The character’s 
description in that case is as follows: “Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely 
in tune with his jungle environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to 
experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and strong. He is 
Tarzan.”235 
It is unclear whether that description, absent the familiar name of Tarzan, would 
be enough to call to mind this specific character, rather than a number of other competing 
                                                 
231 15 U.S.C. ch. 22, § 1127. 
232 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
233 Jasmina Zecevic, “Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters,” 373. 
234 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
235 Ibid., 391. 
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similar characters, such as, for instance, Mowgli from The Jungle Book.236 However, the 
name “Tarzan” is enough to call to mind the character independent of further description. 
This means that Tarzan, as a name, is distinct enough to enjoy protection as a trademark 
unto itself. 
The legal status of Tarzan with regard to trademark and copyright is further 
complicated by the fact that the original stories that feature the character are no longer 
under copyright protection. The first story featuring the character, Tarzan of the Apes, 
was published in 1912, meaning the copyright has since expired and the work is in the 
public domain. However, the author’s estate still owns a trademark on the character name 
of Tarzan, preventing any competing economic exploitation of that character. As one 
legal researcher put it, the unlicensed use of the image of Tarzan, including the relevant 
indicia – the character’s loin cloth as well as movement by swinging on vines – is likely 
to cause some confusion in the marketplace, as consumers assume that the Burroughs 
estate “has approved or is affiliated” with that use, triggering infringement concerns.237 
This is true as long as the character enjoys trademark protection and thus prevented from 
entering the public domain. 
If Tarzan as a character is never allowed to enter the public domain, this provides 
an economic benefit to the factions, or publishers, who are allowed to exploit stories 
about the character in the marketplace. However, this continuing entitlement for those 
publishers must also necessarily limit the potential number of competing, unlicensed 
                                                 
236 Jasmina Zecevic, “Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters,” 373. 
237 Roger L. Zissu, “Copyright Luncheon Circle: The Interplay of Copyright and 
Trademark Law in the Protection of Character Rights with Observations on Dastar v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp,” Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 51, 
no. 2 (Winter 2004): 461. 
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iterations of stories featuring Tarzan that would be created if no permanent monopolies 
were granted, and the trademark is allowed to expire. It is unknown what the results of a 
popular character like Tarzan entering the public domain would be, especially in terms of 
the average perceived quality of the numerous competing new interpretations of the 
character. There would be no centralized authority in charge of the usage of Tarzan in 
new fixed creative works, which also means there would be no centralized authority to 
legally exclude or suppress forms of speech and expression featuring the character. Based 
on the principle established by Mill that the suppression of speech is detrimental to both 
the individual and to society,238 laws that make content-specific restrictions on creative 
expression would also be detrimental. This is also, in part, a deference to Milton, who 
argued that the quest for truth is negatively impacted by a requirement to gain license;239 
and to Lessig, who argues for a greater democratic and competitive context for the 
maturation of cultural elements.240  
There are numerous other popular characters created in the early-to-mid part of 
the twentieth century that have yet to fall out of copyright, and if current trends towards 
the extension of terms continue, may never enter the public domain. As Gerald Jagorda 
states, there has been a cultural and legal shift in the past century “from initial uncertainty 
whether fictitious characters were entitled to protection separate from a work’s text...to 
the present, where the interplay of copyright law [and] trademark law...have erected an 
                                                 
238 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 33. In the words of Mill, such suppression is tantamount 
to theft, as “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing 
the human race.” 
239 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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impenetrable barrier, possibly protecting characters indefinitely.”241 This indefinite 
protection will likely be sought by certain interested parties, foremost among them The 
Walt Disney Company. Disney’s copyright term for the Mickey Mouse cartoon 
“Steamboat Willie,” made in 1928, is scheduled to expire at the end of 2023. But even if 
that date is not legally postponed and the fixed work itself passes into the public domain, 
Disney would still own the trademark of Mickey Mouse, which it may renew 
indefinitely.242 
Trademark, though, is not a product unto itself, but the indication of a marked 
product’s source. Viva Moffat makes this point in describing the transformation of visual 
depictions of characters from “drawings [which]...initially were...part of the product 
[under copyright], and then became...a trademark signifying the source of the product.”243 
This overlap in intellectual property protections is in part enabled by the market 
exclusivity granted by copyright terms. Since Disney has heretofore been the only 
legitimate source of works under copyright that feature Mickey Mouse, audiences 
strongly associate that character with the company, and it is that association that allows 
for the grant of legal trademark protection for images of the character.244 
The extent to which trademark protection would allow Disney to exclude from the 
                                                 
241 Gerald S. Jagorda, “The Mouse that Roars: Character Protection Strategies of Disney 
and Others,” Thomas Jefferson Law Review 21 (1999): 235. 
242 Stephen Carlisle, “Mickey’s Headed to the Public Domain: But Will He Go Quietly?”, 
Nova Southeastern University, last modified October 17, 2014, 
http://copyright.nova.edu/mickey-public-domain/. 
243 Viva R. Moffat, “Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of 
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19, no. 
4 (2004): 1509  (referring to a court case with no formal ruling about the proprietary 
nature of illustrations of Peter Rabbit: Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 
481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). 
244 Moffat, “Mutant Copyrights,” 1508. 
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marketplace derivative interpretations of “Steamboat Willie” and its constituent elements 
– including characters – is unknown, both during the initial terms of copyright protection, 
as well as following the expiration of the initial work’s copyright. Concurrent protection 
through both copyright and trademark potentially allow Disney to circumvent fair use 
exceptions granted by copyright law but absent from trademark law, such as the ability to 
create and publish a visually similar parody of Mickey Mouse.245 Following the 
expiration of a copyright, the trademark protections granted to imagery from a work that 
is newly in the public domain are also unclear. 
The preceding literature review, then, may better contextualize the history of 
copyright in the United States, but there are still issues that require additional 
clarification. For example, additional entitlements granted by overlapping intellectual 
property protections may be perceived as beneficial to the owner of a character such as 
Mickey Mouse that is subject to both copyright and trademark, but the overlap also 
creates confusion about which branch of intellectual property protection has a greater 
impact on the incentive to create new works.246 To the extent they seek their own legal 
grants of market exclusivity through copyright and/or trademarks, artists interviewed for 
this research project might be able to speak more authoritatively on the incentives that 
drive their own acts of creation. As a means to better understand the impact of the 
overlap between these two forms of intellectual property, then, the following chapter of 
this dissertation proposes a methodology for the collection and analysis of qualitative 
data. This data will in part be used to develop a theory of the effects of copyright law on 
the practice of artists and other individuals engaged in the creation of fixed works subject 
                                                 
245 Ibid., 1516. 
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to intellectual property laws. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Examining the Balance of Public and Private Interests 
This research project sought to examine the potential ramifications of the 
evolution of copyright law, and its effect on the authors of original creative works and 
their audiences. More specifically, the impact of the overlap between the two forms of 
intellectual property – trademark and copyright – most relevant to current professional 
artists was examined through procedures described in this methodology chapter. This 
researcher proposed a methodology to uncover the effects of copyright law on the 
practice of creative artists and the resultant art created: a qualitative study comprised of 
elite, semi-structured interviews with some of those most involved in the professional 
categories of creative expression of artifacts that include trademarked and copyrighted 
characters. 
Flexible strategies were employed for collecting and analyzing data, primarily 
elite, semi-structured interviews1 with professional artists, attorneys, and others who 
engage with the cultural and legal norms of intellectual property regimes on a regular 
basis. Strategies that emphasized both emic and ontological perspectives were used 
throughout the research process. By emic, this researcher means the use of a perspective 
that foregrounded the norms and cultural practices of those interviewed with regard to 
intellectual property as perceived and expressed by those individuals themselves. By 
ontological, this researcher means a perspective that foregrounded the interpretation of 
                                                 
1 J.L. Hochschild, “Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews,” Workshop on 
Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research (2009), Retrieved March 
3, 2018, from http://scholar.harvard.edu/jlhochschild/publications/conducting-intensive-
interviews-and-elite-interviews. 
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reality according to those interviewed. Again, the aspect of reality with which this 
researcher was most concerned was the ontological interpretation of norms of intellectual 
property as expressed in copyright law, and more importantly, the impact of artists’ 
beliefs on the underlying social phenomenon of the concept of the moral right to copy 
and/or modify an existing fixed work. Because these beliefs regarding copyright in the 
aggregate constitute a social reality independent of what is allowed by nature, it is 
considered by this researcher to be an idealist ontological position.2 In short, the shared 
interpretations of those interviewed – as well as the countless others who were not 
interviewed – contributed to an iterative process of meaning making with regard to the 
ontology of copyright as both concept and law.  
Constant comparative analysis was used to maintain an emic perspective, 
prioritizing the subjective experience of individuals interviewed for this research project.3 
From an ontological perspective, artists interviewed were presumed to help establish and 
ground background conceptions for categorization of fixed creative works as, for 
example, works of literature, film, or illustrations.4 This ontology of art, rather than 
depending on an empirical examination of artifacts themselves, thus depended on a 
conceptual analysis of artistic practice as revealed by those interviewed.5 Further, in the 
aggregate, interviews conducted may suggest an epistemic basis for “the causal role of 
                                                 
2 Norman Blaikie, “Ontology/Ontological,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science 
Research Methods, ed. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2004), 767. 
3 Sheila M. Fram, “The Constant Comparative Analysis Method Outside of Grounded 
Theory,” The Qualitative Report, 18(1) (2013): 1-25. 
4 Amie L. Thomasson, “The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63, no. 3 (2005): 226. 
5 Darren Hicks, Artistic License: The Philosophical Problems of Copyright and 
Appropriation (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 34. 
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the works of art in the relevant culture,”6 especially here in regards to the conception of 
copyright and intellectual property norms, such as the categorization of given fixed 
creative works as either original or derivative. 
It is the hope of this researcher that such a study is a worthy contribution to the 
existing scholarly literature and ongoing public debate regarding the balance between an 
author’s and the public’s interests in the continued dissemination and (re)interpretation of 
fixed creative works subject to copyright law. The method utilized here was appropriate 
to the task of providing data for the analysis of these competing interests, as artists 
interviewed for this dissertation provided their own ontological interpretations on the 
issues presented here and the balance between public and private interests. This balance 
has no doubt shifted over the years, and changes in the categorization of artifacts as a 
means to increased proprietary control over creative expressions will likely continue to 
affect that balance. 
As posited in the introduction to this dissertation, the dialectical approaches to 
copyright may have lasting impacts on culture and society. Again, copyright as granted 
by law may be interpreted as either a temporary monopoly on what will become public 
knowledge and property, or as the legal certification of the natural right of property an 
author is due. Which approach to copyright law can be said to result in a better society: 
the latter, modern interpretation of fixed forms of expression as the natural property of 
the author (or copyright owner)? Or the Framers’ belief that expressions belong to all 
once they have been made public, but that there must be an incentive granted to the initial 
author so that he or she might in the first place make them public? Again, it is at this 
                                                 
6 Amie L. Thomasson, “The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics,” 226. 
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point unclear which approach to intellectual property may result in the greatest good. 
If there is a balance to be struck between these two interpretations, it will not be 
achieved without an understanding of the issues faced by those who regularly create and 
disseminate fixed works subject to copyright law and policy. In turn, this serves as partial 
justification for the methodology employed here and this dissertation as a whole, as 
artists interviewed for this project offered unique and valuable perspectives on the issues 
presented here. This researcher also believed at the outset of this project that interviewed 
artists would be able to speak on the incentives and privileges enabled by copyright and 
intellectual property regimes, as they engage with the cultural and legal norms of 
copyright and intellectual property on a regular basis. 
For these reasons, the interviews conducted and the selection of interview subjects 
for this research project were not chosen at random or anonymously, and are elite in the 
sense described by Hochschild, in that subjects were “chosen because of who they are or 
what position they occupy.”7 Interviews are also intensive in the sense described by 
Lofland, as they are meant to “collect instances and episodes of action and...problems;”8 
in this case, instances and episodes related to enforcement and/or protection of 
intellectual property rights as guaranteed by law.  
Subjects were selected specifically for their ownership of copyrighted works or 
participation in transfer of ownership of such works. This meant that the most important 
demographic characteristic for each interview subject selected was profession, so that all 
interview subjects either contributed directly to the creation of fixed works – artists and 
                                                 
7 Hochschild, “Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews.” 
8 John Lofland, Doing Social Life: The Qualitative Study of Human Interaction in 
Natural Settings (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), 8. 
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writers – or facilitated the contractual agreements that determined ownership of those 
works subject to copyright law – attorneys and publishers. Certain multinational 
corporate entities – particularly Disney and AT&T – own a large swath of the type of 
intellectual properties – including fictional characters, films, books, and comics – subject 
to copyright and trademark laws as discussed in the literature review. For this reason, 
current and former employees and contractors of those particular companies and similar 
companies were also selected as interview subjects, particularly as persons who were 
presumed to speak more authoritatively on the work for hire practices used by those 
companies. For these reasons, interview subjects selected were thought to be uniquely 
suited to describe and provide context for the application of intellectual property regimes 
in modern professional settings. The relevant demographic characteristics of interview 
subjects are listed in Table 1 below. Certain individuals who were interviewed also had 
experience that ran the gamut of multiple creative professions and with multiple firms 
and organizations, and these distinctions are noted in the list and within the findings 
when relevant to quoted material. 
 
Guiding Interview Questions 
Based on the review of literature in Chapter 2, certain preliminary questions for 
artists guided the initial collection and analysis of qualitative data. These questions 
included: 
1) What incentives currently exist for the artist or author that would not exist in 
the absence of formal copyright law? 
2) How would the artist’s practice be changed by the absence of formal copyright 
78 
 
law? 
3) What are the artist’s experiences with the enforcement of copyright privileges 
as granted by statute? 
4) How has technology changed the artist’s approach to distribution of fixed 
creative works and other matters relating to copyright? 
Other questions were developed over the course of each interview conducted as a 
result of the dynamic nature of each individual’s responses to these guiding questions. 
This interviewer listened and responded to comments made by interview subjects, and 
these responses took the form of follow-up questions to these initial guiding questions. 
 
IRB Approval and Preliminary Research 
Because this research required the participation of human subjects, approval by 
Arizona State University’s Internal Review Board (IRB) was necessary to ensure ethical 
treatment of those participants, and all requirements of the IRB were followed 
accordingly. Following IRB approval, roughly eight months of official data collection 
was necessary before theoretical saturation – or the point at which related concepts were 
thoroughly developed9 – was achieved. Copies of the recruitment letter and consent form 
are in Appendix A and B, respectively. Analysis of the interviews conducted during the 
data collection phase of this study – detailed below – yielded significant findings related 
to the practices of artists in the absence of formal copyright law, as well as a 
comprehensive theory on how current copyright law informs the practice of creating new 
or derived works.   
                                                 
9 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: the Art of Hearing Data, 
2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2005), 67. 
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As part of a pilot study, this researcher spoke with and interviewed artists at 
various points on the subject of intellectual property, most often at festivals, galleries and 
conventions related to the mass production of works subject to copyright. This was done 
on and before October 2017, the date when this current research project was initiated and 
a formal research plan and methodology was finalized. Observations made and 
discussions conducted in these settings before that date allowed this researcher to develop 
the current study by way of Lofland’s four crucial phases10 for studying natural settings 
of social interaction: 
1) Intimate familiarity, or getting close to those actually involved in the creation 
and dissemination of works subject to copyright; 
2) Situation, or the focus on what legal and cultural norms exist surrounding 
copyright in the selected environments; 
3) Strategies, or how artists confront or deal with issues related to copyright, and: 
4) Disciplined abstractions of a variety of specific episodes that may then be 
analyzed in relation to each other. 
This preliminary research, conducted between May 2015 and October 2017, aided 
in the design and nature of the current study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Lofland, Doing Social Life, 3. 
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Sample 
The sample for the current study consisted of 14 semi-structured elite interviews 
with artists and other professionals directly impacted by copyright and intellectual 
property regimes, conducted between November 2017 and July 2018. These interviews 
were semi-structured in the sense that they all begin with the same guiding questions for 
each individual being interviewed, but were primarily driven by the idiosyncratic 
experiences or felt concerns of those individuals, and it was understood by this researcher 
that the perception of each interview subject might change in other circumstances or at 
different times.11 This researcher sought interviews with professionals until theoretical 
saturation was achieved, or until each subsequent interview added less and less to what 
was already known, and eventually only the same information was suggested by new 
interview subjects.12 Relevant demographic characteristics of each participant are listed 
in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, Handbooks for Research in 
Political Behavior (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 120. 
12 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: the Art of Hearing Data, 67. 
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Table 1    
Name Professional Firm Experience Job Roles Years of 
Professional 
Experience 
JS Marvel, Broadway Video Writer, Editor, 
Publisher 
50+ 
TR CBS, Mattel, 20th Century 
Fox, Marvel, AT&T (Time 
Warner) 
Visual and Sequential 
Artist 
20+ 
DF Hasbro, 20th Century Fox, 
Image Comics 
Storyboard Artist, 
Songs and Lyrics 
25+ 
EM Self-Published Writer, Artist, 
Publisher 
20+ 
JB Self-Published, Image Comics, 
Licensed work with Hasbro, 
Licensed work with 20th 
Century Fox 
Writer, Publisher 20 
JR Marvel/Disney, AT&T 
(DC/Time Warner) 
Visual Artist (Inker) 40+ 
MH AT&T (DC/Time Warner), 
Image Comics 
Writer, Editor, 
Publisher 
25+ 
BA AT&T (DC/Time Warner) Writer, Editor 35+ 
TM AT&T (DC/Time Warner), 
Marvel, Image Comics 
Writer, Artist, 
Publisher  
35+ 
DE Disney Writer 20+ 
ZR Verizon Communications 
(Subsidiary), Marvel 
Senior Content Analyst 15 
BS Legal Firm Attorney in IP Law 19 
CC Legal Firm Attorney in IP Law 20+ 
RC Legal Firm Attorney in IP Law 8 
 
As a means to improve interpretative validity, all interviews were audio recorded 
with subjects’ permission, and written notes to mark times and emphasize certain 
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comments were taken by the researcher. Interviews were later transcribed and coded 
using a constant comparative method, described below. This process helped to ensure a 
more concrete process or protocol for data collection and analysis.  
The purposive sample of semi-structured interviews with artists and other 
professionals in this study provided what Jessica Silbey refers to as a “database of 
language,” a thick description13 both of what individuals think and how they engage with 
copyright law in practice.14 This database eventually led to theoretical saturation, or the 
point at which all concepts relevant to this study became fully developed.15 
 
Constant Comparative Method 
This research utilized a constant comparative method for coding, beginning with 
open coding, where interview transcripts were read thoroughly and tagged with initial 
codes, primarily drawn from the relevant literature.16 These included codes such as “the 
public domain,” “moral rights,” “work made for hire” and “employer practices.” This 
was followed by focused coding, where the initial categories were further refined, most 
often to clarify an interview subject’s perceived value judgments of the initial codes. So, 
for example, the codes listed above would be further refined as “advantages of the public 
domain,” “disadvantages of the public domain,” etc. 
                                                 
13 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Case Study,” in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. 
Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 311. 
14 Jessica Silbey, “Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and Work-
Makes-Work, Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators,” The Notre 
Dame Law Review 86, no. 5 (2011): 2099. 
15 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: the Art of Hearing Data, 67. 
16 Kathy Charmaz, “Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research,” in The SAGE  
Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 367-371. 
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The final step for the coding process was in vivo coding, where specific examples 
and phrases expressed by interview subjects were used as categories.17 The methodology 
for coding collected data was also informed in part from a similar study of artist practice 
by Silbey,18 such that interview transcripts were analyzed and coded both inductively, as 
a result of the emergent language of interviews; and deductively, as a result of the 
preliminary findings and research conducted prior to interviews. By this process, 
inductive codes described how interview subjects perceived their own relationship to 
categories such as their own rights as an artist, while deductive codes contextualized 
these perceptions within the broader skein of copyright policy throughout the historical 
term discussed in the literature review. The coding process also consisted of thematic 
analysis of interview data, so as to better examine commonality, differences and 
relationships.19 This analysis most specifically compared interviewed artists’ accounts 
with one another to see what common threads or experiences began to emerge in the 
findings, as well as what experiences were not shared by multiple interviewed artists. 
As the coding process was implemented through the course of this research, units 
of data that shared “certain generic properties” were organized into separate categories.20 
This categorization served to organize units of data – more specifically, discrete passages 
of text from transcribed interviews – as “belonging to, representing, or being an example 
of some more general phenomenon,” according to Susan Spiggle.21 Some of the coded 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Jessica Silbey, “Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and Work-
Makes-Work, Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators,” 2132. 
19 Jamie Harding, Qualitative Data Analysis from Start to Finish (London: SAGE, 2013). 
20 Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research 
Methods, 2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2002), 189. 
21 Susan Spiggle, “Analysis and Interpretation of Qualitative Data in Consumer 
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categories for this research project included, but were not limited to, shared and 
idiosyncratic artist practices with regard to the exercise of creative control of copyright, 
experiences with copyright norms as a function of relationships among artists, and the 
additional competitive context of using creative works that exist in the public domain. 
Because these examples of categories do not refer to easily recognized and concrete 
things, and because they require the simultaneous assimilation of ambiguous and abstract 
concepts, they are high-inference or “fuzzy categories.”22 For example, artists 
interviewed may be using different working definitions for abstract concepts like moral 
or natural rights in relation to copyright, and separate individuals may emphasize or 
disregard elements of such a category depending on their unique professional 
experiences.  
These categories, and the coding method used in general for this research, was 
digitally organized through the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS). The specific software used for this study was RQDA, a free Linux 
distribution that allows for coded interviews to easily be compared and contrasted for 
repeated and emphasized codes, categories, cases, and attributes. This is in line with 
Corbin and Strauss’ suggestion to develop categories as a response to concepts that are 
repeatedly and similarly emphasized by different interview subjects as the researcher 
purposively looks for patterns that emerge within the findings.23 However, the use of 
high-inference categories means that some described instances may point to multiple, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Research,”  Journal of Consumer Research 21, no. 3 (1994): 493. 
22 Lindlof and Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 215. 
23 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, 
and Evaluative Criteria.” Qualitative Sociology, 13, no. 1 (1990): 8. 
85 
 
even contradictory, meanings, according to Lindlof and Taylor.24 Moreover, as suggested 
by Corbin and Strauss, this researcher has attempted to account for any variations within 
the patterns established by the interviews, and to examine data “for regularity and for an 
understanding of where that regularity is not apparent.”25 Further, attempts were made in 
the chapters of this dissertation on findings, conclusions and discussion to account for 
potential conceptual discrepancies when applicable, and to provide “clear, formal 
theoretical definitions of [each] working category.”26 In short, this researcher used the 
method described in this chapter to better explicate what each working category meant, 
and to provide clear definitions of those categories as a product of qualitative data 
analysis. 
The definitions of categories were heavily informed by interview subjects’ own 
experiences and interpretations of events related to the norms of copyright law. This was 
enabled in part by the development of follow-up questions within each individual 
interview. This researcher also allowed interview subjects to contribute in some way to 
the interviews that followed. This was enabled by the development of memos to elaborate 
on coded and analyzed data so as to determine what additional theoretical sampling 
would be required in future interviews.27 These memos aided in providing greater focus 
both to the process of data collection and this researcher’s own ideas.28 Through an 
iterative process of coding and categorizing collected data, this researcher was able to 
                                                 
24 Lindlof and Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 215. 
25 Corbin and Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative 
Criteria,” 10. 
26 Barry A. Turner, “Connoisseurship in the Study of Organizational Cultures,” in Doing 
Research in Organizations, ed. Alan Bryman (New York: Routledge, 1988): 109-110. 
27 Charmaz and Mitchell, “Grounded Theory in Ethnography,” 167-68. 
28 Ibid. 
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continually determine what additional theoretical sampling would be necessary to 
elaborate on the analysis of categories, as well as to more accurately compare individual 
accounts and discuss variation between those accounts.29 Again, this sampling primarily 
took the form of elite interviews. Since these interviews were conducted with individuals 
who may at different times operate at different points along the continuum of the creation 
of a fixed creative work, an analysis of process was also employed to denote when 
changes in working conditions led to changes in an artists’ interpretations of the concepts 
and categories discussed during interviews. This analysis of process was informed most 
clearly by the methodological techniques of Corbin and Strauss, who suggest analyzing 
process as a byproduct of the prevailing conditions in a workplace environment.30 
All of these disparate elements were taken into account for the interviews 
conducted and that served as the units of analysis for this study. Elite, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with artists and other professionals engaged with creative 
works subject to copyright, to the ultimate purpose of developing a rich tapestry of the 
various effects of current copyright norms on how, why, and what individual creative 
works of authorship are produced. One of the primary reasons for speaking with creative 
persons involved in the film, comic book, and general entertainment industry about their 
perceptions of copyright was the potential in those markets for continued inconsistencies 
in the application of legal and cultural norms for what constitutes derivative and 
infringing practices versus transformative and fair use practices. As explicated in the 
literature review, these include norms regarding resignification and remixing of fictional 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Corbin and Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative 
Criteria,” 10. 
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characters subject to trademark but not copyright. As the findings of these interviews 
demonstrate in Chapter 4, there were several concrete examples of artists perceiving 
inconsistent application of copyright norms during their own careers. 
Further justifications for the sample subjects chosen include the unique economic 
considerations that exist for artists creating works of authorship intended for a mass 
audience. Many such artists, from amateurs to professionals, are engaged in market 
transactions of original and derivative creative works in a loosely licensed environment. 
Some professionals, who have a continuity of employment at creative firms such as 
Marvel or DC Comics from the 1970s onward were also able to describe their personal 
interpretations of how the norms and laws related to intellectual property have changed 
over a lifetime. 
One final justification for the interview subjects chosen was that some artists 
represent efforts to create or enhance moral rights arguments for copyright independent 
of existing legislation, and thus have a prior stated interest in addressing copyright 
norms.31   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 One such individual, Neal Adams, successfully campaigned in the 1970s on behalf of 
the creators of Superman, Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, to receive ongoing creator credit 
and financial assistance from the publisher, DC, which owns the copyright and trademark 
to the character and was not legally obliged to care for ex-employees (Rafael Madoff, 
“Superman: Saving His Jewish Creators,” Jewish News Service, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.jns.org/latest-articles/2013/6/10/superman-saving-his-jewish-
creators#.WUAjpR8qdSU=). Today, The Hero Initiative (www.heroinitiative.org) and 
other charities engage in similar efforts to assist aging or infirm artists, while the Comic 
Book Legal Defense Fund (www.cbldf.org) is dedicated to the protection of the First 
Amendment rights of artists, with the support of numerous professional artists. 
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Participant Observation and Researcher Background 
 As this dissertation has so far shown, governments, private interest groups, 
authors, and representatives of the public have engaged in arguments about the proper 
role and implementation of copyright for hundreds of years. This researcher also 
acknowledges a personal connection to the current research as an audience member for 
fixed creative works subject to copyright. As an audience member, this researcher has 
also developed assumptions about the creative process followed by artists and authors 
like the ones interviewed for this research project even before the official onset of 
research conducted for this dissertation. Additionally, artists themselves have often 
written explicitly about personal experiences with copyright norms, enforcement, etc., 
creating a “reasonably useful cache of direct observation reports,”32 as well as pointing 
the way in certain cases towards individuals who would be willing and interested to 
discuss subject matter relevant to this study and dissertation.33 
Such pre-existing information informed what would serve as starting points for 
questions asked of interview subjects, although effort was made to critically reflect on the 
stated aims of those interviewed and remain aware of this researcher’s own personal 
“intuitive inclinations” that could at times alternatively contradict or support those 
statements.34 This researcher sought to assure interview subjects at all times that although 
guiding questions would be used to facilitate and direct their communication through the 
research topic of norms related to copyright and intellectual property, their own 
perceptions and responses would “not meet with denial, contradiction, competition, or 
                                                 
32 Lofland, Doing Social Life, 9. 
33 See, e.g., supra note 29. 
34 Valerie Janesick, “Intuition and Creativity: A Pas De Deux for Qualitative 
Researchers,” Qualitative Inquiry 7, no. 5 (2001): 533. 
89 
 
other harassment.”35 Interview protocol was also designed with both flexibility and 
rapport in mind. A flexible design for interviews and the collection of data helped to 
emphasize what Dexter describes as “the interviewee’s definition of the situation; 
encourag[e] the interviewer to structure the account of the situation; [and] let the 
interviewee introduce to a considerable extent...his notions of what he regards as 
relevant.”36 Rapport with each interview subject aided in the sense described by Lindlof 
and Taylor, in that this researcher was able to quickly establish the nature of this study 
and how the interview would be conducted,37 both aided by the short consent form and 
opening questions provided to each interview subject. 
However, like any research project, this one has limitations. Because this is a 
qualitative study, and does not include a representative sample, the findings from 
interviews should not be generalized to a broader population.38 This researcher did 
attempt to include interview subjects from a variety of professional backgrounds related 
to the research category of copyright, and interviews were conducted over the course of 
several months until theoretical saturation had been achieved. 
In addition to the limitations of the research methods used for this dissertation, 
there are also benefits to this type of qualitative research. For example, a qualitative 
research design such as this allows for a more effective study of human symbolic action 
                                                 
35 Mark Benney and Everett C. Hughes, “Of Sociology and the Interview: Editorial 
Preface,” American Journal of Sociology 62, no. 2 (1956): 140. 
36 Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, 5. 
37 Lindlof and Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 189. 
38 Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 11th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2007). 
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within the context of performance and practice39 than does a quantitative design. 
Interviews conducted provided valuable data concerning the “creative, local, and 
collaborative interaction events”40 that comprise each artist’s performance of 
communication. In the aggregate, these collective performances also point to shared 
practices that become routine in their repetition. This qualitative data was of great benefit 
in helping to catalog and analyze the ontology of copyright in the early twenty-first 
century and how it is epistemologically interpreted by working professionals at this time. 
  
                                                 
39 Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research 
Methods, 3rd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011), 4. 
40 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
The Interviews 
This chapter presents the findings related to interviews conducted with 
professional artists and other individuals engaged with creative works subject to 
copyright law. Individual interview subjects quoted here are not identified by name, but 
their positions within the creative industries they inhabit are listed when relevant to their 
comments. These individuals include visual and sequential artists. Sequential artists is a 
term used to describe those whose art is used to tell a narrative story, most often for 
comic books or storyboards for film. Other interviews were also conducted with authors 
of written works, editors, publishers, CEOs of comic book companies, and attorneys who 
specialize in copyright law. Interview subjects have either current or previous 
employment experience with a variety of firms that specialize in the publication of works 
subject to copyright law, including Marvel/Disney, Time Warner/DC Comics, Hasbro, 
Mattel, 20th Century Fox, CBS Corporation, Broadway Video, Verizon Communications, 
and a number of smaller publishers. 
Interviews with these individuals provided information related to common 
experiences with real or perceived copyright infringement, as well as thoughts related to 
potential future changes in copyright law. From this information, excerpts were taken and 
organized into the sections of this chapter. These sections are 1) artists accused of 
copyright and/or trademark infringement, 2) artists’ defense of intellectual properties, 3) 
joint authorship and collective works, 4) the nature of work for hire and copyright as a 
transferable right, and 5) the role of the public domain. These categories were chosen and 
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formalized as a result of the emic perspective of the interview subjects and the repeated 
similarities in experiences between those interviewed. As described in the preceding 
Methodology chapter, constant comparative analysis was used to help maintain such an 
emic perspective1 – or the foregrounding of the norms and cultural practices of those 
interviewed as those individuals experienced them – so that their subjective 
interpretations were most often presented in their own words. Through these categories, 
artists described their personal understanding of the boundaries of their rights and 
privileges in relation to copyright norms and policy, as well as the permeability of those 
boundaries as they interact with other individuals and groups engaged in similar artistic 
practice. 
The emic perspective of the interviewed individuals was also enabled by 
presenting the original words of those individuals as quotations whenever possible. In the 
interest of clarity and brevity, some quotes have been altered through the use of ellipses 
to excise extraneous words (...) including vocal fillers such as “like,” “you know,” etc. 
Entire sentences have also been excised through the use of ellipses (....) when those 
sentences are deemed unnecessary to communicate the interviewed individual’s thoughts, 
or tangential to the relevant category. Finally, a double hyphen (–) is used in quotes to 
indicate a pause in speech or incomplete sentence. 
This method, and the resultant categories described above, allow the interviewed 
artists to contribute to a mosaic of the current culture of copyright among professionals 
who create fixed artistic works. The findings, then, rather than depending on an empirical 
examination of the fixed artistic works – or artifacts – themselves, employs a conceptual 
                                                 
1 Sheila M. Fram, “The Constant Comparative Analysis Method Outside of Grounded 
Theory,” The Qualitative Report, 18(1) (2013): 1-25. 
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analysis of artistic practice as revealed by those interviewed.2 Many more examples of 
competing fixed artistic and/or creative works that could conceivably trigger concerns 
related to copyright exist. However, the examples in this chapter are the ones that are 
foregrounded and volunteered by the professionals interviewed, all of whom regularly 
engage with fixed creative works subject to copyright policies. 
 
Artists Accused of Copyright and/or Trademark Infringement 
Several artists who this researcher interviewed had prior experiences of being 
accused of actual or potential copyright and/or trademark infringement during their 
professional careers. Although a few instances of these accusations of infringement 
resulted in court battles and thus were a matter of public record, this researcher was most 
often unaware of these accusations before interviews were conducted. Therefore, 
interview subjects were not selected because of any known connection to situations 
involving accusations of infringement.3 These situations typically entailed receiving 
cease and desist letters that requested the accused artist to refrain from the further use of 
specific titles or imagery reserved as intellectual property under copyright or trademark 
laws. In more severe scenarios, interviewed artists have had to enter protracted legal 
battles in the court system, with the attendant time and material costs that such endeavors 
require.  
One individual interviewed describes a lawsuit concerning trademark 
                                                 
2 Darren Hicks, Artistic License: The Philosophical Problems of Copyright and 
Appropriation (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 34. 
3 One exception to this is the example described by the artist infra note 12 and 
accompanying text. This researcher was aware of this example of perceived trademark 
infringement before the interview, and so selected that interview subject in part to better 
explicate the known event. 
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infringement directed at a comic book company called Defiant for which he worked in 
the 1990s. At the time, Defiant published Warriors of Plasm, a name similar enough to a 
then-forthcoming title from Marvel Comics called Plasmer, that Marvel sued Defiant for 
“trademark infringement and unfair competition growing out of defendant’s use of the 
name ‘Plasm’ in the name of a comic book.”4 The individual interviewed for this 
dissertation recalls that the claim was not so much about a genuine potential for 
confusion between the two titles, instead “it was about trying to put [Defiant] out of 
business.”5 
The judge for the case, Michael B. Mukasey, who would later serve as U.S. 
Attorney General, seemed to agree with the interviewed individual’s assessment, as 
Mukasey’s initial ruling was to deny the plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment,6 and 
Marvel dropped the suit without appeal. The interviewed individual provides further 
context: 
[Mukasey’s] trying the first World Trade Center bombers in the morning, and 
he’s trying comic book stuff in the afternoon. When he read his opinion, [Marvel] 
lost every point of every category. Every one. And then he gave a fairly glowing 
review of Plasm, [Defiant’s] Plasm, and then he finishes his opinion, and he calls 
the Marvel lawyers to the bench, and he covers his mike, but you can hear him 
anyway, and he says, “You ever use my court as a business weapon again, and 
you will sincerely regret it. And you better not appeal.” And Marvel withdrew the 
suit. Anyway, that’s what they were doing, it was a business weapon, to put us out 
of business before we got started.7 
 
                                                 
4 Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, a Division of Enlightened Entertainment, Ltd., 837 F. 
Supp. 546, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
5 Interview with JS, February 11, 2018. 
6 Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, a Division of Enlightened Entertainment, Ltd., 837 F. 
Supp. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, or legally 
binding determination of the court, specifically in this case to hold that the plaintiff’s 
trademark in the name Plasm, first sought in the United Kingdom, would be granted 
statutory protection at the same date in the United States. 
7 Interview with JS, February 11, 2018. 
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This individual is also clear about the negative ramifications of having to defend against 
charges of trademark and copyright infringement, even in spite of doing so successfully. 
“It cost $300,000 to win, which is a lot like losing.”8 
Other artists interviewed for this dissertation provide examples of accusations of 
infringement that had far less severe material costs. Like the prior example, the next 
situation is one wherein the dual intellectual property protections of trademark and 
copyright in relation to fictional characters are conflated.9 One individual, another writer 
and publisher, describes receiving a cease and desist letter from Marvel for allegedly 
infringing on the trademark of one of its characters, the Punisher, who wears a prominent 
white skull logo on a black t-shirt. As the writer/publisher describes it: 
We were publishing a series with a gothy girl character wearing fishnets and 
everything else, and she had a t-shirt on her with a cartoon skull. Marvel sent a 
cease and desist based on an [advertisement featuring that character], and said 
“you cannot use a black shirt with a skull on it, that’s our trademark for the 
Punisher.” It was just Marvel’s lawyers looking for stuff to go after. So my 
attorney wrote a big response going back to the Jolly Roger flag and pirates and 
all kinds of shit. But Marvel...are going to do whatever they want, so instead we 
changed the t-shirt on the cover to say ‘punish me.’10 
 
For this publisher, then, it was acceptable to make changes to the iconography of a yet-to-
be published cover to avoid a protracted legal dispute. However, the inclusion of the 
phrase “punish me” did add a sly metatextual commentary to the whole affair, satirizing 
Marvel’s efforts to enforce its exclusive use of select iconography. Since this satire was 
employed as a result of threatened legal action, it is also political speech. This 
relationship between satirical and political speech is examined in more detail in the 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 See supra notes 224-245, Chapter 2, and accompanying text, for discussion of this 
conflation of trademark and copyright in relation to fictional characters. 
10 Interview with JB, May 26, 2018. 
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conclusions and discussions chapter.11 
Another artist describes how his publication of a comic he wrote and drew 
attracted the attention of a popular rock band. The band’s legal representatives requested 
this artist cease using the current title for his book, which was also the name of the band. 
As this artist recounts the incident: 
Back in 1994, I put out a [comic] book called Black Flag, and the idea was that 
this character was betrayed by his government, and so he blacked out all the flags 
on his uniform. That’s where I got the name from. I put it out, and I thought 
eventually, “Maybe the roach spray might send me a letter or whatever.” They 
never did, but I did get a letter from the Henry Rollins band, Black Flag, asking 
me to cease and desist. I got scared, because I didn’t know anything at the time 
about it. So I just changed the name to Black Seed.12 
  
This artist describes how if he received a similar letter today, he would be less likely to 
change the name of his comic book. “I realized that the only way they could do that in 
reality is if there was brand confusion. If I had a band called Black Flag, or if my comic 
had an album or music associated with it, and it said Black Flag on it, there would be 
brand confusion.”13 Ultimately, because the manufacturers of roach motels, the rock 
music band, and this artist himself were all serving separate markets, there was and still is 
an inconsequential likelihood of consumers being confused about the differing nature of 
each product. “You can fight some of these things. People get an itchy trigger finger with 
their legal letters, and you can talk to somebody that knows some things and find out that 
you can keep on going. In that case, I could.”14 
Other individuals interviewed reinforce the claim that litigation is not always 
necessary to reach an agreement between parties in a case of potential infringement. One 
                                                 
11 See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text, Chapter 5. 
12 Interview with DF, February 16, 2018. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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artist and publisher describes the following situation, wherein the president of a rival 
publishing firm called to inform him that a potential lawsuit for trademark infringement 
was being considered: 
[The president of the rival company] called and said, “We’re going to have to sue 
you.” My partner...at least was a lawyer, so I put [them] on the phone with him. 
And [the president] was a big music fan, and [my partner] was associated with the 
Allman brothers band. And so in exchange for getting Allman Brothers backstage 
passes, he forgot it. He just said, “Ok, you guys can do it. I get the backstage 
passes.”15 
 
The publisher interviewed describes this particular situation as likely being a case 
without merit. “[The rival publisher] sort of over-reached. Even back then, they were 
over-litigious.”16 Still, at least in that example, those accused of infringement found it 
more beneficial to come to an agreement with a rival publisher accusing them of 
infringement, rather than to pursue the matter in a court of law. 
Individuals with prior experience working for large publishing corporations 
describe how those corporations have employed discretion in making and pursuing 
claims of copyright infringement against artists. For example, a former talent manager at 
Marvel states that artists who had worked for the company are free to reproduce and sell 
work they had created featuring Marvel characters under certain guidelines. 
It’s not really a stated record, but Marvel kind of, as long as you work for the 
company or had worked for the company, you’re allowed to feature their 
intellectual property in 30 percent of your sketchbook.... If you have a 100 page 
sketchbook, 30 pages can have Marvel property on it, and they won’t really pay 
attention to it.... [The company] likes to have it on their radar as long as you’re 
communicating that. I feel like that’s a good rule of thumb.17 
 
This individual also states that Marvel is within their statutory rights to pursue 
                                                 
15 Interview with JS, February 11, 2018. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Interview with ZR, July 10, 2018. 
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claims of copyright infringement against those artists who hew to the 30 percent standard, 
but that they are unlikely to do so. However, this does not mean that writers and artists 
who have worked with the company are absolutely free to reproduce and distribute work 
for which Marvel owns the copyright. For example, a former writer for Marvel, Gary 
Friedrich, sued the company for the copyright in the character of Ghost Rider that he had 
co-created in 1972.18 Simultaneous to this lawsuit, Friedrich was also selling reproduced 
printed materials of the character at conventions and online, leading to a countersuit by 
Marvel. 
According to the talent manager, “[Friedrich] was trying to sue Marvel for a piece 
of the pie from the Ghost Rider movies. And with him raising such a stink about it – I 
think they looked a little bit closer at ‘Look at all these prints you’re selling at shows.’”19 
At one point, Friedrich was ordered to pay $17,000 for his unlicensed distribution of 
copyrighted materials.20 “It kind of shook the comics community a little bit because 
[Marvel] kind of made an example out of him.”21 Eventually, Marvel and Friedrich 
“amicably agreed to resolve all claims,” according to Friedrich’s lawyer.22 Again, this 
talent manager describes this situation as a rare case, and that artists typically are allowed 
to make limited reproductions of their own artistic works even if a publisher or other 
third party owns the copyright. 
                                                 
18 Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., No. 12-893 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
19 Interview with ZR, July 10, 2018. 
20 Kiel Phegley, “Friedrich Ordered to Pay Marvel $17k Over ‘Ghost Rider,’” Comic 
Book Resources, February 9, 2012, accessed July 10, 2018, 
https://www.cbr.com/friedrich-ordered-to-pay-marvel-17k-over-ghost-rider/. 
21 Interview with ZR, July 10, 2018. 
22 Eriq Gardner, “Marvel Settles Lawsuit with ‘Ghost Rider’ Creator,” The Hollywood 
Reporter, September 9, 2013, accessed July 10, 2018, 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marvel-settles-lawsuit-ghost-rider-624609. 
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I can’t speak for [Marvel], but I have worked in comics for nearly fifteen years. I 
think they kind of turn a blind eye as long as you are working with the company 
and not infringing too much on their intellectual property. It’s almost like it’s 
good for business, right? And I don’t think there’s anything set in stone. I just 
know that when I was training there, if [an artist was] being greedy, they’ll 
know.23 
 
The 30 percent rule, then, does potentially establish a standard policy for an 
acceptable amount of infringement. Further, the transfer of ownership for the copyright of 
a fixed creative work allows for this initial possibility that an artist’s reproduction of their 
own creative labor might legally be construed as infringement. The next section of this 
chapter presents examples of artists who instead own all underlying copyrights in their 
creative works, and later sections further discuss the phenomenon of copyright itself as a 
transferable right. 
 
Artists’ Defense of Intellectual Properties 
In contrast to the prior section’s examples of artists who were accused of 
copyright and trademark infringement, this section describes the experiences of 
interviewed artists who sought to defend their own intellectual property rights when 
others infringed upon them. For example, one artist, previously mentioned,24 describes 
how he had asked another artist who had solicited the sale of a new comic, titled Black 
Flag, to refrain from using that title. 
At some point, last year or 2016, I saw a comic that was going to be coming out 
that they were calling Black Flag, and of course I had to send them a letter. I sent 
it myself, I didn’t get any lawyers involved. And I just explained to them, “Hey, 
you know, maybe in other instances it would be okay, but I already have a comic 
called Black Flag, and if someone searches on the web for ‘Black Flag comic,’ 
now both of ours are going to show up, and that doesn’t make any sort of sense.” 
                                                 
23 Interview with ZR, July 10, 2018. 
24 See supra notes 11-13. 
100 
 
They agreed, and changed the name of their book.25 
 
This artist describes how this use of the Black Flag title would have a greater 
likelihood of brand confusion among consumers than the prior examples of roach motels 
and rock music bands using the same name. He also describes how he did not personally 
find it necessary to employ an attorney or send a more formal cease and desist letter. This 
procedure was successful for him, but stands in contrast to the procedures used by some 
of the other copyright owners interviewed for this dissertation, who did retain legal 
representation when enforcing their own copyrights. 
Other individuals interviewed describe several situations where they employed 
legal and pre-legal practices to protect their own intellectual property. Again, a common 
method for this, especially when infringement takes the form of literal mechanical 
copying of existing artwork – as opposed to the use of underlying ideas and forms in the 
creation of new derivative works – is the use of cease and desist letters. One respondent, 
the president and chief operating officer of a mid-range publishing company, states,  
Yeah, we have definitely had to send cease-and-desist letters to people who were  
misappropriating our artwork. It’s actually more people using our artwork for 
things. We haven’t really had any issues with fan fiction or stuff like that. But I 
have found that a lot of times we will find our artwork used in advertising. I have 
found our artwork being used for advertising for a strip club in Florida. We sent 
them a cease and desist letter and they immediately took it down. We have a 
trademark and IP [intellectual property] attorney that I use, and we have a 
separate attorney, too. I can email him the link, and he’ll just take care of it.26 
 
The same respondent notes that this tactic for discouraging unlicensed use of 
copyrighted art and other fixed works has its limitations. Since cease and desist letters 
rely on the potential enforcement of legal statutes, the threat of enforcement is absent in 
                                                 
25 Interview with DF, February 16, 2018. 
26 Interview with MH, November 4, 2017. 
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jurisdictions where laws differ on what constitutes acceptable derivative use. He 
describes the initial shock of traveling to Japan and finding that his company’s characters 
were being used in numerous unlicensed, sexually explicit derivations: 
In Japan, you go into comic book stores and they have separate rooms where – 
The publishers in Japan allow this and it’s legal, they will publish fan fiction that 
is often pornography. You’ll have Capcom characters fucking Final Fantasy 
characters in some comic series, and you can go into this room if you want to see 
Street Fighter fucking so-and-so, you can buy it. I remember going over there 
when we doing [licensed versions of our characters] in Japan, there was some of 
our stuff there and it freaked me out. Whenever it’s pornography, you’re always 
concerned about your character, but in that culture, it’s allowed and considered 
normal. But if that was done [in the United States], if somebody started 
publishing some Wonder Woman porno comic, they’d get shut the fuck down in a 
heartbeat.27 
 
Artists in America trying to protect their intellectual property, then, may have 
difficulties controlling the unlicensed use of materials under trademark and copyright in 
cultures outside the United States. Efforts are further impeded by the differing cultural 
and legal norms of foreign territories, although cultural norms may diverge even between 
exclusively American artists. For example, either side in a case of infringement may have 
contradictory viewpoints on what may be deemed socially appropriate imagery, as the 
next example demonstrates. 
One interviewed artist who owns his own comic book character describes having 
a vested interest in preventing unlicensed usage of his intellectual property out of concern 
for being wrongfully associated with infringing parties. He talks about an experience 
where another artist used a character he had created without permission: “I took offense 
to it.... It’s not his property, it’s my property. I probably would have let it slide, or I 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
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would have been okay with it, had he said, ‘Hey, can I do this?’”28 This artist states that 
permission would be granted on the condition that anyone who sought a legitimate 
license refrained from creating imagery of his character that featured content such as 
alcohol consumption. He further states, 
There were shot glasses, the character was dreaming, but there were shot glasses 
and alcohol [in the unlicensed image], and in the caption while the character’s 
punching, they say something about light beer or whatever. For me, I draw comic 
books that are for everyone, and I go to the library and I teach a class there, and I 
do little seminars.... I would certainly hate it if I was trying to work out something 
with someone where I was going to go speak with them, and they say “Let’s do a 
little background check on this guy,” and they type it in Google, and the first 
thing that pops up is that image and they see shot glasses. They might say, “Hey, 
we gotta hit the brakes on this, this is not going to work. We don’t want to mix 
kids and alcohol.”29 
 
New derivative interpretations of artistic expressions and characters, then, can be 
at odds with the intentions of the original creators and/or current copyright owners, as 
this example shows. Again, unlicensed derivations may have negative effects on the 
copyright owner’s use and economic exploitation of the original work in traditional 
markets. Examples such as those articulated above that describe or depict alcohol use or 
sexually explicit behavior especially may be cause for concern if they are misinterpreted 
by potential clients and patrons of the original creator as originating from that creator. 
This researcher did not interview the infringing artist in that example, but another 
artist speaks about potential motivations for creating art using another person’s characters 
instead of new ones: “For me, and for a lot of creators, the attraction of them and the 
pleasure of them is that we are not using the largest icons, but [comic book characters] 
                                                 
28 Interview with EM, March 3, 2018. 
29 Ibid. 
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did have their status as icons, and to plug into that is kind of cool.”30 As that artist states, 
the personal interpretation of a previously published character can be a satisfying creative 
experience for many artists. 
New interpretations of existing fixed works and fictional characters may be 
created at the behest of the copyright owner, but according to one writer interviewed, 
there are also legal grey areas when artists create new derivative works without license. 
This writer describes the scene at typical comic book and pop culture conventions: 
Any convention you go to, it’s full of technically illegal bootleg prints by people 
drawing other people’s characters.... If a smaller creator sees their stuff 
bootlegged, it might be a little weirder to them, a little closer to home, different 
than a corporate entity or character. But that person’s not doing anything 
differently than if they were drawing Deadpool [a character owned by Disney].31 
 
As this person describes it, while the act of creating an unlicensed derivation of a 
corporate-owned character is legally the same as doing so for a creator-owned character, 
there are cultural distinctions. If an artist owns the copyright and trademark in a character 
he or she created, others may feel more inclined to respect that artist’s preferences 
towards the creation of derivative interpretations of that character. 
Another writer and editor describes this same phenomenon of individuals “selling 
prints of other people’s trademarked and copyrighted characters,” and states, “It’s 
interesting because technically that’s a violation of copyright law. But it’s not being 
enforced.” This writer notes that there are exceptions to that lack of enforcement, such as 
one writer/creator who “pretty routinely will walk around and if he sees a...print [of his 
character], will tell them to take it the fuck down or he’s going to sue them, and people 
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just take it down.”32  
One writer describes a spectrum of infringement in these types of cases: 
I take issue when it’s more of a straight-up copyright violation versus trademark 
infringement. If someone draws your character, shares it, posts it, that’s another 
level, you can argue if it was right or wrong. It’s way different than if someone 
takes the image you created and duplicates or reposts that image. So that I would 
have a problem with. If someone was taking my covers for my books and 
scanning them, then putting them on things and selling them, that person I’m 
going to go after. If someone made a new print of [my character], it’d probably be 
flattering. I don’t know, I don’t want to open myself up to “it’s okay.”33 
 
That last statement – that the writer would prefer not to open himself up to the 
widespread reinterpretation of his creative works as acceptable without license – suggests 
that that individual at least would prefer artists to seek license when creating derivative 
interpretations of works and characters for which he owns the copyright. The prior 
examples listed above also present some of the potential consequences of ignoring this 
licensing requirement in general. 
There are some key historical examples of artists who did not seek license for 
derivative interpretations, and yet found great success in the marketplace. It is also 
possible for artists to create derivations of existing works that receive greater acclaim and 
become more valuable – in dollar terms – than an original work on which they are based. 
A prominent example of this phenomenon in the twentieth century is the work of Roy 
Lichtenstein, who repurposed comic strip and comic book art as fine art, but without 
attribution to the original artists or publications from which they were derived. So while 
Lichtenstein’s work is often described favorably, an artist interviewed for this dissertation 
does not hold such an opinion: 
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Yes, that no-talent Roy Lichtenstein. Who stole Russ Heath, and Irv Novak, and 
Jack Abel images, and turned them into prints. I brought one of those to show to 
Jack Abel, and I said Jack, why don’t you sue this guy? And he’s making millions 
off the image that he stole from Jack. I think DC Comics should have sued 
Lichtenstein, because taking your product and just saying it’s now become fine art 
– it’s one thing to put it on your living room wall, or maybe on the side of your 
comic book company, but it’s another thing to start selling it for millions, and not 
give any percentage of it to the original source.34 
 
Those who potentially infringe a copyright through unlicensed duplication or derivation, 
then, may have noble or at least innocuous intentions, but for a professional artist such 
duplication also represents potentially lost revenue. The same artist states, “I do paintings 
and drawings...and so if I found anyone just using my image – well, on one level, it’s 
flattering, on another level, if you think so highly of it, compensate me for it.”35 Again, 
some artists might like additional attention for their work, but would almost certainly also 
enjoy some additional remuneration. This phenomenon is addressed in more detail in the 
conclusions and discussion chapter of this dissertation.36 
 All of the preceding examples of real and perceived copyright infringement may 
be discouraging to artists and writers who would prefer not to have to confront such 
issues. Further, as discussed in the literature review,37 it is the responsibility of the 
copyright owner to initiate any claims of infringement, and the government does not 
enforce related statutes absent such claims. Several of the preceding examples from 
interviewed artists describe how these claims may unfold in physical and print settings, 
but potential cases of infringement are even more ubiquitous through the mediated virtual 
space of the Internet, where the barriers to digital publication and distribution are 
                                                 
34 Interview with JR, November 4, 2017. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See infra notes 4-11, Chapter 5. 
37 See supra notes 214-215, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
106 
 
comparatively low. One individual, a senior content analyst for a popular Internet site 
that enables widespread distribution of user-generated content, describes his job as 
“Basically – Internet police.... I’d say my job is 40 percent moderating copyright 
infringement or DMCA policies.”38 This analyst reinforces the point that in cases of 
potential copyright infringement on the site, all removal of copyrighted material is 
initiated by the request of a copyright owner, and not by himself or the site. As he 
describes it: 
A lot of that is user-reported, and they have to, when they report content that they 
think is theirs, and is being infringed upon, they have to swear an oath, under 
penalty and perjury that “I swear this content is mine.” As well as provide a 
source of where the content may have been taken from. If that source is no longer 
online, they have to explain where it might have been taken from.... 
 
It would be illegal to pre-emptively remove [material] without hearing from a 
copyright owner. The volume is just so high, and there’s that grey area of what’s 
considered transformative work. So with that grey area of transformative work – 
that’s on a case-by-case basis. Because at the end of the day, we are a platform 
founded by creators, so we want to make sure that creators have some breathing 
room. And if it’s transformative enough, we’re going to fight for the user’s right 
to use that content.39 
 
Again, the ultimate responsibility of claiming a copyright in a given fixed work rests with 
the owner of the copyright to that work. And while enforcement of copyrights for literal 
mechanical copying are generally more clear, the use of an underlying work in the 
development of a derivative or transformative new work potentially obfuscates who is 
morally and legally in the right. 
A derivative or transformative work may trigger copyright concerns for the author 
of the original underlying work. Sometimes, though, new works may share only minor 
qualities with an existing work, or both artists may create works drawing inspiration from 
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similar sources without awareness of the other. One writer and publisher offers the 
following advice to aspiring creators who worry about others that create similar works: 
You have to kinda not worry about people stealing your ideas, which might be a 
counterintuitive thing. You can’t protect certain ideas or – It really seems that no 
matter how unique your idea is, and it seems like you’re pulling it out of the ether, 
there’s going to be like three other people somewhere at the same time that pull 
the same idea down.... Every author feels like that, you come up with something 
and then hear about something real similar like two months later, and think “shit.” 
Honestly, you gotta protect yourself, but you can’t be delusional about that stuff. 
The best thing you can do is get out there and get it into circulation. Not being an 
attorney, I think the best thing you can do is, before copyright filing, before any of 
that, just get it out there in the world, get it circulated in multiple states.40 
 
Artists who bring their work to market, then, are not guaranteed absolute 
protection against infringement. However, having their work widely circulated is the best 
defense in case issues of infringement develop. As the next section shows, these issues 
may be further complicated when creative works are produced by multiple, or joint, 
authors. 
 
Joint Authorship and Collective Works 
Findings presented in this chapter so far have been related to examples of 
copyright and trademark infringement as experienced by artists and publishers. Examples 
of such infringement are enabled by the view of copyright as an entitlement that allows 
artists to exclude competing derivative works from the legitimate marketplace. Such 
entitlements are most clearly understood in cases where a single author is the owner of a 
particular copyright. The creation of fixed works by multiple parties, however, 
particularly in film, television, and comic books, means that two or more authors may 
have legitimate claims to ownership of a copyright in a jointly created work. In the 
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absence of a formal contract or agreement between individuals who have jointly authored 
a fixed creative work, any party may exercise any and all exclusive rights enabled by 
copyright law without the consent of the other party or parties. As one attorney describes 
it: 
Joint authors all have the same rights, and the same degree of ownership. So if 
you have four people, those four people all own that work, and any one of them 
could do whatever they want with it without the permission of the other three, 
because they are all equal owners. The only time they need permission, is when 
they’re going to grant an exclusive license. A non-exclusive license, which maybe 
a toy company will take because we can see, for example, there’s tons of toy 
companies making Star Wars toys, or what have you. A non-exclusive license, 
they can give it to someone, and the only responsibility then is to account to [the 
other copyright owners], saying, this is how much money we made, and now 
we’re going to split it.41 
 
This legal entitlement to license or distribute a creative work without the consent of a 
coauthor can lead to disagreements between individuals, and is in part why two lawyers 
interviewed for this research project strongly advise developing a written contract 
between authors before a creative work is published.42,43  
There’s nothing wrong with saying to your co-authors, “Hey, I’m excited about 
this project, we’re all going to work together on it. But let’s talk about it now. 
Let’s get it down in writing. Let’s figure out exactly what we’re going to do. So 
that way, we’ve finished with the business end, and now we’re going to focus on 
the creative process....” It’s very difficult to do, especially if, in a lot of these 
collaborative situations, people are friends. People have been friends since 
childhood, people are neighborhood friends or in the same comic book circles. 
And nothing sours a friendly relationship faster than a contract.44 
 
Despite this risk of potentially damaging a long-standing relationship by broaching the 
subject of a written contract, every attorney interviewed – and the majority of artists – 
emphasize the necessity of a written contract for long-term success. Otherwise, 
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disagreements between joint authors later on, after a fixed creative work has potentially 
found economic success in the marketplace – and in the absence of a contract between 
the joint authors – can lead to protracted and expensive legal battles. As one attorney 
describes it, “Once something is successful, everyone is positive that they are a genius. 
And if you have multiple geniuses negotiating against each other, see you in court.”45 For 
a lesser-known author or creator, such legal proceedings are “basically professional 
suicide.”46  
Another attorney provides specific details on the cost of litigation to pursue 
charges of copyright infringement. “I tell my clients, plan to spend five to ten grand a 
month if you’re in litigation. And if it’s in a situation like copyright where you could be 
rewarded substantial damages, just because you win doesn’t mean you’re going to 
collect.”47 Even for a successful artist, attorney’s fees are a significant cost – starting at 
“$250 and up an hour”48 – so this attorney recommends that artists know and 
communicate what their goals are when deciding to litigate: 
My first question [to a potential client] is “How do you want this to end?” So if all 
they want is just for the person to take down the content, then that helps me to tell 
them what is the right way to proceed. Because if I can use a DMCA takedown or 
a cease and desist letter, that is much more affordable than full litigation.49 
 
Wealthier and more established creators may be able to afford the legal costs of a 
copyright dispute with a joint author, but would likely prefer to avoid those costs by 
establishing a contract before publication. “I guarantee that in taking a case up to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, there were hundreds of thousands 
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of dollars of legal bills on both sides by the time they got there,”50 states one attorney, 
citing a prominent case that centered on a copyright dispute and ownership of jointly 
developed comic book characters.51 “It was a gigantic amount of money. And they could 
have gotten out of it...[with] maybe one or two difficult conversations with their 
friends.”52 Instead, besides the dissolution of a previously amiable working relationship, 
that case resulted in a decision that allowed each party to claim ownership in joint works 
where the individual contributions to those works were not in and of themselves 
copyrightable.53 The plaintiff in that case, Neil Gaiman, also received full copyright and 
trademark ownership of a comic book character called Angela as a result of a settlement 
between the two parties, and would later sell these rights to Marvel Comics in toto.54  
As one attorney states, an existing written contract between Gaiman and 
defendant Todd McFarlane at the outset of their working relationship would have helped 
to prevent the lawsuit that did occur, and thus eliminate the legal costs associated with 
such a suit. According to this attorney: 
Doing this stuff in advance of the problem is a lot easier, a lot cheaper, and at the 
end of the day, you’re a creator, you’re an artist, you’re a writer. You don’t want 
to be spending your time – It takes a lot more money, aggravation, etc. to fix the 
problem than it does to avoid it. Time and the aggravation to try and fix 
something that will take time out of your day and put you in a terrible mindset.... 
You don’t want to be in the business of solving problems, you want to be in the 
business of creating.55 
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Interviewed artists reinforce this notion of the primacy of creativity as a preferred 
practice rather than litigation. One artist states that contracts, promissory notes, and other 
written agreements are a secondary concern to the act of creation, and have so far had 
little bearing on his professional creative career. However, this also means that he has 
been willing to work with others without an existing written contract. For example, this 
artist describes a working relationship with another author, with whom he shares a 
copyright in a multimedia project: “It’s all handshakes.... Because I know and trust him. 
Again, I know you should never say that that’s the best way to do it.”56 This artist notes 
that this approach to written contracts, or the lack thereof, is not one he would 
recommend to others. However, he also states that he has not found written contracts, 
when created, to be of much help in cases where money or other considerations are owed 
to him. “I literally have paperwork that is promissory monies for this that and the other, 
ownership of stock in companies – I once worked for a guy, and when that company went 
belly up, he owed $7500 in unpaid monies to me. Never got it.”57 This artist further 
describes that such an experience is to be expected, but that he bore no ill will. “If I ever 
saw that dude – I would stand up and give him a big hug.” Again, this artist notes how he 
would not offer this method for business dealings to others, but in his own words, “I 
don’t ever want to have problems with anybody, I don’t ever want to cause strife. Maybe 
I’m the world’s greatest punching-bag, but – I’m hopefully not dealing with any of those 
people anymore.”58 
Another writer and publisher states that he would typically use written contracts 
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instead of relying on verbal agreements, but “verbal contracts, you know, I have done it 
before, but you gotta really know the people you’re doing it with. Written, it’s all 
explained.”59 As with the example from the prior artist described above, this writer states 
that disagreements, particularly about unpaid monies, may still arise. “If you have a 
verbal agreement with someone, and then you work together for a year, and then you go 
sue each other, either one of you are lucky to get anything out of it other than grief.”60 
However, it is possible, according to this writer, that a judge may see evidence of a verbal 
contract and working relationship that was followed for a period of time before promised 
payments ceased. A judge might rule in favor of a plaintiff in such cases, but this writer 
warns, that judge could also dismiss a case entirely. “In my experience, judges do have a 
lot of power in terms of what they decide.”61 
Attorneys interviewed do recognize that written contracts, in and of themselves, 
are not a guarantee against litigation when disagreements arise. Contracts that are not 
specifically tailored to the needs of all involved parties, and instead drawn up in whole or 
in part from boilerplate or generic documents, can open creators up to costly legal battles 
if disagreements arise. “There’s a lot of liability in that, because a contract that’s 80 
percent good enough for you is 100 percent going to wind up in a lawsuit.”62 The best 
way to prevent this, according to attorneys, is to not rely on generic written agreements, 
and instead “talk over your issues” with a lawyer, focusing on things like “who are you 
working with, what do they bring to the table, what issues do you see coming up, what 
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problems have you had in your discussion?”63 From there, legal professionals can help 
creators draft a contract specific to their situation.  
Attorneys also point out that creators looking to draft any written agreement 
should not rely on just one person: “Be wary of one attorney who says they can handle 
everything.”64 Authors and artists engaged in the creation of joint works must necessarily 
recognize that the creation of their fixed creative works was not achieved by the efforts of 
just one person. Therefore, there is a familiar logic to the suggestion that contractual 
agreements for the administration of rights related to copyright can similarly not be 
completed by a single individual. 
In summary, interviews conducted for this research demonstrate that joint works 
in general presume that all creative parties involved in the creation of a specific fixed 
work share in the ownership rights granted by copyright law. But as the next section will 
describe, copyright itself is a transferable right, and authors may divest themselves from 
ownership in a copyrighted work. With works made for hire, this transfer of ownership is 
enacted even before a creative work has been fixed in tangible form. 
 
Work For Hire and Copyright as a Transferable Right 
In addition to the complications that arise from the joint creation of creative 
works and the resultant shared ownership of a copyright, any individual who owns a 
copyright also has the legal ability to transfer that ownership to another party. This 
transfer of copyright shifts the authority of who may legally exclude others from the 
marketplace. These transactions may be done following the completion of a fixed 
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creative work, or even prior to any artistic labor being enacted. A priori transfer of 
copyright is described in the law as work made for hire.65 
Since work made for hire as a legal concept was introduced with the 1976 
Copyright Act, enough time has passed for successful publishing firms to be aware of the 
statutory requirements and secure work for hire agreements with employees when 
relevant. However, one editor who was working at a popular comic book publisher at the 
time of the law’s initial implementation in 1978 describes the difficulties of securing the 
then-new written agreements from employees and independent contractors. The publisher 
had not prepared for the changes in copyright law, and “we had to play catch-up, because 
nobody had done anything. No preparations made, it just took us all by surprise. And we 
had to get agreements from people that say that everything they ever did was work for 
hire.”66 This lack of preparation stood in contrast to at least one rival publisher that the 
interviewed editor describes as “always pretty buttoned up. So, by the time the copyright 
law changed, they had already had all-new vouchers printed, with the work for hire 
statement on it, and they were totally prepared.”67 
The editor states that his organization’s lack of preparation for the changes in 
statute also had the effect of discouraging writers and artists from signing any work for 
hire documents drafted by the company. “The first document that was prepared by 
lawyers was all scary language...and nobody wanted to sign it. Nobody. So I rewrote it, 
and made it one page. Vetted it through the lawyers, they said, ‘Yeah, that’s okay.’ We 
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finally got everyone to sign.... It was really a mess.”68 While this individual no longer 
works for this publisher, that company continues to publish comic books today, and owns 
copyrights to the vast majority of the creative work it publishes. 
An artist working for that same publisher at the same point in time describes the 
situation in similar terms: 
Yeah, the work for hire thing started to be distributed, and people were saying, 
“I’m not going to sign it, and I got a lawyer.” That was dishonest and 
disingenuous, because by the act of signing the back of the check, it said you 
agreed to all this stuff. Again, I’m part of the team, so I didn’t create anything, so 
I didn’t have the outrage others did, but I was in solidarity with them. But 
ultimately, I don’t know of anybody who fought the system and won it.69 
 
Now, with work for hire existing as an ingrained practice at many publishing 
firms for decades, artists have developed an understanding of its potential ramifications. 
Artists interviewed for this dissertation describe the recognition that such a transfer of 
ownership divests an artist of his or her rights in relation to the reproduction and 
publication of a creative work. One artist states,  
I don’t have any rights. I signed a contract, that said “you give up any rights for 
any work we do, work-for-hire.” I mean, it’s kind of sad and ironic all at the same 
time, because there are people who say, “Well, I’m not going to give my good 
work to this company, because I’m going to wait until I do it on my own. Because 
they’re going to own my characters.”70 
 
Work for hire practices, then, potentially encourage artists to withhold what they might 
consider their own best work. They recognize that they will have limited or non-existent 
control of that work’s presentation in the marketplace, as well as limited or non-existent 
financial reward when a work made for hire achieves economic success. 
 The alternative to such work made for hire agreements, according to interviewed 
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attorneys, is for artists to negotiate for retaining the copyright in the work they create. 
Retaining the copyright then allows the artist to license initial or derivative publication 
rights to publishers or other third parties. One attorney provides the potential financial 
advantages of such an agreement: 
Nowadays you would say, “I’m not going to sign [a work for hire agreement], I’m 
going to license it to you. And I’m going to get royalties. And you’re going to pay 
me 5 percent.” And 5 percent of a billion dollars is a lot of money, rather than the 
$10,000 you got paid and you thought “That’s great, I can’t believe I made ten 
grand off of this. That’s terrific.” Now are you going to be successful negotiating 
that all the time? Probably not, unless you’re established and have a big name, 
and you have a good track record. But there’s no sense in not trying. Say that up 
front, don’t wait for it to go completely out of control.71 
 
As that hypothetical negotiation proposes, the financial rewards for retaining the 
copyright in a creative work can be significant. However, many artists and writers may 
not have a complete understanding of the differences between work for hire and creator-
owned agreements. One interviewed artist speaks about creative persons in the comic 
book industry as falling into one of two camps with regard to work for hire: 
The thing is, most of the people I talk to, are either people who work on freelance 
comics, so they don’t own anything. Or they are people who do independent 
comics books, so they own what they’re doing, but they haven’t done anything 
big enough where they’ve sold the rights outright.72 
 
Economic considerations are foregrounded, then, for artists who are considering not just 
the sale of copies of their creative efforts, but also the sale of the copyright itself. Such a 
sale may be the result of economic success, but as the same artist states, it can also be the 
result of destitution and bankruptcy: 
When you go bankrupt and you’re a comic book professional, and you own [a 
copyright or trademark], it becomes part of your assets. So you can lose your 
thing.... Certain people, if they end up having to file for bankruptcy because they 
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overproduce content or otherwise put themselves in harm’s way, then have to file 
for bankruptcy, the characters they own are an asset. And they lose them because 
someone else will swing in and go “I will buy this because I’m now going to take 
over this.” And the money goes to basically cover whatever people are owed. I’ve 
seen this happen.73 
 
Another option for artists who enter into a publishing agreement with certain 
publishers is to sell or transfer a portion of the copyright to the now economically-
invested third party. In some cases, while the original artists or other creative persons 
may retain the title of copyright in whole or in part, the publisher will retain controlling 
interest in the licensing of derivative works based on the original work, and otherwise 
administer intellectual property rights in new media. As one publisher states,  
We have work made for hire contracts, and we have different types of deals. We 
can have a deal where the creator has 90 percent of the rights, but we control the 
rights....We can have a minority share in a property, but we control the rights and 
we administer the rights. That person is just a passive participant, and that’s most 
of our deals, actually. It’s happened to me many, many times, because we are very 
creator friendly, where if there is an issue, we will often just give them the rights 
back, or sell them back cheaply. We just don’t want problems with creators.74 
 
This publisher describes how authors and artists who deal with his company may regain 
controlling interest and full copyright in their intellectual properties once the company 
has recouped its financial investment, but also notes that working with larger companies 
like Disney often require an artist to surrender all ownership claims to the work they 
create. “They do it every day. It happens all the time, and most people do it willingly.”75 
One interviewed attorney states that artists who are willing to entirely surrender 
copyrights to their own work are often financially motivated. Artists may sell their 
copyrights or complete work for hire projects because the money paid upfront is 
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perceived to be greater than potential future profits from a given creative work. 
According to this attorney, such actions possibly belie an artist’s lack of belief in his or 
her own abilities: 
Sometimes there’s investments in time, sometimes it’s an investment of belief in 
yourself. I have some creator friends who have had movies or television shows 
made out of their work, and inevitably they are faced with a choice at the outset of 
today’s money or the prospect of a percentage when this is successful. And 
today’s money might seem like a lot of money, and it is, and if you don’t believe 
in your work or you don’t believe that it’s going to make it, then you might take 
the money. But in almost every situation, even if it’s only moderately successful, 
the long-term royalties, dollars, and ownership, retaining even a small piece of 
ownership or licensing power over that thing, a little bit of belief in yourself can 
set you up for life if you hit the right project.76 
 
Artists with limited professional experience, then, may not consider the long-term 
economic viability of the work they create. According to one writer/publisher, those with 
limited experience simply do not consider the factors related to intellectual property: 
“Most indy guys who come into this business don’t think about trademark or copyright at 
all.”77 
Even artists and other creative persons who do think about those concepts may 
not have a complete understanding of things like the length of copyright terms or the fact 
that copyright is granted automatically upon creation of a fixed creative work. One artist 
interviewed for this dissertation states, “I wasn’t even aware it was automatic.”78 Another 
artist states that he did not know copyrights continued for a period of time after an artist’s 
death: “Run that by me again. When you create something you own it for the duration of 
your life plus 70 years?”79 
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There is the potential for misunderstanding or confusion about what the law 
allows with regard to a work made for hire, too. For example, as Title 17 of the United 
States Code is written, only specific mediums of expression are eligible for consideration 
as works made for hire, including 
...a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a 
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as 
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas...80 
 
According to an attorney who specializes in intellectual property, an author who takes 
this statute at face value might assume that mediums not listed, such as comic books, are 
ineligible for consideration as work made for hire: 
Comic books isn’t in the list, in the statute, of things that can be work made for 
hire. So, people say, “Great. I own everything, this could never be made as a work 
made for hire.” That would be great for creatives, but that’s not the case. Because 
there’s something on the list called collective works, which means like a 
periodical or a magazine. And comic books are a lot like a magazine. So the 
publishing companies, as long as they have you signing an agreement, saying it’s 
a work made for hire, then they own it all.81 
 
This attorney also describes the central importance of the written agreement that allows 
for a fixed creative work to be treated as a work made for hire. “If you’re an independent 
contractor, you own that work, unless you signed a work made for hire agreement.”82 In 
the absence of such a contract, copyright initially is reserved for the individual or 
individuals who fix a creative work in a tangible form. Again, without contracts 
specifying work for hire terms, a third party that commissions the creation of an original 
piece of art such as a painting does not own a copyright in that piece of art. The copyright 
rests with the artist, and not the owner of the physical artwork. In such cases, according 
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to this attorney: 
What you own is the paper, and the ink.... You own that physical copy.... Just 
because you’re holding the paper, even though it’s the original, you can’t start 
making copies of it and just selling them. There’s a difference between owning 
the copy of something, and owning the original work, and owning the copyright 
in it, which is the right to reproduce it and redistribute it and make money on it. 
So, the artist retains that right. It would be like going to order a book off Amazon, 
and can you start making copies of it? No. So the same thing applies to your 
commission.83 
 
Again, under statute, artists reserve the right to control the reproduction of fixed works 
they create unless they transfer this right in writing. 
Artists who do not think about the conditions of work made for hire run the risk of 
losing copyrights in their creative works as a contractual condition of employment. One 
artist who – in conjunction with another writer – developed a character to be published by 
a major comic book publisher, states that his agreement to work for hire terms meant he 
had no ownership stake in that character, and would not share in any profits arising from 
the exploitation of that character’s image in the marketplace. “I signed a work for hire 
agreement that said they pay me for the work and that’s that.... I wish I would have been 
a little smarter with it, but it is what it is.”84 He also describes how professional artists 
need to negotiate terms of ownership with a publisher if those factors are important to 
them. “If anybody wants to have their own characters and their own creations, they need 
to go through the process of creating it themselves, and make sure that they are the ones 
who the trademark and copyright are assigned to.”85 
Other artists interviewed also speak about how creative individuals need to 
negotiate with publishers if they want to avoid unfavorable terms. One artist describes the 
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editor-in-chief of a large American comic book publisher as a personal friend, but states,  
If the writer/penciller/inker knows to ask for stuff, then [my friend is] a 
negotiator. If they don’t know to ask, he’s not going to volunteer it. Now you’d 
think someone who has been an artist’s champion all his life would do that, but I 
think he was just saying, “You know, there’s money involved, there’s expenses.” 
Some people will ask for paper or profit and that will cost the corporation more 
money. So if they don’t know and they don’t care, the corporation will save 
money. It got to the point where comic books were published on the cheapest 
possible paper available to print on without ripping, just to save the company 
money. You could see the image on one side from the other side. I don’t mind that 
they do this, because they are a business.86 
 
Further, artists recognize that successful negotiations also depend on the 
dynamics of power between interested parties. “Certain companies hold, in the balance of 
power, they have the power. I could have said I wouldn’t do work for hire, I want credit 
for this and that, and they could easily go, alright, well, someone else is doing it.”87 
Depending on the contracts they sign, artists may also find related moral rights – such as 
a right to proper attribution – are impacted by the terms of employment. Examples of this 
and other issues related to the category of ethical treatment of artists by employers and 
publishers are described in the next section. 
 
The Ethics of Employment and Copyright 
 In interviews conducted for this dissertation, artists describe examples of both 
perceived ethical and unethical treatment by publishers or other creative firms in the 
course of their employment by those organizations. These examples, as with prior 
categories discussed, center on instances concerning copyright law and ownership of 
copyright as determined by contract. Responses from professional artists emphasize the 
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personal responsibility of creative individuals to negotiate for the contract terms they 
want, and the understanding that a publisher is not necessarily incentivized to freely offer 
the most generous terms to employees or independent contractors. As one artist puts it: 
My advice would just be, if you want to have ownership of your character, do it 
yourself. Don’t give your creations away. If you’re in a place where you can 
create something, at least be smart enough to negotiate, you know? Obviously 
they want you to sign it all away, it’s in their best interests.88 
 
Another artist makes similar points, citing the career of Jack Kirby, a comic book 
artist who worked steadily in comics from the 1930s until his passing in 1994, but did not 
own the copyrights to many of his most popular creations. Most famously, Kirby – along 
with writer Stan Lee – created many of the Marvel superhero characters, including the 
Fantastic Four, the Hulk, and the X-Men.89 The artist interviewed for this dissertation 
invokes Kirby’s name as a prime example of the neglect shown to creative employees by 
corporate employers as a matter of course: 
When they changed the price of the comic from 12 cents to 15 cents to 25 cents, it 
was never because the artist got a raise. They never said, “We should pay our 
people better money. We’re just being forced to pay more to paper manufacturers, 
printers, and distributors, I guess we have to raise our rates.” So these artists, 
whether it’s Jack Kirby, who practically invented comics, or all the other people, 
we don’t care. They’ll die, someone else will come around. Kids will buy the new 
stuff. Every now and then you’ll get a champion for your work, but most of the 
time and especially now, it’s kind of a mindless, faceless corporation.90 
 
Other interviewed artists offer similar descriptions of publishers and other 
organizations as “mindless, faceless corporations,” but also suggest distinct reasons for 
why that is the case. Successful corporations, over time, will employ new and different 
individuals, including legal professionals, each of whom may have different 
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interpretations of what constitutes acceptable practices regarding the treatment of 
intellectual property. This is made clear by the experience of one artist who has worked 
for a prominent creative firm over the course of several years. In his words: 
I still work for [this company]. I made no bones about it, and this is in no way a 
disparagement towards them. They’re a good company to work for, but the policy 
at the time, and I have to preface it with the words “at the time” because they have 
a revolving legal department. Some lawyers that are there are not there anymore, 
and so during the time when I was working on a [movie] project.... I wrote a lot of 
lyrics for the music.... They basically said it was under my job description of 
something I should do, and they would not give me any sort of credit for doing it. 
They said it would be convoluted and we have a music supervisor and all these 
other things. Of course I was upset, because I wrote a high-percentage, more than 
80 percent of the lyrics...and they just told me that I could not get credit. 
 
Two years later, someone else was doing the same job I was.... They wrote a 
song. Not only did they get credit, they got publishing [royalties] and they got 
paid. And it’s only because the lawyers that were present when they asked saw no 
problem with it. So it was literally a subjective thing from the lawyer’s point of 
view.... I asked, they gave me a big no, and two years later it was a yes. The thing 
I thought was kind of a bummer was I just wanted credit. The songs were good 
songs, good enough that they were being sold on iTunes and making [the 
company] money. So I was a little miffed about that. But it is what it is, they were 
within their rights, and their legal counsel at the time, that was his or her 
recommendation. They suggested to [the company] it would be a bad idea to give 
me credit. Of course, new lawyers came in and their opinions were different, that 
supervising director did get credit and publishing, so it was subjective.91 
 
Work for hire practices are primarily used as a means to assign copyright, but as the 
preceding example demonstrates, this system may also result in a lack of attribution for 
an artist engaged in creative work. 
There are other instances when artists may not receive attribution when 
contributing to a joint work. Sometimes, this lack of attribution is understood and agreed 
upon by all parties. This is the case for some artists who contribute to officially licensed 
derivations of intellectual properties that are meant to hew as closely as possible to 
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already existing fixed works. For example, one writer/publisher interviewed describes 
how, in the process of producing officially licensed comic books for a popular broadcast 
animated series, his company was provided style guides. These style guides inform 
licensors how to accurately represent characters and scenarios from the original work in 
licensed derivations, and any deviation may result in denial of publication to the licensed 
derivative work. As this writer/publisher states, 
That was by far the absolute worst licensing experience from the creative process. 
One of the best-selling things we ever did. It was phenomenal and they all came 
out well. They were literally – when you do a T-shirt or something like that, or 
when you do any kind of generic product license, they just send you a style guide, 
and you copy and paste the files from the style guide on to the packaging. That’s 
it, it’s not like comics. And we had to hire their own animators to draw the 
comics. And the regular animators were too busy, so you had the assistant 
animators drawing at the animation studio, showing it to their bosses, getting it 
approved, sending it to us, and then we would send it to [the studio that owned the 
copyright], and then it would get rejected. And we were like, “Your own people 
drew this.” So then we started taking the style guide, the picture, and pasting it, 
because they had all types of images of all the characters. So anytime we could 
we would just paste in the images from the style guide, and those would get 
rejected, they’d say this drawing is wrong, and it’s literally from the style guide, 
and they said, “Oh, well we changed that.”92 
 
Again, in situations like this, when the goal for the finished product is to represent as 
closely as possible an existing visual interpretation of a character or setting, attribution 
may not be given for every single creative individual’s contribution to the derivative 
fixed work. Further, this writer/publisher describes the final result as being successful 
financially, but a negative creative experience because of limitations that required the 
visual look of the derivative work to hew so closely to the original. 
Artists engaged in the creation of derivative works or joint works may not have a 
strong claim as an individual author seeking attribution, but many would still prefer to be 
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given credit for the contributions they make to a fixed creative work. Attribution, when 
properly given, should also extend past the life of both the author(s) and the copyright 
itself. Again, copyrights in theory do not last in perpetuity, and expire at a point 
determined by statute. The next section of this chapter describes artists’ conceptions of 
that stage of intellectual property where creative works are no longer subject to 
proprietary license or copyright ownership: the public domain.  
 
The Future of the Public Domain 
 The preceding sections of this findings chapter have all covered instances where 
a specific fixed creative work is claimed under copyright by one or more individuals. As 
those instances and examples demonstrate, such claims of ownership through copyright 
necessarily limit the ability of parties without copyright ownership of a given work to 
reproduce, create derivative works from, or otherwise critically engage with that work. 
As described in the literature review, however, the ultimate fate of all works under 
copyright – at least prior to the twentieth century – was to eventually enter the public 
domain. Once in the public domain, a fixed creative work may be reproduced or used to 
create derivative works by any and all individuals, independent of legal title. Artists 
interviewed for this research project offer some descriptions of both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the current cultural perceptions of the public domain, as well as how the 
concept may be applied to intellectual property under current corporate ownership going 
forward. 
Interview subjects are overwhelmingly in agreement that popular works and 
characters currently under copyright and trademark will continue to be owned by 
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corporations in perpetuity. Most also believe that certain corporations, foremost among 
them Disney and Time Warner, will continue to successfully engage in lobbying 
lawmakers to retroactively extend copyright terms. One artist, when asked when he 
believes characters like Superman and Mickey Mouse will enter the public domain, 
states, 
I don’t. I think those are giant, multi-billion dollar corporations, with hundreds of 
thousands of employees, and hundreds of thousands of square feet of retail space, 
amusement park space, that are dependent on some of these larger brands. And 
they have enough control and enough money that they’ll change the laws. And 
they’ve already done it. I know the power of these entities. I’ve worked with 
them, and I don’t see it happening.93 
 
This is a common response among artists interviewed: the assertion that currently 
popular iconic characters, such as Mickey Mouse and Superman, will never entirely enter 
the public domain. In the words of another interviewed author, “Disney will change the 
laws, get the laws changed whenever they need to. I think every time. These major 
corporations lobby and pressure and have the law stretched to their convenience.”94 And 
another: “I wouldn’t be surprised if they fought it and got it pushed back again.”95 And 
another: “Those [Superman and Mickey Mouse] will be extended with protection 
forever.”96 
One interviewed writer/publisher states that this current paradigm is “dangerous 
territory.... Companies are too big, and the way that Disney has expanded the copyright 
on things – There’s a whole school of thought that there’s almost like a copyright 
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cartel.”97 Excessive copyright terms also lead this individual to the conclusion that “there 
needs to be limitations on copyright.”98 After describing early American term lengths – in 
his words, a “Jeffersonian conception” where copyright lasted “about fifteen years” – this 
researcher asks if he would personally be satisfied with copyright terms that brief. “Oh, 
definitely not. I think fifteen years is crazy.... I think, after fifty years, max, you should 
have to give up the copyright.”99 He also makes moral arguments similar to the ones 
proposed by Samuel Clemens before Congress in 1906, that certain dispensations should 
be made to provide for the children of authors by extending copyrights, but not to the 
extent that terms would also protect grandchildren or future generations.100 
As noted in the literature review,101 a fictional character’s initial appearance in 
print or in film could fall out of copyright, enter the public domain, and be free to use 
without license by anyone. However, the name and likeness of the character would 
remain a protected trademark in perpetuity, or as long as corporations continue to use 
those marks in commerce. Interviewed attorneys also comment on this phenomenon as it 
relates to artists who may regain copyrights in characters they created but have sold to 
third parties: 
These characters and these titles can become trademarks, and trademarks don’t 
expire. So if the publishing company has established a trademark in a character or 
title, [an artist who created a character] may get the copyrights back, but [they] 
can’t do anything with it, because [they] don’t own any of the trademarks. And 
once some of these bigger characters start going into the public domain, you’re 
going to see a lot of fights about whether or not trademark law can basically 
artificially extend the copyrights.102 
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This legal distinction between ownership of a character through copyright or 
through trademark also means the sale or transfer of the copyright of a character does not 
also necessarily result in the transfer of ownership for the trademark of that same 
character. This was made explicit in court rulings related to the heirs of Superman’s 
creators – the Siegel and Shuster families – attempting to reclaim ownership of that 
character.103 Specifically, the court held in that instance that should current corporate 
ownership of Superman be terminated and the ownership of the copyright was reassigned 
to the creators’ heirs, trademark ownership for elements such as the image of the 
Superman logo would not also be reassigned.104  
Additionally, although a copyright in the initial appearance and publication of 
Superman may have been either assigned to the creators’ heirs or entered the public 
domain, the same could not be said for subsequent appearances of that same character in 
comic books, film, etc. As one writer/editor for a large publishing firm states, 
That’s what we’re coming up with, and that’s what was the crux of the most 
recent Siegel family settlement. Action Comics No. 1 material and the first 
Superman story fell into the public domain, and [Siegel’s family] were going to 
start reprinting it, because they had the right to do that. DC entered into a good-
faith negotiation [with the author’s heirs]. There was nothing DC could do about 
stopping publication that they wanted to. What they wound up doing – and I don’t 
know that this was the settlement – but they wound up making it worth their 
while. So they maybe get a piece of the character as it continues. But the fact of 
the matter is, that one story, you wouldn’t have gotten very far, because you have 
70 years of the character [not in the public domain].105 
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Thus, as a hypothetical, Superman’s initial appearance would be free to reprint, 
although that reprint could not bear the title Action Comics. In addition, authors could 
not, in such a paradigm, reprint, remix, or create derivative works of that public domain 
story that included later familiar additions to the ongoing Superman narrative: kryptonite, 
the ability to fly, the major metropolitan newspaper The Daily Planet. All of these and 
more appeared in officially published or broadcast iterations of the character following 
that first appearance in Action Comics No. 1. 
One interviewed attorney states that it was likely that the knowledge of these 
limitations influenced the Siegel family to accept a deal with Warner Bros. and DC 
Comics rather than try to publish the character on their own once the copyright had been 
reassigned. 
They settled, and they got something way more than what they used to have. But 
why would [the Siegel family] make a deal? Why wouldn’t they just take it and 
say “We’re going to do our own thing on it.” Well, do you know how to do your 
own thing with that? Because [Warner Bros. and DC] is a company that’s been 
doing it for 60 years, longer in some cases. They have all the marketing in place, 
they know how to make good movies or bad movies that sell, they know how to 
exploit, and that’s not a bad word, it just means they know how to use something. 
They know how to exploit this intellectual property. What are you going to do? 
You don’t have an in at Mattel or Hasbro or anything like that. Are you going to 
start up all of a sudden? You’re not going to do it. So let’s arrange for a deal now, 
and we’ll cut you in on some of this, and everybody’s happier than where they 
were. We don’t lose, the publisher doesn’t lose, the property’s there, the creators 
see some revenue, they’re happy, everybody loses, everybody wins a little bit.106 
 
Even if the original authors of a creative work – or their families – can reclaim 
copyright ownership for that work, they thus face potentially insurmountable hurdles in 
continuing to exploit that work in the marketplace. This attorney suggests that the new 
owners would be limited in their ability to exploit an intellectual property like the 
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Superman character with the same success as the current enterprise. This is in part due to 
the specific lack of publishing experience of the new owners, and in part due to the 
piecemeal nature of what aspects of a popular fictional character’s copyright would be 
reassigned. 
Other artists also note the limitations imposed by a hypothetical piecemeal release 
of the early published appearances of popular characters into the public domain as 
statutory terms expire. One artist remarks that as much as he would enjoy creating 
Batman comics without corporate oversight or the need to license the character, he would 
still, hypothetically, be limited by what stories have entered the public domain. “I would 
use Batman, but it’s gotta look like the old Batman.”107 In the 1930s, when Batman first 
appeared in the pages of Detective Comics, the visual design was absent many of the 
familiar indicia that make the character recognizable today, such as the yellow oval 
surrounding the bat chest emblem, and the modern shape of the character’s cowl and 
cape. 
One artist describes the mutability of popular characters like Batman or Mickey 
Mouse as one reason for their continued success. In comparing the official 
representations of Batman from the 1930s to the 1960s and 1980s, he states, 
You look at [creator and artist] Bob Kane’s Batman, and he’s changed [since 
then].... That’s fine, because times change too, right?... Frank Miller’s Batman 
was indicative of where we were as a society in 1986. The campy Batman, 
fighting guys with giant balloons and clowns and all that, unless it had a bit of grit 
and darkness to it, had no place in the 1980s....That’s the thing with any sort of 
really strong character. You’re going to have that, and that’s going to be part of 
why it has a life in the first place.108 
 
This artist further hypothesizes that, were he to ever personally create a character with 
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lasting appeal, or “something of that legacy quality,” he would refuse to assign its 
copyright to anyone outside of family: “[that character] can only be licensed.”109  
 Following this licensing practice, this artist allows for the possibility that a future 
licensed version of a character he creates could become more popular than his own 
original creation, but states, “If it strengthened and gave life to a legacy character, and 
ensured it’s longevity through that period of time, then I’m 100 percent behind it.”110  
Current legacy characters that have stood the test of time, including popular 
corporate-owned characters like Batman or Superman, have had numerous interpretations 
in various media over the preceding decades, all while under copyright. However, there 
are of course many examples of characters that are in the public domain that have also 
received numerous creative interpretations and still remain popular. Interview subjects 
are able to offer some thoughts on how still-popular works and characters in the public 
domain continue to influence the creative process for artists working today. For example, 
one author notes, “Things that may have been forgotten about 50 years ago find new life 
and popularity once they’re in the public domain.”111 This statement suggests that the 
popularity of any given creative work, concept, or character is not strictly a function of 
proprietary ownership, and that certain works that are less popular while protected by 
copyright law may become more popular once copyright protections expire.112 
Proprietary ownership, in the form of a copyright and/or trademark, does ensure 
to an extent that an author is able to maintain market exclusivity for a published work, an 
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advantage that is not shared by works in the public domain. Again, works in the public 
domain may remain popular or become even more popular than when they were initially 
published, but this is a popularity which may be exploited by anyone. The same 
interviewed author states, “The downside of doing your unique take on Dracula is that 
there’s probably 20 other people doing that same thing.”113 Authors and other creative 
individuals, then, must deal with a competitive context when using public domain works 
that is not present when a published work is deemed wholly original and non-derivative 
of an existing work. 
One artist notes that despite this competitive context, some fictional characters 
appear to have limitless potential for exploitation, despite how many iterations have 
previously been fixed in mediums of expression like film, novels, and comic books. 
“Robin Hood will always be cool. And people know who King Arthur is, or Mother 
Goose, Aesop, Grimm, those things that exist in [the public domain].”114 This artist also 
states that in some instances, just using underlying themes or ideas from works in the 
public domain can have broad market appeal: 
I’d be just as interested in seeing a new take on Robin Hood as a new character 
that might be doing the same sort of things in a different setting. Like Robin Hood 
in Space. They don’t need to call him Robin Hood, they could totally change his 
name and just have this guy who is the protector of the poor and whatever. 
They’re both interesting. If you’re a capable writer, and can put new clothes on an 
old idea, you’re going to be better for it.115 
 
This ability to “put new clothes” on existing concepts, according to this artist, is a large 
part of the cultural benefits provided by the existence of the public domain. 
The public domain gives people toys to play with. It’s a good setting for exploring 
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ideas with low risk. It’s a fertile ground for people to explore their creativity. I’m 
happy the public domain stuff does exist, and it gives people the chance to try 
their ideas on things that are workable.116 
 
There is a benefit to even fictional material finding its way eventually into the 
public domain. According to one writer/publisher, 
The original laws [in America] were if you invent something, then you can protect 
it in commerce for [about fifteen] years, and then you gotta let it go, because 
otherwise that hurts competition. The whole reason why copyright is supposed to 
expire is so that you don’t get stagnated and you don’t stop inventing things. 
Imagine if you couldn’t do a Santa Claus story or a Frankenstein story or Dracula 
story because a family from a thousand years ago still owned those characters. Or 
you couldn’t write the Bible without getting permission from the descendants of 
the nephews of Jesus or something. Best-selling book of all time, you don’t think 
there would be people fighting for that?117 
 
There are other examples of works that have entered the public domain and are thus free 
for anyone to exploit. However, the interviewed writer also describes how fixed works or 
characters that are in the public domain may still be claimed – sometimes falsely – as 
intellectual property under proprietary control. He states that his own publishing 
company released a book featuring a character known to be in the public domain, and yet 
still received a cease and desist letter from a company that had formed a limited liability 
corporation with “the character’s name, comma, LLC. Imagine it’s Santa Claus, you’re 
coming out with a comic book about Santa Claus, and Santa Claus LLC [sends a cease 
and desist].”118 While the interviewed writer was still eventually able to publish the 
allegedly infringing work featuring that public domain character, he describes this 
incident as one way that copyright and trademark laws are abused even after those 
protections have expired. The interviewed writer also suggests that popular works and 
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characters currently subject to copyright and trademark terms might one day also enter 
the public domain, but that there is no evidence it will happen any time soon. 
 As a whole, the interviews conducted for this dissertation reveal an existing 
culture among professional artists that emphasizes the continued utility of many works in 
the public domain. However, there does not seem to be any expectation among those 
interviewed that the popular works under copyright from the early and middle twentieth 
century will ever fall out of copyright and enter the public domain. Artists are also 
willing to agree to licensing or work for hire terms as a means to create derivative 
interpretations of works and characters under copyright, even when such terms are judged 
to be morally and ethically lacking. These findings also reveal how some artists interpret 
current copyright norms, and how those norms shift through the application of new laws, 
technology, and the intersection between the two. 
As a conclusion to this chapter, this researcher notes again that each individual 
interview conducted followed an idiosyncratic trajectory, meaning that each interviewed 
artist focused on aspects of copyright that he or she found to be most personally 
meaningful. Despite this idiosyncrasy, numerous repeated patterns and categories were 
prominent throughout multiple interviews, including 1) the experiences artists and 
authors have had in enforcing their intellectual property rights, or having others enforce 
such rights against them; 2) how the artist’s practice would be changed by the absence of 
formal copyright law; and 3) artists’ perceptions on the public domain and its role within 
the broader skein of cultural norms related to the concept of copyright. While any 
particular artist’s experiences may not be ultimately generalizable to the collective 
practices of all artists working professionally, each example that falls under one of these 
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described categories is useful as data for what can actually happen under current 
copyright law. The final chapter of this dissertation positions these current cultural norms 
within the broader history of copyright in the United States, and theorizes how norms 
related to original creative expression may continue to develop. 
The findings of this study also offer jumping off points for future research related 
to artists’ practices and copyright. It is possible to conduct a similar study with more 
artists who have specifically served as defendant or plaintiff in litigation regarding 
copyright infringement, or artists who have made a conscious choice to eschew the 
transfer of their copyrights through work made for hire. Specifically with regard to the 
public domain – and focusing on sociocultural norms rather than the more clinical norms 
discussed here – future research may also examine cultural developments that may 
incentivize working artists to adopt practices associated with actively forgoing copyright, 
such as creative commons or copyleft schemes.119 Findings here are also prominently 
related to material concerns and claims of ownership, but the exploration of intellectual 
property as a primary factor in the development of self-identity and the resultant impact 
on interpersonal communication as a means to create and maintain personal brands may 
also serve as an avenue of future research. There are many options available, and the 
study of copyright norms in cultural and legal capacities remains a rich vein for study. 
  
                                                 
119 See supra notes 209-210, Chapter 2, and accompanying text.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
A Theory of Rights in Intellectual Property 
The goal of this research project has been to contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge on the subject of copyright in a way that may help to serve current 
professional artists and the general public in understanding what copyright law does and 
does not allow. More importantly, an additional goal of this dissertation is to critically 
analyze why copyright law allows what it does, as well as why any individuals would 
deviate from the proscriptions of the law. This researcher has endeavored to examine how 
current cultural norms are potentially in conflict with the law – in either constitutional 
provision or statute, as well as according to the philosophical aims of the initial passage 
of copyright laws in America. The most profound of these conflicts is the one between 
the categorization of copyright as a temporary monopoly versus that of a perpetual 
property right. 
This chapter, then, must seek some manner of resolution to that conflict. This 
researcher argues for that resolution in a particular way in large part because of the 
misclassification of certain behaviors as copyright infringement. For example, it is 
concluded here that the current cultural and legal norms of copyright allow some 
derivative creative expressions to be incorrectly classified as theft. In this researcher’s 
view, this type of improper labeling arises from the primary misclassification of 
intellectual property itself. As initially posited in the title of this dissertation, intellectual 
property is not property. This dissertation concludes, in part, by formulating a theory that 
intellectual property is not property. Further, this chapter is meant to explain the theory 
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and support that conclusion. Intellectual property cannot be accurately defined as real 
property for the reasons outlined in the literature review,1 most explicitly that real 
property must be scarce as a prerequisite for the need to determine ownership of that 
property.  
Creative works that are reproduced are removed from the context of existing as 
individual artifacts, and copyright law attempts to offer rights of entitlement and limited 
ownership that nature does not provide when scarcity is overcome in this way. A natural 
state allows for the unlimited reproduction of creative works – either by manual or 
mechanical labor – in theory, and digital technologies allow for the unlimited 
reproduction of those works in practice. Limitations on this natural state arise from the 
moral arguments made by artists and individuals who speak on behalf of those artists so 
as to appropriately incentivize and reward the continuing development of original 
creative works. It is posited here that the research conducted for this dissertation – 
including the evidence provided by findings from interviews and the historical record 
surrounding copyright law – supports this researcher’s conclusion that intellectual 
property is not property. 
Again, despite the moral arguments made by artists and legislators for centuries, 
the types of infinitely reproducible creative efforts that are subject to copyright law 
simply do not conform to the categorical requirements of real property. It is more 
accurate to consider creative works as various instances of semiotic sign systems. These 
are what Ferdinand de Saussure called semiological facts: “a set of signs fixed by 
                                                 
1 See supra notes 104-106, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
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agreement between the members of that society; these signs evoke ideas,”2 and those 
ideas are naturally open to endless interpretation, reinterpretation, and reproduction. In 
short, creative works are public – not finite – goods.3 This statement serves as the 
underlying theoretical principle that informs the remainder of this chapter. The principle 
will thus be used as the narrative spine connecting the remaining sections of this chapter 
and the conclusion of this dissertation. 
This researcher concludes that the categorization of intellectual property as real 
property – and the resultant framing of copyright entitlements as property rights – have 
clear impacts on modern interpretations of numerous categories in relation to the concept 
of copyright. As mentioned above, the primary misclassification of intellectual property 
itself allows for a range of behaviors to be falsely positioned as criminal acts. Foremost 
among these is the framing of unlicensed duplication as a form of theft. It is within the 
scope of this chapter to discuss why such acts cannot reasonably be described as theft, 
and to make relevant conclusions regarding the impact of this modern framing on the 
right to attribution and authorial paternity, concerns related to freedom of speech, 
economic exploitation of fixed creative works, permissions in virtual marketplaces 
enabled by new technology, and the role of the public domain. All of these categories and 
associated conclusions are developed within this chapter through analysis of the findings 
from interviews conducted, as well as analysis of the literature regarding copyright as 
described in chapter 2 of this dissertation. This is done to bring more cohesion and 
support to the theory and conclusion championed here that intellectual property is not 
                                                 
2 R. Harris, E. Komatsu, Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics 
(Elsevier Science, 1993)(1910-1911), 9a. 
3 See supra note 2, Chapter 1, and accompanying text. 
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property, and to examine the cultural norms that are created and reinforced by the 
conflation of the two categories. An example of this type of connective analysis is the use 
of experiences that artists shared in interviews regarding the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, used in tandem with the history of prominent American court cases and 
statutes related to copyright. Again, this is done to more fully analyze current cultural and 
legal norms of professional behavior. 
The discussion of cultural norms will include subsections dedicated to a 
determination of what constitutes originality in the creation of an artistic work, as well as 
distinctions made between theft, infringement, and inspiration. Fair use exceptions to 
charges of infringement will also be discussed, with satirical works being the most 
prominent types of exceptions currently allowed by law and cultural norms. There will 
also be discussion of fair use exceptions for charges of infringement as a result of 
political speech and copyright’s relation to First Amendment guarantees for freedom of 
the press and of speech. Again, this discussion is informed by analysis both of interview 
findings, as well as the historical record of intellectual property dating back to the 
development of copyright as a concept distinct from censorship. 
Following the sections related to cultural norms, various points related to the role 
of the public domain will be explicitly connected to this researcher’s conclusions with 
regard to the nature of intellectual property. This is done to determine the role of the 
public domain with regard to professional artistic environments and how it may be 
minimized, expanded, or otherwise changed in the future, and there are also 
recommendations made about those types of changes. Again, the most prominent 
argument made throughout this chapter is the overarching conclusion of this dissertation: 
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an appeal for the continued cultural and legal understanding that intellectual property is 
not property, but rather a means to reward creative labor with temporary exclusivity in 
the mechanical duplication of a fixed creative work. 
 
Economic Fruits of Creative Labor 
A common thread among the interviews conducted as part of this research was an 
emphasis by artists that they have a personal understanding of what their own claims to 
intellectual property are, similar to what Elizabeth Eisenstein refers to as a “possessive 
individualism”4 that characterizes authors’ relationships to their own work since the 
development of print. Much of this possessive individualism arises from each author’s 
self-evident truth that he or she must enact some creative labor in order to produce even 
derivative fixed works. A distinction is made here between labor that results in an 
original – or even derivative – fixed creative work, and what could be called rote labor. 
The products of rote labor might produce something inherently useful, like an alphabetic 
listing of phone numbers for a given region. However, such products, according to court 
rulings,5 do not overcome the hurdle to be deemed original and thus eligible for copyright 
protection. Artists who labor creatively, though, most often want to be recognized and 
rewarded for the fruits of their labors, and they also wish to prevent perceived theft of 
those fruits. 
The metaphor suggested by “the fruits of their labors” may be helpful in 
                                                 
4 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications 
and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe, Volume I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 121. 
5 See, e.g., Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The ruling 
invoked here is most often referred to as “the sweat of the brow” doctrine. See also supra 
note 95, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
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determining what constitutes theft when it comes to the complicated concept of 
copyright. This metaphor alludes to a Talmudic story, previously cited in the introduction 
to this dissertation,6 called “The Case of the Poor Man Who Shakes the Olive Tree.”7 In 
this tale, a man who climbs a tree to knock some attendant olives to the ground is 
shocked to discover that when he climbs back down the tree, another man has taken the 
dislodged olives, the literal fruit of his labors. As discussed in the literature review,8 
however, a logical distinction must be drawn between intellectual property and chattel. 
Chattel, or real property, if possessed, must necessarily be dispossessed by all others. 
Anyone who removes the olives from the ground after they have fallen deprives all 
others, including the man who labored to shake them from the tree. Intellectual property, 
when copied, may be possessed simultaneously by as many individuals as there are 
tokens that exist. It is as if olives were not taken from the ground, but copied or 
duplicated, so as not to deprive the individual who shook them loose. Artists and others 
who perceive that they are the victims of theft when tokens are copied or otherwise 
derived without license are not deprived of any property. They are, however, potentially 
placed into a competitive context with their own creative output, an aggrievement that 
can lead to a range of potential behavioral reactions, such as a withdrawal from the 
marketplace and the refusal to create, or more likely, the refusal to distribute future 
authored works, to share “the fruits of their labors.” 
This framing emphasizes the potential effectiveness of an incentive paradigm for 
the further creation – and especially for the distribution – of works subject to copyright, 
                                                 
6 See supra notes 5-7, Chapter 1, and accompanying text. 
7 Neil Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft: The Jewish Law of Copyright Since the 
Birth of Print (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 175. 
8 See supra notes 104-106, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
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and thus a justification for the creation of a copyright scheme within statute. Despite this 
justification, this framing also acknowledges that while such a scheme may incentivize 
the creation of new fixed works, it does not bestow upon the creative contents of such 
works the qualities that would make it property. “Intellectual property” and its historical 
antecedent, “literary property,” are both misnomers, as they do not in a real sense 
describe the concepts to which they refer. Property that may be infinitely reproduced or 
duplicated is not property. 
When fixed creative works are mechanically duplicated, such duplication results 
in the creation of additional tokens that are also property, and artists or publishers must 
contend with the additional competition of those newly existing tokens in the 
marketplace. The modern interpretation of copyright and subsequent implementation of 
related laws make moral claims for the unfairness of such competition to the artists who 
labor creatively, for reasons of improper attribution9 or perceived loss of personal 
profit.10 Artists interviewed for this dissertation have also made convincing arguments for 
the unfairness of this type of unlicensed competition with their own creative output.11 
Again, however, it is posited here and concluded that such competition is not theft, since 
intellectual property is not property. The rabbinic scholars of centuries past recognized 
this in their interpretations of “The Man Who Shakes the Olive Tree.” Those scholars did 
not describe even the taking of unattended olives – real property – as outright theft, but 
instead referred to it as “theft because of the ways of peace.”12 In similar fashion, the 
unlicensed duplication or copying of an artist’s creative works may offend that artist, 
                                                 
9 See supra notes 11-12, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
10 See supra note 74, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
11 See supra notes 34-35, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
12 Mishnah Gittin 5:8, explicated in Neil Netanel, From Maimonides to Microsoft, 175. 
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providing a disincentive for the creation and distribution of future works, and disrupt the 
peace of a paradigm that normally incentivizes artists and grants them strong claim to the 
exclusive distribution of their creative output.  
 
Work For Hire and Authorial Paternity 
Unlicensed duplication is not the only way that artists can be said to be deprived 
of the fruits of their labors. There is another, more concrete legal means by which authors 
may be deprived of claims to their creative output. This is the sale or transfer of their 
copyrights in a given fixed creative work to a third party, usually the publishing entity 
that initially commissioned or otherwise financed the creation of the fixed work in 
question. The perception of copyright as a temporary monopoly would position such a 
transfer as an agreement by an author not to compete with the publisher in economically 
exploiting a fixed creative work for a limited time. However, the perception of copyright 
as a claim to property falsely promotes work for hire as a transfer of property. 
Oftentimes in the comic book publishing industry, writers and artists are divested 
from their initial copyrights because of work for hire contract terms that explicitly retain 
the copyright of a work for the publisher. Some authors, such as Alan Moore,13 have 
spoken out against work for hire practices, and subsequently refused to work with 
publishers that use those practices.14 Related trade organizations, like the Graphic Artists’ 
Guild, also decry the practice of work for hire as it relates to comic books, stating that the 
                                                 
13 See supra notes 170-174, Chapter 2, and accompanying text, for previous discussion of 
Moore and an example of his creative work that initially broached concerns related to 
copyright law. 
14 Andrew Hoberek, Considering Watchmen: Poetics, Property, Politics (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 81. 
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publishing category is not specifically listed in statute as a valid medium for the practice, 
and that artists are often independent contractors and not employees, further invalidating 
the claims on copyright made by publishers.15 The result is that authors like Moore, as 
well as artists interviewed for this dissertation who sense they will be legally deprived of 
authorial claims of paternity or financial remuneration, may self-inhibit their own 
creative output,16 theoretically to the detriment of the public. 
Again, there is no explicit mention in statute of comic books as a form of 
expression for which work for hire practices may apply. However, continued cultural 
practices, including the perception of copyright as a property right and the agreement of 
comic book artists to submit to work for hire terms, has legitimized the practice for those 
artists even in the absence of explicit statutory support. As noted in this dissertation’s 
Findings chapter, attorneys interviewed described the language of Title 17 of the U.S. 
Code17 as being close enough, with descriptions of “collective works” functionally 
serving as an appropriately legal descriptor for most mediated audiovisual works created 
by multiple individuals at the behest of a centralized employer.18 
However, this is not to suggest that artists have no other option but to submit to 
work for hire terms exclusively. The 1976 Copyright Act,19 reinforced by court 
decisions,20 does require that an author and employer must both agree before the creation 
of a work that it will be work for hire. This agreement is what allows for the legal transfer 
                                                 
15 Graphic Artists Guild, Graphic Artists Guild Handbook: Pricing & Ethical Guidelines, 
14th Edition (New York: Graphic Artist’s Guild, Inc., 2013), 268. 
16 See supra note 70, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
17 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
18 See supra note 81, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
19 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
20 See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 960 F. Supp. 710, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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of a copyright from the author to the author’s employer. This agreement can be merely 
verbal, and does not require a written contract. For this reason, the Graphic Artists’ Guild 
recommends that artists are clear about their paternal claims of authorship for a given 
creative work from its inception, and that they inform potential clients that they have, for 
example “a studio policy of not signing work for hire contracts.”21 Also, upon receiving 
checks from clients that include work for hire language as a condition for receipt of 
moneys, artists are within their rights under the law to cross out such language and write 
“deposited without conditions,” preventing late-stage introductions of work for hire 
terms.22 If the public were also to more broadly accept that intellectual property is not 
property, this would further limit the acceptance that any individual or group could 
reasonably claim continued ownership of any author’s work outside of limited exclusivity 
for initial publication. 
Work for hire terms under the 1976 Copyright Act have also continued to roll 
back protections for the initial author of a given creative work that were standard with 
prior copyright statutes. The 1909 Copyright Act allowed for two terms of 28 years, and 
required that the author of a given work personally petition for the second term.23 This 
was meant to lessen the bargaining power of publishers by preventing them from holding 
exclusive rights in the sale and distribution of a given creative work for the full length of 
statutory copyright protection.24 However, the Supreme Court held in Fred Fisher Music 
                                                 
21 Graphic Artists Guild, Graphic Artists Guild Handbook, 127. 
22 Ibid., 35. 
23 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Statutes at Large, 1075. 
24 Jesse J. Krueger, “Copyright and Kryptonite: The Failings of Intellectual Property Law 
through the Eyes of Superman,” Duquesne Business Law Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer 
2012): 233. 
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v. M. Witrock & Sons25 that authors could assign ownership of the second term of 
copyright before the first had expired. This advanced the trend of increasing privileges 
for publishers and decreasing protections for authors, so that moral claims made in 
support of granting initial copyright protections to incentivize authors are undermined. 
There are historical examples of publishers who have misrepresented their controlling 
interest in an author’s creative works – most often as a claim to the “property” of those 
works – to coerce those artists into signing over copyright in the renewal term. 
One of these examples is the Captain America character, developed by Joe Simon 
and Jack Kirby and first published by Timely Comics – later renamed Atlas and then 
Marvel – at the end of 1940. In 1969, as the initial copyright term for the character’s 
introductory comic book appearances expired, Simon applied for renewal. Marvel’s 
publisher, Martin Goodman, misled Kirby about his own rights in the character as a 
coauthor of those early Captain America comics. Kirby signed away any controlling 
interest he had in the character for promises of payments that were never forthcoming.26 
Again, even for someone who “practically invented comics,” as characterized by an artist 
interviewed for this dissertation,27 there is not much evidence that publishers are inclined 
to consider an artist’s cultural contributions to a given medium of creative expression 
during negotiations of copyright ownership. 
Some of the individuals interviewed for this dissertation describe publishers as 
now having even more outsized bargaining power compared to a writer or artist.28 One 
                                                 
25 318 U.S. 643 (1943). 
26 Ronin Ro, Tales to Astonish: Jack Kirby, Stan Lee, and the American Comic Book 
Revolution (New York: Bloomsbury, 2004), 134-5. 
27 See supra note 90, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
28 See supra note 87, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
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prominent reason for that power is a publisher’s ability to purchase a copyright that lasts 
for 95 years if the writer or artist agrees to work for hire terms at the outset. Again, this is 
ultimately not a property right or a claim to ownership, but a set term of exclusivity in the 
continued publication of a fixed work. From that point of view, an author who submits to 
work for hire terms effectively agrees – for a literal lifetime – not to publish or license to 
publish a work that he or she created. It is posited here that this is an absurd term length 
for a monopoly on publication rights, and the existence of work for hire in the law 
betrays the myth that copyright is a natural or moral right.  
Artists do not have to submit to work for hire terms, although as one interviewed 
writer states, there are many artists who “do it every day. It happens all the time, and 
most people do it willingly.”29 Current laws do not favor these artists’ chances of 
maintaining authorial paternity and ownership of their copyrights. Moreover, the popular 
cultural interpretation of a copyright as a property right positions the creation of certain 
derivative works as a form of theft. For example, an artist would be charged with 
infringement for creating a new fixed work using an existing character – even a character 
he or she created – if that character was created under work for hire terms. This standard 
is in place despite the fact that outside of mechanical reproductions of prior works, all 
such works are original in the sense that they represent the fruit of some new creative 
labor. 
The next section of this chapter describes additional complications that may arise 
when even seemingly original creative works may also be categorized as derivative of 
another, earlier work, and thus an infringement on that earlier work. Again, this is 
                                                 
29 Interview with MH, November 4, 2017. 
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examined in large part as a means of providing additional support for the conclusion that 
intellectual property is not property, but instead in these cases the enforcement of a 
monopoly grant. 
 
Claims of Originality 
Idiosyncratic claims to originality and the labor required to create art necessarily 
complicate the development of legal norms for what might objectively be understood as 
an original fixed creative work. As discussed in the literature review,30 courts have been 
unable to clearly delineate where inspiration ends and excessive taking begins. U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, has written that freedom of 
speech considerations weigh heavily in favor of allowing an individual to make his or her 
own speech, but less so on the ability to make others’ speeches again.31 This statement 
suggests that copyright laws may be used to enjoin speech that is duplicated or derived 
from what are considered original expressions. Further, the ideal form of expression – 
i.e., speech that is arguably most deserving of copyright protection – would be one that is 
wholly original. Unfortunately, this ability to enjoin unoriginal speech still clashes with 
the foundational philosophy of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. Political speech, for example, is rarely wholly original, and yet enjoys the 
most explicit protection under the First Amendment. Also, as will be further described 
below, nearly all forms of speech may be understood and interpreted as derivative of 
other, earlier expressions. The standard for freedom of expression should weigh more 
                                                 
30 See supra notes 220-222, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
31 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). “The First Amendment securely protects 
the freedom to make – or decline to make – one's own speech; it bears less heavily when 
speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches.” 
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heavily, then, on the side of protecting all speech, regardless of the degree of originality 
assumed. However, copyright law, especially when positioned as a property right, makes 
room for only limited exceptions to copyright’s exclusive grant. 
Satirical derivations and representations of existing works under copyright is one 
broad category that enjoys specific fair use exceptions to infringement, despite relying 
partially on non-original expression. A satirist changes the character or tone of an original 
work, and this may be considered the source of the derived satirical work’s own 
originality. A derivative work that lacks satirical or political modifications is less 
obviously a new original work for which the artist may be granted a copyright. The lack 
of modifications is likely what led the court in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange32 to allow 
film studio MGM to reproduce an artist’s photo-derived illustration of The Wizard of Oz 
without the artist’s permission. 
MGM owned the copyright in the film – the original or underlying work in this 
context – and so was thought to be allowed to reproduce an unlicensed derivation without 
satirical or political character. It took years for another court to reverse this decision and 
acknowledge that artists who create derivative versions of copyrighted works may retain 
a copyright in the new derivation, which would allow them to exclude the original 
copyright owner’s use of that work in the market.33 Still, an artist who creates a 
derivative work has no recourse to reproduce that derivative work because it infringes on 
the copyright of the original work. Copyright law serves as a form of mutual blocking of 
publication and reproduction in these situations. In a sense, the complications of this type 
of mutual blocking trigger concerns related to the expressive and distributive capacities 
                                                 
32 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
33 Schrock v. Learning Curve, 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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of either party, creating a metaphorical Gordian Knot. Again, the argument that 
intellectual property is not property provides perhaps the swiftest cut to that knot: if there 
is no inherent ownership right in a given creative expression, and only a limited 
monopoly on its literal reproduction, then an artist would be free to create and publish 
derivative expressions that use the same underlying semiotic sign systems – in this case, 
images of characters from The Wizard of Oz – without license. 
Under current copyright law, what is allowed in such situations is not as clear as 
just letting anyone freely publish his or her own work, derivative or not. However, artists 
engaged in the creation of derivative works often have an understanding of how the law 
limits access and economic exploitation of other popular works subject to copyright. 
Many of the artists interviewed for this dissertation repeatedly demonstrate such 
understanding as a result of communications with other artists,34 licensing authorities for 
creative works,35 and infringement concerns that resulted in the use of cease-and-desist 
letters.36 Again, these limitations are a function of the proscription of law, and not of any 
intrinsic qualities of property. As noted above, visual representations of fictional 
characters are an example of what de Saussure called semiotic sign systems or 
semiological facts37 and there are no natural limitations on the continued dissemination 
and (re)interpretation of those signs. 
It is posited here that copyright law itself is a type of superstructure sign system, a 
means to mark the limitations that at least some parties agree to in the continued 
reinterpretation of fixed creative works. Under this system, legal justifications are 
                                                 
34 See supra note 25, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
35 See supra note 92, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
36 See supra note 26, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
37 Harris and Komatsu, Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics, 9a. 
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required for a derivative work to meet both the threshold for originality and a finding of 
fair use that would allow it to be published without license. The addition of political or 
satirical themes aids in that determination. Legal justification, though, does not always 
equate to moral justification. 
As the next section describes, derivative fixed creative works that rely on other 
“original” creative works to make satirical or otherwise explicitly political statements 
have been developed throughout the historical periods examined in this dissertation. The 
practice also continues today. However, even when such artistic derivation is not legally 
prohibited, it is also not enacted, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, “without claim or 
complaint from anybody.”38  
 
Satirical and Political Derivations of Fixed Creative Works 
Satires and parodies are the types of derivative works that are most often allowed 
under copyright law to be published and reproduced without license as fair use of existing 
fixed works. The analysis of these types of derivative works is relevant to this 
researcher’s conclusion that intellectual property is not property because they are the 
most prominent examples of works that are granted exemptions for copyright protection. 
It is argued here, however, that similar exemptions should be more broadly granted and 
assumed to be fair use even absent satirical – or overtly political – elements within a 
derivative work. For example, a character, either fictional or based on some real person, 
is one common element of an existing work used in satirical derivations. The 
                                                 
38 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in Andrew A. 
Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson volume 13 
(Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Society, 1907), 333-34. 
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interpretation of characters under copyright law as a form of intellectual property, 
coupled with the common requirement of satire to expose or ridicule the original work it 
is satirizing, means that artists are often sensitive to unlicensed derivations of the 
characters they create and for which they claim ownership.39 
Whether they are reading legitimately licensed or bootlegged derivations, modern 
audiences are familiar with a wide variety of interpretations of popular characters, from 
comic book superheroes to the fantasy characters of the Brothers Grimm. Fictional 
characters that are still under copyright today, such as Superman, have been satirized 
numerous times over the years, often without the license or permission of the copyright 
holders, and such derivative works are allowed according to law. One notable example is 
Harvey Kurtzman and Wally Wood’s “Superduperman,” a comedic satirical take on 
Superman that appeared in Mad Magazine in 1953. Like many satirical derivations, 
“Superduperman” applied a “real world logic to a kind of inherently absurd...situation,”40 
according to writer Alan Moore. In turn, this method for structuring a story inspired 
Moore to apply real world logic to super-hero stories – like the ones he wrote for the 
British character Marvelman – so as to produce greater dramatic effects, to “make 
something that was quite startling, sort of dramatic and powerful.”41 
Partly as a result of courts ruling that humorous satirical derivations are protected 
under copyright law as fair use,42 one might assume that satire must be comedic to be 
deemed fair use. However, Moore’s critical thoughts on the subject show that effective 
                                                 
39 See supra notes 28-29, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
40 Interview with Moore, quoted from George Khoury, Kimota!: The Miracleman 
Companion (Raleigh, NC: TwoMorrows, 2001), 11-12. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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satire can adjust an original work’s tone along multiple thematic trajectories in the 
creation of a derivative interpretation. In turn, this derivative work overcomes the hurdle 
to be deemed an original work itself, offering a novel contribution in terms of tone, 
theme, or other formalist element(s) absent in the work being satirized. This novel 
contribution can even be explicitly political, and there are examples of that in fictional 
works that long predate the current cultural and legal norms of copyright. 
During the nineteenth century, derivative interpretations of existing works may 
not have been as widespread compared to today, but there are still numerous examples 
from that time of authors satirizing existing works for new purposes and audiences. The 
example that follows is valuable both for its political additions to an existing fixed 
creative work, as well as for the resultant critical reaction from literary stalwart Charles 
Dickens. 
In addition to his tours of America to champion his cause for an international 
treaty on copyright,43 Dickens also held strong opinions on the malleability of texts to 
create derivative works. He was personally opposed to the revision or derivation of fixed 
creative works to suit a new author’s political purposes. One prominent example of this 
opposition revolved around the temperance-themed fairy tales developed by fellow 
Briton George Cruikshank, an artist who had previously worked with Dickens as an 
illustrator on several editions of the latter’s popular works, including Oliver Twist.44 
Cruikshank, in works published between 1853 and 1864, created derivative 
interpretations of popular fairy tales such as Cinderella and Puss in Boots, adding 
                                                 
43 See supra note 74, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
44 Charles Dickens and George Cruikshank, Oliver Twist: Or, the Parish Boy’s Progress, 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1838). 
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political and moral claims that alcohol was dangerous, and that abstinence or temperance 
was the solution.45 Dickens was offended at the use of existing fixed creative works to 
advance a political agenda. He responded with the essay “Frauds on the Fairies,” which 
included this line: “Whosoever alters [these tales] to suit his own opinions, whatever they 
are, is guilty...of an act of presumption, and appropriates to himself what does not belong 
to him.”46 
Dickens did not claim that Cruikshank was forbidden to hold or express his 
opinions on temperance, but he did claim that the existing creative settings and characters 
of other authors were ill-suited vehicles for those arguments. It is not clear how necessary 
the use of these specific fairy tale characters were for the purpose of promoting 
temperance: would, for instance, a “Raccoon in Waders” serve as an effective 
replacement for “Puss in Boots,” and still allow Cruikshank to communicate his literary 
message as intended? With Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,47 the U.S. Supreme Court 
positioned a similar question as one of parody versus satire: “Parody needs to mimic an 
original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or 
collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so 
requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”48 Ultimately, though, this is an 
argument about superficial aspects of a satirical work. All satires and parodies must 
reference pre-existing works: if parody makes such reference more explicit, this 
guarantees only that the parodied original work served as some sort of inspiration for the 
                                                 
45 Ruari McLean, Victorian Book Design and Colour Printing, Second Edition (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1972), 163-164. 
46 Charles Dickens, “Frauds on the Fairies,” in The Works of Charles Dickens: 
Miscellaneous Papers, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1908): 407. 
47 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
48 Ibid., 580-81. 
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parody. Absent a more specific critical analysis of the parody, even the nature of that 
inspiration is obscured. Bruce Rogow, the attorney for Campbell in that case, provides 
further clarification for the specific needs of a parody to make use of an existing creative 
work: 
In order to do the parody, you have to take a large body of the other work. That’s 
why I think you have more latitude in the parody case to win under fair use, even 
though you’ve taken a lot. The joke isn’t there without the listener understanding 
that this came from some other source and is now being recreated in a different 
way to make fun of something. So I think there’s a lot more room in parody to 
take pretty much the whole work.49 
 
In the prior example of Cruikshank’s fairy tales, it was clear that Cruikshank was 
satirizing the vice of drink, and employed parodies of fairy tale characters to do so. 
Perhaps, in the eyes of Dickens and other critics, an original fairy tale by Cruikshank 
would have been deemed a more suitable means to express his political views. But then, 
how much would need to be changed, how different and novel would these new fairy 
tales need to be, before they could be fairly described as original creative works unto 
themselves? If parody serves as a type of explicit bibliography for the content of satire, 
then the removal of superficial allusions or references to existing works does not make a 
derivative work more original. Again, under the presupposition that copyright is a 
temporary term of exclusivity and not a property right, this researcher posits that the only 
meaningful metric for a determination of originality is that an author or artist enact some 
creative labor to fix a work. This is true even if that creative labor employs the use of 
preexisting semiotic sign systems, including fictional characters or the melody of a 
popular song. Laws that rule otherwise, or that demand political or satirical justification 
for the use of preexisting signs, potentially obscure the continuity of the derivative 
                                                 
49 Bruce Rogow, interviewed by Joseph Russomanno, February 22, 2001. 
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author’s creative inspiration and process, and stifle the expression of that artist. 
Similar cases continue to be prevalent today, even as the cultural and legal norms 
of copyright change. The artist Matt Furie, for example, has repeatedly brought suit 
against numerous parties for the unlicensed use of his cartoon frog character, Pepe, in 
political contexts.50 The political character of these satirical Pepes is often associated 
with extremist ideologies, with the result that the Anti-Defamation League even took the 
step of adding Pepe to its database of hate symbols.51 Talk show host Alex Jones defends 
these derivations as fair use because “it’s political speech, it’s totally protected.”52 This 
defense is characteristic of the present paradigm of copyright law, wherein unlicensed 
and derivative use of existing fixed works requires an affirmative defense of why such 
use should be allowed, rather than a justification for why it should be enjoined. Furie 
makes it clear that he is not happy with the association of unlicensed images of Pepe with 
extremist political ideologies. However, this dissatisfaction is not purely a political issue, 
and is instead a subset of a larger issue faced by artists of misappropriation and 
misattribution. 
The next section describes how intellectual property law has adapted itself to 
questions of these issues with regard to originality in more generic terms, outside of the 
realms of satirical or political intent. It also discusses the consequences for individuals 
creating and distributing new fixed works that are used in the creation of derivative works 
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or determined to be derivative themselves. The conclusion that intellectual property is not 
property is also reinforced by the evidence provided below that such derivative works do 
not alter the existence of the original works from which they are derived. 
 
Originality, Unfair Competition, and Confusion in the Marketplace 
Outside of satirical or political contexts, where creative works are repurposed to 
espouse a political statement that in some way relies on explicit reference to a particular 
creative work, it is still difficult to make claims that any single fixed creative work is 
itself wholly original according to the norms of existing copyright law. The discussion of 
originality within this section examines some of the moral concerns raised by artists with 
regard to unlicensed derivations of their work. However, it also reemphasizes the point 
that the very possibility of creating such derivative works without changing a particular 
token of the original work means that neither original nor derivative types of intellectual 
property are property. 
There are numerous examples from this dissertation’s findings, including its 
interviews, demonstrating that creative works that might be considered wholly original 
are shockingly easy to contextualize as derivative of prior existing works. Were it 
otherwise, existing and potential audiences would find no appeal in what would be a 
completely alien and indecipherable expression. This is similar to a point made by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Bleistein v. Donaldson,53 and 
previously cited in the literature review of this dissertation.54 As Justice Holmes wrote, 
even an educated judge may have no clear understanding of what makes a creative work 
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valuable in the eyes of the consuming public.55 Truly original and great works, according 
to Holmes, might possess “novelty [that] would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke.”56  
It is posited here that the law should not demand too stringent a test for 
originality, then, partially because authors often must balance competing creative needs 
of using both novel and familiar forms to effectively communicate with an audience. If 
the law demands even a minimum threshold for originality, this demand allows for the 
possibility that expressive works that are new and likely meet such a threshold for 
originality may still be described as derivative of another creative work. Once a fixed 
creative work is positioned in this way, there is the additional possibility that the artist of 
such a work will be accused of copyright and/or trademark infringement. This is in line 
with research conducted on inductive reasoning in general, and the tendency for 
individuals to perceive similarities between categorical instances as causally related.57 
Individual artists, too, may possess strong claims for authored works similar to 
their own to be derivative in some sense, and may also wish to limit the attendant 
associations that form in the minds of audience members who perceive similarities 
between existing creative works.58 In contrast to the prior example of Dickens and 
Cruikshank – where satire was used to condemn vice – one interviewed artist describes 
how his misappropriated character was drawn as engaging in alcohol consumption.59 The 
interviewed artist says his most prominent concern is being wrongfully associated with 
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the infringing party and the potential impact such infringement could have on future 
business opportunities. This potential for confusion in the marketplace based on wrongful 
association serves well as a moral justification for enjoining that specific derivative work. 
But what about the next one? Or the one after that? As the example of Furie and Pepe 
most prominently shows, artists ultimately have no absolute control over how their works 
are interpreted and resignified by future parties, even if they might be able to prevent 
some instances of such derivative activity. Again, this is evidence that all creative works 
exist as sign systems – and not property – that may be naturally and endlessly resignified, 
even as those resignifications may offend artists responsible for an original work. 
All creative works – despite the wishes of any artist – are ultimately part of an 
unending chain of derived expressions, with every artist and creative work a 
corresponding link. The boundaries between these links may be more or less distinct 
based on the relative perceived novelty of any given fixed creative expression. This 
novelty may be a function of the artist or other copyright owner enforcing that copyright 
through litigation, but this method also allows for broad overreach by parties that attempt 
to claim ownership in more generic expressions. This latter category may help perpetuate 
claims of originality or novelty, but also has the simultaneous effect of minimizing the 
scope of the public domain. 
Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant,60 described within the context of the Findings 
chapter,61 is an example of how current intellectual property regimes allow for broad 
overreach with regard to claims of ownership of an image, concept, logo, etc. As noted 
by the interviewed author in that case, and as supported by separate interviews with 
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attorneys, the financial costs are high to successfully defend against claims of 
infringement in a court of law.62 Even absent formal legal proceedings, artists may see 
their works removed from legitimate marketplaces by distributors if a third party makes 
claims of ownership to a particular phrase defined as a trademark. 
This was the case with M.C.A. Hogarth, a woman who wrote a digitally-published 
book, Spots the Space Marine. She initially made it available for purchase through online 
retailer Amazon’s CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. Amazon, however, 
removed the book from its online store after a U.K. company, Games Workshop, claimed 
it had a trademark for the phrase “space marine” that enabled it to exclude other uses of 
that phrase from the marketplace.63 Games Workshop may have wished to reinforce the 
notion of perceived novelty and originality of the term “space marine” in the minds of 
consumers and other potential audiences, but again, the descriptive model of creative 
expressions as links in an unending historical chain is useful here. In this case 
specifically, the use of the phrase “space marine” in similar creative contexts predated the 
uses from either Games Workshop or Hogarth, having been used in 1932 as the title of an 
Amazing Stories tale: “Captain Brink of the Space Marines.”64 With the aid of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a U.S. civil liberties advocacy organization, Hogarth was 
able to convince Amazon that the trademark infringement claim was not legitimate, and 
her book continues to be sold on the company’s website. 
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Both Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant65 and Hogarth’s trouble with the use of the 
term “space marines” are examples of situations in which creative individuals, accused of 
copyright or trademark infringement, needed to expend time and material resources to 
defend against those accusations if they hoped to continue publication and distribution of 
their creative works in a legitimate marketplace. Artists who wish to avoid similar issues 
are thus incentivized to minimize attendant associations between the original works they 
create and any fixed creative works that served as inspirations for their new works. The 
author Ronin Ro, for example, in writing about the career of Jack Kirby, suggests that 
Kirby’s comic book art served as source material for the development of George Lucas’ 
Star Wars films: 
Jack himself felt the name Luke Skywalker sounded suspiciously like Mark 
Moonrider from [Kirby comic] The Forever People, and that Lucas’s the Force 
was similar to [Kirby characters] the New Gods’ vague cosmic essence the 
Source. In Star Wars, a kind, gray-haired mentor urged Luke to join a galactic 
battle and returned from the dead, just the way Himon recruited Scott Free in 
Mister Miracle and also overcame death. Like Darkseid, Darth Vader ruled 
Stormtroopers and lived on a planet that had a huge circle carved into its side (like 
the flaming fire pit he’d always drawn on Apokolips). And Darth Vader served 
the Dark Side.66 
 
The preceding excerpt is only a partial sample of the similarities noted by Ro 
between Kirby’s comics and the Star Wars films. Ro also quotes a friend of Kirby’s who 
stated that “Jack didn’t want any money or anything from Lucas, but he wished that 
Lucas had at least admitted where he got most of those ideas.”67 The culture of copyright, 
however, simply does not incentivize or encourage authors to describe their own creative 
output as being derived in whole or in part from prior works. The exception to this, as 
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noted by several interviewed artists as part of this research, include works that are in the 
public domain and may be freely referenced without license.68 However, for works that 
are still under copyright, the framing of that copyright as a property right denies the 
continued resignification of semiotic sign systems as a kind of continuous communicative 
act among all creative parties and audiences. It also encourages individuals to claim 
ownership in expressions of myth and remain silent on the inspirational source of those 
expressions. Ironically, the most prominent exception to this is satire or parody, which 
again are most often used as tools to ridicule or criticize an existing work or person. For 
many authors, then, a discussion of the process of development for a particular creative 
work still under copyright protection is not worth the trouble of accusations that might 
accompany that discussion, and again, the resultant expenditures in time and materials 
that dealing with such accusations entails. As the next section describes, these 
expenditures in time and materials are somewhat offset by technological advances that 
enable greater access to the marketplace. However, legal claims of infringement and the 
framing of copyright as a property right potentially minimize what may be counted as 
legitimate. The conclusion that intellectual property is not property is also contrasted in 
this next section with the development of laws for computer hardware and software that 
more explicitly grant proprietary protections for the manufacturers of such products. 
 
Legal Reactions to Technological Innovation 
As mentioned in the prior section, broad expansions in publishing options enabled 
by advances in technology, foremost among them networked culture and the Internet as a 
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whole, have ensured that the marketplace to sell one’s creative efforts today has lower 
barriers to entry. The most significant of these barriers is merely the digitization of a 
specific token, whether that is a book, film, comic book, etc., into a binary expression of 
data that may then be read by any personal computer. An analog fixed creative work may 
already be infinitely reproducible in theory, but digitizing that work makes the action of 
reproduction a push-button affair that almost entirely negates material costs for copying. 
This easing of technological limitations on literal copying has been met in the law with 
increasingly broad entitlements and intellectual property protections granted to owners of 
valuable copyrights, especially with regard to networked computer hardware and the 
software that it runs. This section will discuss how copyright law has expanded and 
changed as a direct result of innovative technology and technological adaptations, and 
how the categorization of copyright as a property right legally inhibits the ways 
consumers and audiences may interact with the actual – i.e., not intellectual – property 
they own. This is important to the dissertation as a whole for providing another point of 
comparison with regard to semiotic sign systems. Like the fictional characters mentioned 
above, software and other digital code exists as an idea, endlessly reproducible and 
without the intrinsic qualities of real property. However, copyright law continues to 
artificially restrict how these sign systems may be used on the basis that such intellectual 
property remains the property of the copyright owner even after a sale has been made. 
The preceding sentence briefly describes the most significant change in copyright 
law as it relates to new technologies: the grant of continuing proprietary interest for 
copyright owners in the single tokens of a work even after the first sale. This is because 
the legal download of most  programs, files, and other digital tokens most often require 
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users to sign an End User License Agreement (EULA), and such agreements typically 
present language that positions the purchase of software or digital editions of fixed 
creative works as a temporary license, and not a permanent sale. Such agreements stand 
in stark contrast to the essential assumption of the first sale doctrine. As described in the 
literature review,69 this doctrine allows those who purchase a token of a fixed creative 
work to dispose of that token as they wish, including by resale.70 
Court rulings from the last decade have, in some ways, reinforced the first sale 
doctrine, as in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley.71 The Supreme Court ruled in that case that individuals 
may sell or dispose of legitimate physical copies of published works as they wish, even if 
the copy was lawfully printed in a foreign territory. However, in digital marketplaces, the 
first sale doctrine is increasingly limited by rulings regarding the redistribution of digital 
creative works. In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,72 for example, a man was held liable by the 
court for reselling software that he himself had bought second-hand and never installed 
on his own computer, so he had never even agreed to the EULA. The courts have 
essentially empowered companies that sell digital works to determine the legal use of 
software and other files “licensed” to a user. Thus, there is not only an infringement on 
the right of first sale, but the interaction of the user with the software is subject to 
copyright infringement even if there is no duplication of the work in question.  
                                                 
69 See supra notes 107-110, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
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When software companies sue a user for what they determine to be an abnormal 
use, that use might really be a result of the essential step defense. In the language of the 
specific statute, “It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program 
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program 
provided that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program.”73 This is a statutory recognition of the fact that it is 
impossible to create a digital recording in such a way that it does not automatically copy 
itself again, since the recording must at some point “generate an unencrypted stream of 
data that can be interpreted by a sound system or screen.”74 Again, besides the logical 
inconsistency of labeling digital files as real property, since they are not finite, the 
architecture of a personal computer automatically duplicates such “property” as a 
necessary step for access. 
Copyright owners such as software companies are thus empowered to seek an 
injunction if they are dissatisfied with how users interact with their software.75 This was 
demonstrated in the case of George Hotz, an American hacker who gained root access to 
his Sony Playstation 3 video game system and published the results. Sony sued him for 
breach of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act76 and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,77 
both of which have such broad language as to prevent a user from gaining unauthorized 
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access to devices they have purchased.78 The DMCA is ostensibly meant to protect 
copyrights, but it was also a partially reworked piece of legislation meant to control 
access.79 The DMCA thus allowed for an individual to be prosecuted for attempting to 
circumvent any access control on a piece of technology, independent of whether the 
technology controls access to copyrighted materials. In short, Hotz was found in violation 
of contributory copyright infringement for modifying the property he owned, even though 
he did not unlawfully duplicate copyrighted materials. 
The larger issue at play is that although creators do have more platforms and 
publishing options today for distributing fixed creative works, these venues are arguably 
compromised by laws that favor increased regulation of those same platforms and the 
technological means to access them. Again, the philosophical grounding of such laws, 
including the DMCA, is that those in possession of a copyright are exercising a property 
right when they limit how end users and audiences engage with the tokens of software 
and other digital files that they purchase. When combined with the longer terms of 
exclusivity that current copyright law provides for copyright owners, the cultural trend 
overall points toward statutory limitations on access at the same time that network 
technology mechanically disinhibits access to information. In addition, larger existing 
firms that own valuable copyrights continue to lobby Congress for even greater periods 
of exclusivity. As the next section describes, these efforts help to increase the proprietary 
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claims of copyright owners, while continuing to limit the scope of the public domain. 
 
The Role of the Public Domain 
It is notable that every artist interviewed for this dissertation believes that popular 
characters currently owned by corporate entities will remain under the protection of 
copyright and trademark regimes in perpetuity. A typical response from an interviewee 
comes from a writer who states that popular characters currently under copyright are 
unlikely to ever enter the public domain: “[Corporations] have enough control and 
enough money that they’ll change the laws. And they’ve already done it. I know the 
power of these entities. I’ve worked with them, and I don’t see it happening.”80 As shown 
by the prior example of Simon and Kirby’s Captain America, changes in statutes are not 
necessarily the only means for publishers and other corporations to exercise their control 
of popular creative works subject to copyright.81  
It is possible to examine changes in copyright legislation over the last several 
decades and find clear lobbying efforts to retroactively extend copyright terms for 
existing works and otherwise expand protections granted by intellectual property 
regimes. Sometimes, there even appears to be a certain amount of quid pro quo between 
lobbyists and senators who support such changes. Senator Patrick Leahy, who once wrote 
about the necessity of the United States acceding to the Berne Convention as a means to 
“improve its trade balance” vis-à-vis the economic exploitation of copyrightable 
materials,82 has championed copyright expansion for decades. In return, corporations that 
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benefit from such expansion, such as Time Warner, reward Leahy with participation in 
the creation of new fixed creative works: to date, Leahy has appeared in more feature 
films starring Batman than any other actor, including any who have played the role of 
Batman.83 Leahy earns royalties from his appearances, all of which are donated to the 
Kellogg-Hubbard public library in Montpelier.84 Time Warner, the corporation that owns 
the Batman trademark and copyrights on all legitimately published works featuring the 
character, has also donated more to the Democratic Senator from Vermont than to any 
other single politician.85 
These facts suggest how entrenched media firms are able to petition for the 
extension of copyright terms. The facts, however, do not on their own answer the 
question of why these firms continue to expend such effort to lobby for these extensions. 
The understanding of intellectual property as a property right to be protected against theft 
through infringement is a partial explanation. This misunderstanding of the proper role of 
copyright could in turn be used to justify holding creative works under exclusive 
proprietary control in perpetuity. Regardless of the beliefs of those who lobby for the 
laws and the legislators who draft them, unlimited copyright term extensions mean that 
fewer and fewer creative works will continue to reliably enter the public domain. As 
noted by one publisher interviewed for this dissertation, this is further complicated by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Law and Technology 3 (1988): 177-186. 
83 Kevin Collier, “Senator who Wrote Pipa Called Out for Batman Cameos,” The Daily 
Dot, last modified December 11, 2015, https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/patrick-leahy-
pipa-dark-knight-cameo/. 
84 Paul Heintz, “Holy Cash, Batman!” Seven Days, July 11, 2012, accessed August 18, 
2018, https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/holy-cash-batman/Content?oid=2184373. 
85 “Time Warner: All Recipients,” Open Secrets, accessed March 31, 2018. 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/recips.php?id=D000000094&type=P&state=&sort=A
&cycle=2010. 
169 
 
organizations that attempt to falsely claim ownership of public domain works and 
characters through abuse of related intellectual property laws such as trademark.86 
However, if intellectual property as a concept was more broadly understood by all 
involved parties as a grant of temporary exclusivity for copying rather than an underlying 
property right, such false claims would be minimized as creative works would be more 
often presumed as public goods rather than private chattel.  
Corporations also lobby for the extension of copyright terms, even for copyrights 
in less valuable works, because the public domain serves as another source of 
competition. Just as works protected by copyright compete with each other in the market, 
works in the public domain compete with those under copyright, and public domain 
works possess the advantage of lower costs to access. The public domain also has no 
commercial interests of its own. Since commercial and noncommercial material now 
primarily share the common delivery system that is the Internet, a strong public domain 
also has a distinct advantage over copyrighted content that requires additional 
permissions to access, distribute, and transform works. For that reason, many corporate 
owners of valuable copyrights would prefer that no other intellectual works ever enter the 
public domain, and for close to two decades, this has been the case.87 According to 
Lawrence Lessig, “A good Republican might say, here government regulation is simply 
getting in the way of innovation and creativity. And...a good Democrat might say, here 
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the government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason,”88 
emphasizing the political failings of either party on their own ideological grounds.  
The political failings of either party with regard to copyright, in the opinion of 
this researcher, can be traced to the underlying and false assumption that intellectual 
property is property, and so must be protected as such. Fortunately, if the public can 
become better informed on the nature of copyright and intellectual property, it is possible 
for the related laws to be adjusted and refined so as to better champion the progress of all 
the arts, no matter the idiosyncratic nature of their perceived value among disparate 
audiences. Recommendations to accomplish this goal, then, is the subject matter of the 
final section of this chapter and of this dissertation.  
 
A Possible Future of Copyright 
This researcher’s conclusion that intellectual property is not property prioritizes 
the role of the public domain over the temporary grants of copyright provided to authors 
of new fixed works. Despite the inconvenience to individuals or parties who possess the 
monopolies that are valuable copyrights, a free market for creative and intellectual works 
should be the default setting for the iterative process of defining, distributing, and 
refining the culture related to those works. In order to continue to “promote the progress 
of science and the useful arts,”89 as the Constitution permits, those monopolies should be 
granted to authors of new works. However, copyright’s privileges should be temporary 
and not subject to automatic unlimited extension. 
                                                 
88 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock 
Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin, 2006), 177. 
89 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 8. 
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This researcher further argues that copyright protection length should be 
unalterably established at the time a work is created, and not subject to post hoc 
extensions. If a work produced and published in 1960 was initially subject to a maximum 
56-year term of copyright, then the public has every right to expect that work to reliably 
enter the public domain in 2017. As the source of statutory protections on copyright, the 
government must also be the source of reliable information on what works have entered 
the public domain after copyright terms expire. This is in line with the founders’ 
intentions for copyright,90 and is the most effective way to encourage public benefit from 
the dissemination of intellectual and creative expression, which is the primary purpose of 
such monopolies. 
The form and character of such public benefit may not be immediately obvious. 
Clear quality of life improvements accompany advances in intellectual property subject 
to patent law, such as medicines and other life-saving technologies, so that in those 
situations the benefit to the public is evident and monopoly terms thus do not exceed 20 
years. On the other hand, there are no clear direct effects towards the public – either of 
benefit or of harm – that accompany extending copyright terms for fictional creative 
works. However, it is possible that what some individuals position as modern problems 
related to artifacts of popular culture would be ameliorated by shorter copyright terms 
and a greater cultural emphasis on the public domain as final destination for fixed 
creative works. 
To pick one prominent example, the space opera adventure series Star Wars has 
enjoyed a lengthy term of fairly sustained popularity since the initial film’s release in 
                                                 
90 See supra notes 39-43, Chapter 2, and accompanying text. 
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1977. In 2015, Fortune estimated the total value of the franchise at around $42 billion, 
greater than the annual gross domestic product of some small nations.91 However, one 
criticism of the Star Wars franchise that has become more prominent in recent years is 
the lack of representation for individuals with different sexual, racial, and ethnic 
backgrounds than the primarily heterosexual, Caucasian, male cast of the films. Despite 
the numerous repetitions of this argument for greater representation for minority 
groups,92 none frame the issue as a result of the exclusive controlling interest of Disney 
that is enabled by copyright. Indeed, were the copyright in Star Wars to expire, any 
individuals or groups would be free to develop their own derivative or transformative 
interpretations of the work, and could include any amount of diverse elements that they 
so desire.93 This freedom to refine and reinterpret a fixed creative work is the natural state 
of any mediated expression, and copyright remains a temporary suspension of that natural 
state for the purposes of incentivizing initial publication. 
Whatever the hypothetical results of limited copyright terms might be, it is clear 
to this researcher that current norms of copyright provide excessive reward through 
monopolies, such as terms of exclusivity that can extend long past the life of those with 
any genuine moral claim to paternity as the author of a given creative work. If that trend 
                                                 
91 Jonathan Chew, “Star Wars Worth More Than Harry Potter and James Bond, 
Combined,” Fortune, December 24, 2015, accessed July 4, 2018, 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/24/star-wars-value-worth/. 
92 Google offers more than 22,000 results for the search “representation in Star Wars,” 
with headlines including “The Quest for Queer Representation in Star Wars,” “Why Star 
Wars’ Increased Female Representation is Important,” and “Do Minorities Exist in Star 
Wars?”  
93 Coincidentally, had Star Wars been subject to the maximum 28 years of copyright 
protection granted by the initial American federal statute of 1790, the first film in that 
series would have entered the public domain in 2005. This was also the year that series 
creator George Lucas released what would ultimately be his final film contribution to the 
series. 
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continues, private control will totally eclipse social benefit, and limited monopolies will 
exist as absolute monopolies. Enabling such complete proprietary control of interminable 
copyrights to private ownership undermines the stated purpose of all copyright legislation 
– to promote the continued development of science and art for the benefit of society as a 
whole – and diminishes the public’s ability to contribute to aspects of culture they find to 
be personally meaningful. Granted, while there is benefit in incentivizing authors with 
temporary economic monopolies, the words of John Milton may best express the ultimate 
danger of locking down the marketplace of ideas: “Truth and understanding are not such 
wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes, and standards. We must 
not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the Land, to mark and 
license it like our broad cloth, and our woolpacks.”94 Instead, among this dissertation’s 
conclusions is that it is in the best interests of society, economically and intellectually, to 
implement any new copyright legislation with the same foundational sense of purpose 
that was intended by the framers of the Constitution. In that way, individuals may be 
rewarded for their intellectual efforts, but not interminably, and not at the expense of the 
public’s ability to further develop culture through the use of published creative works. If, 
indeed, copyright is to be positioned as a natural right in the same sense that freedom of 
speech is a natural right, then it must be a universal right for all to make copies, and for 
the relevant statutes to make only minor and temporary limitations on that right.   
This is not to say that individuals have no moral or natural claim to the creative 
labor they enact. This researcher is not inured to the moral claims of artists, especially the 
                                                 
94 John Milton, “The New Inquisition,” from the Areopagitica, collected in English Prose 
Vol. II. Sixteenth Century to the Restoration. Henry Craik, ed. (1916) Retrieved from 
http://www.bartleby.com/209/417.html on June 15, 2018. 
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claims that artists make on behalf of themselves. If an artist, for example, directly 
requests that another individual not use a character he or she created in a new derivative 
work – either for reasons of preventing confusion95 or limiting competitive 
interpretations96 – this request certainly has a stronger moral imperative than a third party 
doing the same thing for a character whose original creator passed on decades ago. To 
some artists, the extensive copyright terms that allow the existence of the latter category 
might even serve as evidence for “copyright cartels,”97 organizations that continue to 
petition for greater terms of exclusivity absent a moral justification for such. Ultimately, 
if copyright is going to be perceived – even illogically – as a moral or natural right, it is 
still necessary for an individual to claim that right, but not a third party who is 
disengaged from the creative labor that initially fixed a work. The desire to more fully 
understand and appreciate those moral claims at the level of the individual was at the 
heart of this research, and is the reason interviews were conducted with creators who can 
best express examples of those claims, including writers, editors, graphic sequential and 
illustrative artists, among others. 
In turn, it is the hope of this researcher that those same creative individuals, even 
as they are incentivized to share their original works with the public, understand that the 
act of publication must necessarily disenfranchise them in some way from the ultimate 
control of such works. Perhaps more importantly, the publishers and corporations that 
often initially bring those works to market must understand that their own control of 
those works and the derivative interpretations of such is also limited. No creative work – 
                                                 
95 See supra note 29, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
96 See supra note 32, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
97 See supra note 97, Chapter 4, and accompanying text. 
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or semiotic sign system – is incorruptible, everlasting, or unchanging from its present or 
original form, even as a result of the laws of man. The greatest of myths may endure and 
inspire, but no individual can truly own them, and no singular voice can determine the 
stories that will contribute to a better society. Rather, a commitment to the protection of 
the natural rights of individuals to freely express themselves – even when such 
expressions are unoriginal or derivative – is the greatest guarantee of the iterative 
approach of a finer world. 
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CONSENT FORM  
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The Impact of Copyright Law on Artist Practice 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Joseph Russomanno in the 
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State 
University.  I am conducting a research study to analyze the impact of copyright law and 
norms on artists’ practices.   
I am inviting your participation, which will involve a 20-45 minute interview on this 
subject matter and your professional assessment of it.  You have the right not to answer 
any question, and to stop participation at any time. 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  If you choose not to participate or to 
withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. 
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. Although there is no 
personal financial incentive for participation, benefits of your participation include the 
potential contribution to scholarly knowledge on this subject matter. 
The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications. Your 
name, or identifying demographic characteristics may be used in connection with quotes 
you provide to this researcher. Otherwise, all data collected will remain confidential to 
the extent that only the primary researcher has access to data maintained on secure ASU 
cloud storage. 
I would like to audio record or video record this interview. The interview will not be 
recorded without your permission. Please let me know if you do not want the interview to 
be recorded; you also can change your mind after the interview starts, just let me know. 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at: (Evan Billingsley, ebbillin@asu.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU 
Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you 
wish to be part of the study. 
By signing below you are agreeing to be part of the study. 
Name:   
Signature:       Date: 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
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● IQ1. What incentives currently exist for you as an artist or author that would 
not exist in the absence of formal copyright law? 
● IQ2. How would your practice be changed by the absence of formal copyright 
law? 
● IQ3. In what ways may a derivative work be said to be an infringement of 
another’s copyright, and how would those ways differ, legally and culturally, 
with the absence of formal copyright law?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
